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1 BACKGROUND  
This chapter considers existing power systems and presents a promising solution 
for them (IEC 61850 standard) by highlighting the initial publication review as a 
background for my research. It considers how existing power systems operate 
and future demands, with a view to discovering and highlighting the bottleneck of 
existing power systems, and whether the available solutions associated with their 
implementation challenges are suitable to upgrade, retrofit or migrate to these 
new solutions, which eliminate existing power systems’ limitations. Challenges 
that might prevent the implementation of the new solution are specified and set-
tled via experimental verification, which is presented in detail in the rest of this 
thesis.              
1.1 Introduction 
Recently, utilities have witnessed a strong trend towards new standards and tech-
nologies, fundamentally transforming their capabilities and bringing a new solu-
tion that supports and meets their existing and future demands. However, exist-
ing power systems’ automation and protection have traditionally used proprie-
tary manufacturer-specific communication protocols carried over other protocols 
for various applications. According to these infrastructure interfaces among pow-
er system nodes, intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) from various manufacturers 
may require huge investment based on developing a costly and complicated pro-
tocol convertor. Consequently, conditional power quality supply has been high-
lighted in recent years, and new laws, taxes and deregulation have been issued  
for instance, in Finland penalties have been regulated for non-delivered energy, 
while Sweden has issued a new law such that no interruptions longer than 24 
hours are allowed after the year 2011 (Brändström & Lord 2009). Therefore, one 
of the most dominant considerations of current and future power system design 
comprise the standardization solution, product-featuring, smooth integration 
and a higher degree of adaptability, such that it may be used to revolutionize 
power systems’ operation, improving reliability as well as maintenance, and re-
ducing the installation time and effort. In order to address these issues, in 2003, 
the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee 
(TC)-57 has published the IEC 61850 standard, entitled “Communication Net-
works and Systems in Substation” (IEC 61850 standard), which is defended as a 
common inter-national standard and one of the most promising powerful solu-
tions to existing power industry limitations, and which is expected to support 
power systems’ evolution. As far as the IEC 61850 standard is concerned, it is a 
promising solution to existing power systems’ limitations; however, various as-
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pects are not specified within the IEC 61850 standard and are left for end-use for 
instance, the highly reliable substation automation system (SAS) communica-
tions bus topology, types of redundancy, etc. Moreover, researchers and develop-
ers have noted that the open nature of the IEC 61850 standard gives broad free-
dom for manufacturers to operate with. Further, the interpretations of the IEC 
61850 standard from different manufacturers remain different based upon the 
ambiguity that still exists. These issues may vary the interoperation of the stand-
ard from one manufacturer to another and may increase the complexity of the 
interoperability tasks within the SAS. In addition, many of the available automa-
tion and protection functions are grounded upon the emerging concept of a smart 
grid (SG) based on the IEC 61850 standard are whether need to be developed, or 
initially invented in which that softly amendment solutions are no more feasible.  
This is because several principles of conventional power systems, such as the ra-
dial topology, passive nodes, one-way power flow, etc., are not maintained any-
more. Therefore, further discussion and testing works need to be processed, and 
revolutionary energy system infrastructure changes might need to be based upon 
the IEC 61850 standard in order to meet end users’ requirements and prove the 
feasibility of the IEC 61850 standard (i.e., that it possesses high-energy system 
reliability and is fault-tolerant).       
Meanwhile, the global acceptance of the IEC 61850 standard has raised its profile 
as an interesting area of research, from both the academic- and the industry-side. 
This wide acceptance has stimulated researchers and developers to go further to-
wards plug-and-play-based IEC 61850 implementations within SAS and beyond 
to an SG. For coping with these demands, various research groups and pilot pro-
jects have been carried out globally - for instance, the University of Vaasa has set-
up an in-house research and testing laboratory, the Development of Education 
Services of IEC 61850 in a Multi-Vendor Environment (DEMVE). All my re-
search activities have taken place under the umbrella of two projects, namely 
DEMVE I and DEMVE II. These projects raise the vision and the spirit  of the IEC 
61850 standard based on sharing data among various manufacturers’ intelligent 
electronic devices (IEDs) and executes the information that has been shared by 
this data (i.e., interoperability). Interoperability is one of the main concerns re-
garding the IEC 61850 standard. Moreover, it has also been considered as the 
major challenge faced by SAS design engineers in establishing seamless commu-
nication among various manufacturers’ IEDs. However, initially, substation au-
tomation and protection was the main focus of the IEC 61850 standard’s first 
version. The key point is that it provides a uniform framework for all the related 
system levels. IEC 61850 takes into consideration all the various aspects that are 
common at the substation site, such as data models, communication solutions, 
engineering and conformity testing. The legacy protocols concentrate on how the 
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data is transmitted on the channel. Meanwhile, it organizes the data - in terms of 
applications - by means of syntax and semantics in the devices where they do not 
specify it. The main aspect that IEC 61850 adopts based on its architectural con-
struct is “abstracting” the data object’s definition and services. Independently of 
any underlying protocol, it creates data objects and services that support a com-
prehensive set of substation functions and it provides strong services to facilitate 
substation communication. The abstract definitions of the data object allow its 
mapping to any protocol that can meet the best data and service requirements, as 
IEC 61850 does not specify any protocol. IEC 61850 specifications focus on three 
major issues, namely standardizing the available information, services (write, 
read, etc.) and communication services. Further, the IEC 61850 standard in Part 
8 and Part 9 (IEC 61850-8; IEC 61850-9) specifies Ethernet communication 
technology based on the open system interconnection (OSI) model for the station 
and the process level within the SAS. Ethernet technology has been defined as an 
appropriate communication solution for power automation usage based on its 
high flexibility, bandwidth and speed.  
This thesis provides guidelines and facilitates the design and implementation of 
the IEC 61850 standard within an SAS. It first considers the relatively new IEC 
61850 standard from different perspectives. An explorative study and analysis of 
the IEC 61850 standard and the legacy power system are conducted which 
demonstrate the impact of the IEC 61850 standard on the legacy power system’s 
infrastructure, such that it might not meet the requirements imposed by electrici-
ty utilities’ deregulation. Furthermore, various reliability and availability analyses 
have been carried out on different SAS communications bus topologies. Secondly, 
several practical testing experiments for the SAS based on the IEC 61850 stand-
ard are designed, constructed and carried out. These practical testing experi-
ments are implemented to evaluate and prove the feasibility of the IEC 61850 
standard as a promising solution for the communications system within the en-
ergy system. Lastly, a favorable communication solution based on a new commu-
nication technology, cognitive radio (CR), for a future SG is proposed. Strong 
practical experience was gained through the SAS configuration process, several 
contributions were made based upon these analyses and some future work issues 
were identified (more details about these contributions are presented in Section 
1.6).           
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1.2 Power System New Opportunities for Protection  
and Automation                             
Growing world economies and populations are expected to increase electrical 
energy consumption two-fold by 2050, and according to the International Energy 
Agency study climate change is the gravest global challenge facing energy utilities 
(VTT 2009). Energy systems produce energy services for society’s needs. An en-
ergy system can be seen as a complex of many interlinked units or chains. Typ-
ically, the chains are composed of elements (e.g., power generation, a substation, 
conversion, transmission, etc.). Meanwhile, protection and automation in power 
systems are two of the main infrastructures supporting the reliability and flexibil-
ity of electrical grids that link power generation units with power consumptions 
in a dynamic manner. Energy systems, based on a growing and changing market, 
have been forced to retrofit and update legacy energy systems. Utilities now look 
at methods for efficient utilization that incentivize power quality improvements, 
permitting higher profits by increasing interest in state-of-the-art solutions that 
decrease outage costs. This is the case where the capacity for controlling energy 
flows from source to consumers and the stability and maintainability of the ener-
gy grid are the main concern, whether or not the solutions are based on conven-
tional methods or new technologies.    
A few years ago, managing the energy system’s infrastructure was the main focus 
and it occupied the attention of utilities. The objective of conventional power sys-
tem control is to maintain system stability. In order to achieve this goal, it may 
require conventional actuators (e.g., an automatic voltage regulator (AVR), power 
system stabilizers (PSSs) and a flexible alternating current transmission system 
(FACTS). These instruments have to be considered within the control algorithm, 
which is based on a single, independent control loop. The outputs of these algo-
rithms are then used as a combination of advanced controlling techniques’ solu-
tions as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Traditional control of EPS single independent local control loops. 
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G
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This incomplete vision has changed given the concept that two infrastructures 
must be managed, along with the energy system infrastructure and the commu-
nication information system infrastructure (Korba et al. 2005). Existing SAS 
communication and information systems are mainly designed according to the 
electricity production and consumption infrastructure which existed several dec-
ades ago, and they lack coordination among various operational entities. These 
entities are introduced into the energy grid by an incoming burst of distributed 
renewable energy resources (an SG).  
The emerging concept of an SG has set completely new requirements for energy 
systems. Distributed production requires distributed automation, which in turn 
requires advanced communication solutions to operate reliably. Communications 
networks within energy systems enables a new kind of solution that provides in-
telligent performance. This intelligence has been introduced by means of ex-
changing real-time information, whereby different active nodes are linked with a 
bidirectional communications network system. Today, communication technolo-
gy offers the possibility of opening the circuit breaker far from detected devia-
tions. These abilities open the door to remote or wide-area monitoring and con-
trol (WAMC) platforms and central management services that pre-process the 
aggregated information throughout the entire power system. Furthermore, they 
permit the sharing of information between different utilities, which allows for a 
real-time view of the entire energy grid (Kezunovic 2007).  
As such, the future trends in terms of energy system protection and automation 
are to mi-grate from a local measurements supervisory control and data acquisi-
tion (SCADA)-based approach to a dynamic measurement system. To realize 
such a system, synchronized phasor measurement units will be implementing 
together with the stability assessment and stabilization algorithms. Phenomena 
such as frequency deviation, thermal line overheating, circuit breaker status, 
voltage in-stability, etc., will be dynamically monitored and shared among the 
energy system nodes. Furthermore, power system stability can be characterized 
in real-time and the protection solution setting can be selected from the available 
entities based on learning. The WAMC power system is shown in Figure 2 
(Tholomier & Jones 2010) (Korba etc. 2005) (Selim etc 2012).   
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Figure 2. Future trend in protection and automation of EPS  
1.2.1 Power System Model 
For over a century, synchronous machines have been used by electricity power 
systems to generate electricity. However, recently, renewable-energy sources 
such as wind and solar power have begun to expand at increasing pace. Power 
systems have one or more sources of power (generators). Traditional generators 
are rotating machines which, in a steady state, rotate at 50-60 Hz or else at a syn-
chronous speed. However, not all AC power systems are always in a steady state 
and they may exhibit defects such as harmonic distortion, sags, swells, etc., or 
else they may the power system tray may try to correct the imbalances between 
generation and loads so as to stay close to a synchronous speed, i.e., in synchro-
nism  (Rasmussen 2003). In some cases generator machines deviating from the 
ideal behaviour may become unstable. The main reasons for deviation are as fol-
lows:, 
1. Network configuration variation, whereby there are alternating opera-
tions of the distribution network between closing and opening based on 
local needs or protection system’s operation (local events). 
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3. Physical unsymmetrical faults, individual fault in part of the system, for 
instance in the lines, the transformer, a single phase load or a short circuit 
in a single phase. 
4. Nonlinearities of the electrical equipment, upon the fact, the instantane-
ous values of voltage, current, magnetic fluxes etc. 
Obviously, losing synchronization is not desirable. However, large disturbances 
do happen, even if infrequently (Devos & Rowbotham 2001) (Saccomanno 2003). 
The dynamics of a rotating machine can be modelled in a manner that, in case of 
the load, increases. The machines will require more accelerating power, Pa, 
which is the difference between the mechanical power, Pm, and electrical power, 
Pe, to rotate at synchronous speed, as follows, 
(1.1)                              𝑀𝜔 ́ + 𝐷?́? = 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃 
where δ represents the deviation of the shaft’s rotational angle from synchro-
nous, ω = δ’ is the deviation from synchronous speed, M is the rotation inertia 
and D is the damping. Pm is controlled by the manufacturer while Pe is the real 
electrical power which is injected into the transmission network and which 
transmits power from the generator to the distribution feeder. The modelling of 
this transmission network can be done as a standard mesh circuit as follows, 
(1.2)                I = Y . V 
where I is the injected current, Y is the conductance and V is the single phase 
voltage based on the frequent assumption that the three phases are balanced. 
Therefore, only a single phase is required to be modelled. For electricity power 
transition, injection is a more interesting term than the I current injection, given 
that the main consideration is the transition of the electrical power from the gen-
erators to the consumer. Thus, the transmission network can be modelled as, 
(1.3)             S = g (V) 
where S is the power injected into the node voltage and g indicates the nonlinear 
functions that relate power injections to the node voltages. Finally, the power sys-
tem has to be modelled in such a way that provides immunities to credible dis-
turbances and avoids outages (Bose 2003).  
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1.2.2 Structure of Energy System 
An energy system in the most general terms comprises a generation station, a 
high voltage medium and low voltage power networks (the grid). Based on the 
concept of distributed generation and the location of the renewable power 
sources - which are constructed far away from the consumption area - the greater 
the need for extensive and reliable transmission networks. A transmission net-
work consists of a power line, a control centre and substations. The substations 
are the most crucial nodes in the transmission and distribution networks, and the 
first version of IEC 61850 concentrated on substation automation. Electricity 
utilities’ deregulation as regards power generation, transmission and distribution 
in each country has com-promised many different companies involved in it. In 
order to perform their func-tions and provide secure, stable and reliable power 
services, all power stations, substations, power lines and related control centers 
are interconnected, forming an electrical energy grid. In the past, this intercon-
nection was poorly formed. How-ever, based on future electricity demands, this 
interconnection must now become stronger and rise to a national level, forming a 
national energy grid with an asso-ciated reliable communications system network 
(EWICS 2006). 
Electrical energy trading businesses have increasingly tended to build up strong 
synchronous connections between separate electrical energy systems. Here, the 
observation may be made that the power consumed no longer needs to be gener-
ated locally. Consequently, a greater quantity of electrical power now is trans-
ported over the transmission network over longer distances as a part of the ener-
gy trading business. The energy-related policy of the European Union has opened 
the door to a competitive electricity market by building trans-European networks 
so as to provide a highly secure and stable power supply. For instance, the Nordic 
energy system comprises the grids of Finland, Sweden, Norway and Eastern 
Denmark, Table 1. In addition, there is an internal HVDC between southern Fin-
land and southern Sweden, various HVDC connections between the Nordic pow-
er system and the Eastern and Western European and Russian grids. The weak 
point of the Nordic power system is the ageing of the transmission lines, which 
have turned into a major risk as regards undesirable power flows and oscillation, 
the occurrence of which has increased significantly (Turunen 2008, 2011).    
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Table 1. Interconnection from Finland to the Nordic energy system and neigh-
bors 
To Sweden Two 400 kV AC lines 
One 220 kV AC lines 
One 400 kV DC cable 
To Norway One 220 kV AC line 
To Rus-
sia(asynchronous) 
Back-to-back HVDC of 1400MW 
One 400kV and two 110 kV radial AC lines to power 
plants 
To Estonia (asynchro-
nous) 
HVDC light of 350 MW 
1.2.3 Legacy Communication System Infrastructure 
Existing communication and information system infrastructures for energy grids 
lack coordination among various operational entities. This infrastructure had 
been designed based upon the needs of traditional energy systems, whereby vari-
ous subsystems are separated and data and information sharing is limited, which 
is usually the case with slow or else delayed restoration. Further, it has been 
highly focused on vertical communications between a control centre and individ-
ual sub-system for local and remote monitoring and data acquisition (Gopala-
krishnan & Thomas; Xie et al. 2002).  
A simple star network topology - hardwired point-to-point - in which SCADA are 
used today, carries a status such as “switch open” or “switch close” and com-
mands, bidirectional between the control centre and poll substation remote ter-
minal unit (RTU).  Figure 3 illustrates the traditional energy grid. Consequently, 
this communication structure, given the concepts of distributed power generation 
sources and grid-wide phenomena, has a limited ability to cope with. This is par-
ticularly important in a deregulated environment where the huge amount of in-
formation generated from distributed renewable generation resources needs to 
be shared for the protection and automation functions.  
Sharing information will increase the opportunities to limit spread of disturb-
ances throughout the energy gird, which becomes more vulnerable to the phe-
nomenon of cascading. In order to overcome these drawbacks, special protection 
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schemes have been developed. Several monitoring and measurement technolo-
gies have been implemented with the continuing development of IEDs.  
Communications systems network media play a critical role within the energy 
grid infrastructure. In the present case, Ethernet technology has been considered 
as a simpler means to transfer data, and the widespread adoption of it as a faster, 
less expansive and better standardization effort - as brought by the IEC 61850 
communication protocol - has seen a marked improvement in interoperability 
scenarios (PULSECOM 2010). 
 
 
Figure 3. Traditional energy system communication network. 
1.2.4 An Open System Interconnection Model 
The OSI model was developed by the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (IOS). In the late 1970s, the OSI model was first presented as a set of proto-
cols that covered all aspects of network communications. The OSI model pro-
vides for open networking environments that allow various manufacturers’ sys-
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tems to communicate regardless of their underlying structure. Nowadays, differ-
ent network technologies are in use, exhibiting beneficial operational under-
standing and a strong ability to integrate different communications systems with 
each other. In truth, facilitating communications without requiring changes to 
the logic of the underlying hardware and software is the reason for the high de-
gree of acceptance of the OSI model in several technologies (Stalling 2007). 
The layered framework is an OSI model, being the most basic form that divides 
the system architecture into seven hierarchical layers that became the standard 
for most communications systems’ architectures. The seven layers of the OSI 
model are separated but are highly interconnected. Each layer provides a subset 
of functions related to its operations and needs to communicate with other sys-
tems. Within a single system, each layer performs services for the upper layer and 
implements services performed by the lower layer. 
The OSI model provides for the idea of dividing the communications process into 
separated layers within the telecommunications network. Each layer adds a spe-
cific segment of data that is related to its functions. Consequently, in a given mes-
sage, there is no direct connection between peer layers. However, the physical 
layer deals with the physical aspect of carrying the data that flows down from the 
application layer through each layer at the sending ends to the receiving ends, 
where the data flows up through each layer to the application layer. In addition, 
direct connections are not the only way that is specified by the OSI model; for 
instance, connection links can be established through a packet switch or a circuit 
switch. Figure 4 illustrates the OSI architecture and provides a summary of each 
layer’s functions. 
 
Figure 4. Open system architecture and summary of the layers functions 
Communications technologies comprise a broad and dynamic field that has 
evolved and is growing rapidly. The strong evolution of communications technol-
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ogy can be integrated into the power industry. Therefore, the data services and 
applications of the power system substations based on IEC 61850 are built over 
the standard OSI model’s seven layers in order to accomplish interoperability and 
to become future proofed, which is the basic requirement for any standardization 
process (Sidhu & Gangadharan 2005) (Bose 2003).  
1.2.5 Substation Communication Protocols 
 Conceptual frame work based communications among systems are provided by a 
network communication model. However, a specific communication method 
does not. Network communication protocols are defined as the actual communi-
cation based on a formal set of rules that enable to computing systems under-
stand, accept and talk to each other. A short introduction to some of the substa-
tion communication protocols will be presented so as to better understand the 
need for a new global standard. 
1. Modbus 
Modbus is a protocol that represents the common defined language that has been 
implemented by Modicon devices in order to link between each other and other 
devices through different types of communications networks. The first appear-
ance was in 1979, for use in a programmable logical controller. It can be consid-
ered to be the first industrial open-file bus that a developer could implement with 
its products without limitations. Now, it is one of the de facto standards used for 
connecting industrial electronics devices. Client/Server communication services 
include the Modbus communications schema, which is provided by an applica-
tion layer protocol. Therefore, the standard Modbus system may consist of up to 
247 servers and one client. It is simple and easy to understand and implement. 
How-ever, its simplicity given the data model that has been used by Modbus can-
not support complex object structures, nor can various automation functions be 
executed by different types of substation devices. These issues are the main draw-
back of its implementation and have forced manufacturers to define their own 
functions, leading to a reduction in operability and compatibility among multi-
vendor products (Rev 1996).  
 
2. DNP3 Distributed Network  Protocol  
The DNP3 protocol was developed by Westronic Inc. between 1992 and 1994. It 
was designed to achieve open, standard-based interoperability between substa-
tion devices such as computers, IEDs and central stations. DNP3 is built based on 
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the IEC 60870 standard. Its partially completed protocol specifications have been 
used to provide a more easily implementable protocol that supports newer func-
tions within centralized SCADA systems. DNP3 was specifically created for North 
American requirements and was widely carried out by typical electrical utilities. 
Such utilities may have a centralized operations centre for monitoring and con-
trolling all devices within the energy system. One of the mean drawbacks that 
limits using the DNP3 protocol in modern substations is its processing latency. 
Extra time is required when a transport layer breaks long messages into smaller 
frames, or when reassembling frames based on longer messages. Further, the 
time that is required for receiving confirmation messages, or the time spent wait-
ing for multiple retries when retries are configured, is unacceptable (Curtis 2005) 
(Fieldsever Technology).   
3. IEC 61850 
IEC 61850 is a relatively new international standard, which has been developed 
to define the communication infrastructure within the substation for the first 
version, and has been extended to support the protection and automation for the 
energy system within the second version. The IEC 61850 standards have been 
expected to provide and ensure seamless communication as well as integration 
between IEDs from various manufacturers into a hierarchical level. The rest of 
this chapter explores the standards in details.  
1.2.6 Substations Topologies 
Energy systems have to be adapted according to needs. It has become necessary 
to transmit power for longer distances at higher voltages. Direct high voltage 
from a power plant cannot be used in homes or by businesses. In such systems, 
various types of substations are implemented to adapt the distributed voltages. 
Further, they are used to split the flow of electrical power among the outgoing 
lines based on their topologies, which makes the electrical power usable for end 
users. Therefore, substations can be classified based on their size and functions 
(ABB 2012).  
Typically, transmission and distribution comprise the two types of substation. A 
transmission substation is usually supplied with a transmission-level feeder (100 
kV and higher) which can connect two or more transmission lines that allow a 
single source of electrical power to be split into more outputs. In the simple case, 
all transmission lines are of the same voltages. In another case, it may have a 
transformer to step up or step down voltages based upon needs.  
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The size of a transmission substation ranges from small (which may consist of a 
bus plus some circuit breakers) or large (consisting of multiple voltage bus levels, 
many circuit breakers and an enormous amount of monitoring protection and 
numerous control devices). In this case, it may require a redundant communica-
tion link among the transmission substation devices, as well as between trans-
mission substations and a control centre, to increase reliability. Figure 5 illus-
trates the two types of transmission substations (Shoemarker & Mack 2002). 
 
 
Figure 5. Small transmission substations. 
Once the electric power reached its distention, the distribution substation is used 
to step down the transmitted voltage to lower level and to split the electric power 
in order to be shared by the end users. The ranges of the distribution substation 
voltages are between 3.4 kV- 33 kV depending on the size and coverage area 
served by the local utility. Figure 6 illustrates two types of the distribution sub-
stations (IEC 61850-1 2003). 
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Figure 6. Small distribution substation. 
1.2.7 Substation Monitoring and Control 
Monitoring and control are the key features of an SAS allowing electrical utilities 
to coordinate any disturbance devices installed in the substation remotely. Differ-
ent types of devices are utilized within the SAS. These devices are integrated into 
a functional group based on their communication scheme for the purpose of 
moni-toring and control. SASs seen rapid evolution in the last two decades. The 
main factors in this evolution have been considered based on, firstly, the devel-
opment of high-speed microprocessor-based IEDs implementing digital technol-
ogy and its massive usage - for instance, protective relays, meters, programmable 
logical controller PLCs, transducers and other devices that can be dedicated to 
specific functions in an SAS. Secondly, the vast amount of data and information 
provided by IEDs, which encourages researchers towards significant develop-
ments in communications systems based on the agreed and accepted usage of 
communications standards and protocols. This allows for the use of equipment 
from the various manufacturers. Thirdly, the merging of the objective of a shar-
ing data be-tween various devices inside SASs as well as outside them to limit 
cascade phenomenon based energy system failure. Different types of the moni-
toring and control schemes have been implemented within SASs; however, they 
are outside the scope of this study. Figure 7 illustrates the conventional substa-
tion architecture where the centralizing scheme simplifies an SAS based upon the 
fact that all the interfaces are centered around the SCADA RTU. According to this 
classification, substation architectures can be divided into three hierarchical lev-
els. A substation’s primary equipment, such as circuit breakers, power trans-
20 kV
D1-1 D1-2
Circuit 
Breaker
Switch
34,5 kV
13,8 kV
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formers, switch-gears, etc., and their link elements, such as instrument CTs, VT 
transformers, circuit breakers, etc., represent the level zero process level (Mes-
maeker etc. 2005) (Prasoon etc. 2009). 
 
Figure 7. Conventional substation architecture. 
Consequently, automation, control and protection can be considered according to 
two levels. Level 1, which represents the bay-level devices such as IEDs, protec-
tion, measuring, PLCs, QoS, etc., is directly connected to devices at the process 
level. Level 2 corresponds to the human machine interface (HMI) and the control 
centre, which is interfaced digitally with the bay-level devices. Based on this lev-
el, all the substation functions, such as local operation, macro commands, cen-
tral-ized automatic functions and incident recording, are performed. Further, for 
HMI with the SCADA center and with the managing engineering center of the 
utility, bay devices at this level may be represented as Level 3 (Amantegui et al. 
2005). Interfaces inside and between substation levels are created by the com-
munications system in which it plays the key role in exchanging information and 
functions, and so it can be considered as the glue that binds the substation levels 
together. All systems’ performance, reliability, speed and supported functions can 
be determined and defined by its communications networks. Serial, asynchro-
nous communications and legacy protocols are the existing solutions that are 
being used today and which require upgrades or retrofits (UIS 2007).   
1.2.8  New SAS Technologies           
With today’s rapid developments, technologies essentially share significant as-
pects such as faster speeds (computers), Broadband (communications) and better 
electronic power control (FACTS). These developed technologies bring a combi-
nation of multidisciplinary skills and experiences that have driven the substation 
 
Process level
Bay level
Station level
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automation project to meet the diverse needs of today’s utilities. Here, we briefly 
outline several modern technologies that may be used in new substation design. 
1.2.8.1 Intelligent Electronic Devices 
An IED is a single device that can perform functions such as protection, control, 
metering and sending/receiving data to/from an external device, resulting in 
more compact designs with reduced wiring and high reliability. The associated 
enhanced microprocessor and modern communications technologies with the 
new IEDs have increased the capabilities for remote/local control and data acqui-
sition for use in network analysis. Further, different IEDs raise the possibility of 
integrate between one another so that they can function together and share in-
formation locally as well as beyond the gate with other systems. One of the main 
key features is that they are programmable, i.e., the embedded function can be 
changed or updated by downloading a new software version when available so as 
to take advantage of new functionality. Figure 8 illustrates the functions that 
have been merged with the new IEDs (Hor & Crossley 2005).    
 
Figure 8. IED merging functions.                       
1.2.8.2 Communication Media 
Utilities have acquired numerous communication media options that have been 
implemented in modern energy system grids, such as microwave transmission, 
fibre optics, spread-spectrum techniques, wireless radio and various high-speed 
process buses. Each utility has always had a proprietary communications system 
which is used to connect various subsystems. The utilities have been considered 
as among the largest users of data and real-time information based on shifting 
their focus to client services. This scheme requires delivering the specific data to 
Server
HMI
satalite
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the selected client within the assigned period of time, requiring data communica-
tion over the extended communications network. The main focal point for the 
communications network is comprised by the merging requirements, raising is-
sues for various types of proprietary subsystems’ communication solutions as 
regards a hybrid SG (Kezunovic 2010). A hybrid communications network has 
been adopted in the new SAS, merging a modern process bus with high-speed 
fibre optic technology. Broadly, the fibre optic medium is replacing copper wire 
since it is suitable in the substation environment and it has been recognized as a 
backbone for many network systems. There are two options for fibre optics that 
might be chosen. First, there is a single mode, which has one source laser-
generated light with a core diameter of less than a tenth of the wavelength of the 
propagating light and which can be implemented in the case of long-distance 
transmission up to 3,000 m. Second, there is a double mode with a relatively 
larger core and generated light from multiple streams and which can be imple-
mented for medium or short distances. Several benefits can be realized by using 
fibre optics, as it supports long-distance communications with less loss, a high 
data rate, a high bandwidth, smaller sizes, lighter weights and strong immunity 
to electromagnetic interference (Kezunovic 2007). 
1.2.8.3 Synchronized Sampling 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) had been integrated in the utilities industry 
to provide a reference time signal. The reference time signal provided by the GPS 
system is very important for signal processing analysis - for instance, in order to 
correlate the disturbance event reports received from a single IED, and when in-
tegrating data from different IEDs in different locations. Further, it exhibits a 
high degree of synchronization with universal coordinated time (UCT) with an 
accuracy of up to 1 µs, which in turn can be received over a wide area such as that 
covered by a power system network through a GPS receiver. The purpose of uti-
lizing this technology is to carry out a synchronized sampling clock within the 
input data acquisition system in IEDs and to provide a time tag to the data polled 
by IEDs. Consequently, modern substation operations based on protection and 
automation functions may require synchronization for a successful implementa-
tion, for instance the digital current differential protection function (Kezunovic 
2007). 
1.2.9 Upgrade Migrate and Retrofit 
In Finland, many regional substations are ageing as the average age is more than 
40 years old - for instance, the substation in Vöyri has a static relay technology 
for protection and control SPAJ 3A5 J3, SPAA 3A5 J40 and a switchgear system 
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manufactured by Strömberg (now merged with ABB) from the 1980s. Utilities try 
to extend the lifetimes of aged substations by maintenance scheduling and repair 
strategies. The system’s maintenance and services costs are going up every year 
given the obsolescence of substations’ secondary devices and the complexity of 
software (which affects the system’s reliability negatively). These issues have 
forced utilities to retrofit the existing legacy SAS (Beaupre et al. 2000; ABB 
2008). Another crucial issue facing utilities for upgrading ageing energy system 
units is that the lifecycle of the secondary devices is half that of the primary appa-
ratus. In industrialized countries, such a retrofit scenario is quite common (for 
instance, the Vöyri substation retrofit project). Utilities have realized that auto-
mation based on state-of-the-art secondary devices, as well as the global standard 
IEC 61850, has proven to be a good approach to extending the lifecycle of substa-
tions and their primary apparatus. Further, by using this step-by-step approach, 
they can ensure that they minimize investment costs in addition to serving the 
needs of the next 10-15 years as regional electrical power demand steadily in-
creases (ABB 2010; Lenzin 2011). Optimizing substation operations within a de-
veloped and competitive environment forces utilities to initiate the need to estab-
lish continuity of services during any transition. Outages should be minimal and 
only used where there is no other option - for instance, in the Vöyri substation, 
and based on the concept of reducing outages, an auxiliary bus bar for contingen-
cy and maintenance has been utilized, while a backup generator assesses when 
the full load is ready to operate and whether an interruption has occurred to the 
incoming power supply. As regards upgrading all legacies’ secondary devices and 
migrating the SAS to the IEC 61850 standard with a fully factory-tested solution, 
bay-by-bay might not be a big challenge as built from scratch. A retrofit project is 
more challenging by its nature, it requires that legacy devices and new IEDs must 
be compatible and operate smoothly. Due to these challenges, the sub-station 
retrofit project can be characterized based on two cases. In the first case, with the 
extensive use of IEDs, utilities have been worried based on that they could not 
specify what was necessary, since the new standard IEC 61850 does not stand-
ardize functions. Further, the principle task of specification raises concerns that 
certain requirements will be met besides whether the maximum possible benefits 
are ensured based on use. Therefore, the main question arises as to what must be 
changed, since the boundary is the existing substation automation system’s re-
quirements, which need extensive knowledge as regards the existing substation’s 
automation and future demands in addition to hands-on training and clear oper-
ational instructions. This results in specifying the needed functions based on ei-
ther a functional point of view only or by referring to some dedicated existing 
devices, meaning control, protection and monitoring units. The available func-
tionality based on the new standard needs to be covered and it may require one 
or else multiple IEDs.  
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The IEDs in the substation can be divided based on the above concept into two 
groups: 1) performing data acquisition and processing, which are installed 
through the control house, such as protective relays, and 2) mounting and col-
lecting the data from the primary apparatus, which is called the ‘switchyard mon-
itoring’ of devices, and installing them afterwards onto the primary apparatus. 
The system is established by enabling the interconnection of various advanced 
IEDs and processing the incoming data from these IEDs at both the substation 
and the control centre. Utilities have new opportunities in terms of interoperabil-
ity and interchangeability that have been achieved based on new standard ad-
vantages, enabling utilities to select IEDs that best fit their needs. The result is 
that utilities do not have to worry about compatibility, even when they select 
IEDs chosen from multiple vendors or versions, since the new SAS standard en-
sures this (Janssen & Brand 2010; Kezunovic et al. 2010). Consequently, utilities 
have to initiate their selection process criteria - for instance, if the selection had 
been made based upon the evaluation of the data that is provided by the vendor 
manuals. Taking a decision by means of what are the most strongly related per-
formance characteristics might be a hard task, but it might also be necessary to 
develop tools to measure this data. Therefore, the criteria for the selection pro-
cess must be initiated up to the task, requiring the utilities-side to provide appro-
priate tools and methodologies for evaluating the design of the new SAS. As a 
result, the requirements for retrofit projects based on the first case solution can 
be encapsulated as, 
 
1. Considering all operational parameters, maintenance and asset man-
agement requirements based on analyzing and consulting to achieve 
the optimal specification for a cost-effective solution.   
   
2. Providing integrator engineers, for whom the main role is to imple-
ment all the substation devices (existing and new IEDs) as one inte-
grated system by using appropriate tools which enable users and de-
vices to share data.  
 
3. Coordinating between all the groups involved throughout the project 
to ensure the most efficient and timely project management imple-
mentations.   
 
4. Creating laboratory setup with modelling and simulating capabilities 
to provide IED evaluations before implementation so as to achieve ful-
ly tested solutions that are future-proof and ready for implementa-
tion. 
 
5. Hands-on-training and education to facilitate the transitions from the 
legacy system to modern IEC 61850 in order to ensure optimal im-
plementation and usage for added and extended functions.   
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In the second case, consideration had been given to the extreme implementation 
of fibre optics cables within the updating task of the legacy substation. Clearly, in 
legacy substations’ cables, damage is often caused by rodents, since substations 
might be established in rural areas. Another crucial issue is the weight of copper 
wire, which is high, especially in larger substations that use longer cables to con-
nect all their subsystems. Further, the environmental challenges due to imple-
menting copper wires, such as high voltages, relatively high resistance, extreme 
temperatures, current faults and harsh environments. Therefore, the most viable 
option in the case of upgrading or maintenance (damaged copper cable) and in 
order to overcome all these limitations is fibre optic, which has many advantages 
as mentioned earlier. 
1.2.10 Towards a  Smart Grid 
An SG is a common objective for a variety of types of development, since today’s 
grids are heavily based on a hierarchical architecture with a unidirectional top-
down power flow that was built between the 1970s and the 1980s. Energy grid 
operating methods have not changed, even though demand has increased drama-
ti-cally over time, mostly due to environmental and economic concerns. As re-
gards a SG, this can be defined as an upgrade in the electrical grid’s transmission, 
with distribution networks that link power generation units and power consump-
tion in a dynamic manner, and which attempts to operate intelligently based on 
their be-haviour and actions. On the other hand, the broad expectation for the 
future of a SG has led the European Commission to realize and set its policy to 
move to-wards a SG. This approach has been approved by merging the new tech-
nologies, which will allow electrical power to flow exactly where it is needed 
(when it is needed) in a cost-effective manner. In addition, it will be possible to 
improve consumer services in compliance with shifting its behaviour from a pas-
sive receiver for power into an active participant by means of allowing sharing 
information and monitoring. This real-time monitoring of its status and commu-
nication with the grid operator and the energy supplier allows the consumer to 
directly control and manage their individual consumption as well as introducing 
the concept of ‘return power’ to the grid from small resources (VTT 2009; Energy 
Future Coalition 2010; MEMO 2011). Eventually, there will be significant great 
benefit for all actors, such as the grid operator, with the merging of the concepts 
of centralized and decentralized power generation. This approach allows for the 
connecting of all renewably generated power from a variety of generation sites 
and players scattered over wide areas. Another crucial issue which becomes in-
creasingly important is energy storage and load management based on increasing 
the share of the intermittent power in the system. However, storing electricity 
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relatively is difficult based on its nature. Nonetheless, renewable power genera-
tion plants from neighbouring areas, such as solar power from North Africa, 
could be used to store energy by means of using pump storage plants for manag-
ing fluctuating power supplies and loads, resulting in high reliability and flexibil-
ity. Figure 9 illustrates the future electrical energy grid (Larsson 2009) 
(Battagöini etc. 2008). 
 
Figure 9. Future electrical energy grid. 
1.3 The IEC 61850 Standard for Energy Systems 
1.3.1 Background to the IEC 61850 standard 
Sharing real-time data becomes a dominant task for any successive system opera-
tion. In a substation, the real-time data needs to be shared speedily and accurate-
ly among the substation devices as well as with other energy subsystems. This 
con-cept has generated a demand to integrate and consolidate IEDs. This task 
may require a standardized communications language among devices in order to 
facili-tate interfaces, since the existing solutions have reached their limits. In 
particular, the Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI) and IEEE raised the 
concept of a utility communication architecture (UCA) in the early 1990s. The 
idea behind the concept is to identify the requirements, structure and specific 
communications technologies that can be used to implement the standardization 
scheme deemed suitable for future extension. The first version concentrated on 
the interfaces be-tween the control centres and the substations and the control 
centre (Proudfoot 2008) (IEC 61850 2003). 
In 1994, the next phase of UCA (UCA 2.0) started to define the substation’s 
communications bus. The UCA architecture comprised data objects on the appli-
cation layer. The service interface was the middle layer, providing tasks such as 
defining, retrieving and logging process data in the bottom communication pro-
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file’s layer. The IEC 57 Technical Committee began its activity in 1996 using the 
same concept as that for IEC 61850. In 1997, the IEC 61850 standard was defined 
as the common international standard when the two groups merged their work. 
As a result, the harmonization process comprises the current IEC 61850 specifi-
cations, which include UCA 2.0 as well as offering additional features. The first 
version of the IEC 61850 standard was published in 2003. Figure 10 illustrates 
the merging process of the two working groups (Adamiak &Premerlani 1999) 
(Ozansoy 2009). 
 
Figure 10. Merging process. 
1.3.2 Overview of the IEC61850 standard and Basic Concepts 
Nowadays, the IEC 61850 standard has become one of the most promising and 
powerful solutions for the power industry’s existing limitations and is expected to 
support energy systems’ evolution. The key point is that it provides a uniform 
framework for all the related system levels. IEC 61850 considers the various as-
pects that are common at the substation site, such as data models, communica-
tion solutions, engineering and conformity over the channel. Although organizing 
the data in terms of applications by means of syntax and semantics within the 
devic-es, they did not specify it. 
The main aspect that IEC 61850 adopts is the associated architectural construct, 
“abstracting” the data object’s definition and its services. These data objects and 
their associated services are abstracted independently from any underlying pro-
to-col, which supports a comprehensive set of substation functions and provides 
strong services in order to facilitate the energy system’s communication. The ab-
stract definitions of the data object allows its mapping to any protocol that can 
meet the best data and service requirements, as the IEC 61850 standards do not 
specify any protocol. Therefore, the IEC 61850 specification can be encapsulated 
according to three major focusing issues, 
 
1994
EPRI, IEEE
UCA 2.0
1996
IEC TC57
IEC61850UCA 2.0 IEC61850
1997→2003
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1 Standardizing the available information (the data object model), substa-
tion functions (the functional model) and the IEDs name, thereby 
providing the IEDs with a shared vocabulary that supports the intended 
semantic meaning.  
 
2 Standardizing different ways of the accessing the scheme for the availa-
ble data’s abstract communication services interface (ACSI). These ways 
are defined as services. Further, specifying the mapping scheme accord-
ing to the communication services and the data according to a number of 
protocols. 
 
3 Defined a language eXtendable Markup Language (XML) implemented 
to describe all the configuration information exchanged between the 
IEDs, the network and the power system.  
 
The scope of the first version of the IEC 61850 standard is composed of 10 major 
parts that together define the various aspects and the requirements that must be 
fulfilled by the SAS. The main goal is to achieve interoperability among the IEDs 
within the SAS, as illustrated in Table 2 (IEC 61850 2003) (Mackiewicz 2006). 
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Table 2. Scope of the first version of the IEC 61850 standard. 
Part  Definitions 
1 Introduction and Overview: this provides an introduction to IEC 61850 
and a general overview of all the parts. 
2 Glossary: this gives definitions of the specific terms used in the SAS. 
3 General Requirements: this defines quality requirements-based system 
operations. 
4 System and project management: this specifies engineering service re-
quirements. 
5 Communication Requirements for Functions and devices Models: this 
defines the virtualizations aspect and its performance requirements. 
6 Configuration Description language for communication in Electrical Sub-
station:this specifies a file format for describing system configuration 
and relation between devices. 
7 Basic Communication Structure for Substation and feeder Equipment: 
7-1 Principle and Models: it defines the communication and information 
model principles also mapping scheme.  
7-2 Abstract Communication Service Interface (ACSI): it defines the coopera-
tion of various devices.  
7-3 Common Data Classes (CDC): it defines the common attribute type and 
common data classes related to substation applications.   
7-4 Compatible logical nodes and data classes: it specifies the data classes 
with regard to syntax and semantics. 
8 Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) 
8-1 Mapping to MMS (ISO/IEC 9506-1 & 2) and to (ISO/IEC8802-3): it de-
scribes the communication mapping for the entire system. 
9 Specific Communication Services Mapping (SCSM) 
9-1 Sampled Values over Serial Unidirectional Multi-drop Point-to-Point Link: 
it describe the point-to-point unidirectional communication mapping 
services. 
9-2 Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3: it describes the SCSM for bus-type. 
10 Conformance testing: it specifies the implementations conformance test-
ing techniques and the declared performance parameters measurements 
techniques.    
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1.3.3 IEC 61850’s Impact on and its Benefits for Substation 
Operations 
The positive impact of the IEC 61850 standard on substation operational costs is 
clearly known in terms of increasing the power quality and reducing the outage 
response. However, this goal requires paying attention to how to implement the 
IEC 61850 standard in order to build, integrate and operate the SAS. Energy sys-
tems are moving into the digital environment, where huge amounts of real-time 
information is available, allowing a new kind of calculation for higher level sub-
station functions-based protection and automation. The IEC 61850 standard is 
unique, designed from the base up in order to operate over state-of-the-art tech-
nologies. It provides a novel set of functionalities which do not exist within lega-
cy SAS operations. From an IEC 61850 implementation point of view that at-
tempts to utilize the fullest functionality, numerous of benefits will be achieved 
(Janssen 2008; Holbach et al. 2007), such as: 
 
1 An open system for protection, automation and data sharing from the use 
of the standard representation for all the objects of the energy system and 
a common technology infrastructure to eliminate procurement ambigui-
ties.  
2 Interoperability between devices from various manufacturers within the 
energy system and the ability to configure the system with the available 
configuration system tools independently of on-site manufacturer sup-
port. 
3 A secure and dependable overall system by means of several techniques 
that allow for flexible information transfers 
4 Reducing the overall system costs for operation and maintenance 
5 Flexible and expandable functions, and easy adaptation by means of self-
description in a standardized manner. 
1.3.4 IEC 61850-7-420  
The incoming global boom in distributed energy resources (DERs) systems needs 
to be integrated into the energy grid, and its impact on distribution power sys-
tems in turn raises challenges. These challenges have stimulated utilities and 
DER manufacturers to announce a growing need to define and standardize com-
munications outside the individual SAS, which may include various DER IEDs. 
As a result, the standard IEC 61850-7-420 was published in 2009 as an extension 
 Acta Wasaensia     27 
  
of the IEC 61850 standard and in order to address these issues. The IEC 61850-7-
420 specifies various types of LNs and information modelling suitable for differ-
ent DERs – for instance, wind farms, fuel cell systems, photovoltaic, combined 
heat and power (CHP), etc. Via information modelling, the LNs facilitate com-
munications and the integration of the DERs into the utilities protection and au-
tomation systems. However, the other specifications (ACSI, communication 
mapping) are still based on the existing IEC 61850 standard. Utilities and DERs 
manufacturers are expected to achieve benefits from utilizing the IEC 61850-7-
420 in terms of reducing installation and maintenance costs. Furthermore, by 
offering the standardization of all DERs data models, this will improve interoper-
ability among distributed automation systems (DASs) and DERs and increase the 
reliability of the energy grid (IEC 61850-7-420 2009).  
1.3.5 The IEC 61850 Information Model 
The information model in IEC 61850 is hierarchically structured, whereby LNs 
are the essential elements of this model. Modelling is performed in a standard-
ized way in order to provide an opportunity for interoperability among IEDs 
within the system. IEC 61850 models virtualize the real devices in energy systems 
as logical devices (LDs) such that the LNs are hosed by.  An LN represents a spe-
cific function within a device where the function can be split into multiple LNs 
that can be located in various physical devices which, in terms of this infrastruc-
ture, are called distributed functions. Therefore, an LN may be considered as the 
small part of function that possesses the capability to exchange data. The hierar-
chy information modelling can be classified as five levels in order to perform ap-
plications within SAS. The levels have an inheritable relationship. In a substa-
tion, one or more physical devices can be defined. The individual physical device 
may have zero or multiple servers (typically at least one server). The server object 
based on the hierarchical data model is located on the topmost level, as illustrat-
ed in Figure 11, which may have one or multiple access points. In compliance 
with the data model, the server class can be described as a collection of the ob-
jects below it in the data model. Further, it possesses methods that can create all 
the underlying objects. Based on a server implementation perspective, in order to 
access the objects of the data model from the server, the list of object references 
and corresponding references to instances of the objects are stored in the server 
class, which allows for the performing of this task. The definition of an LD and a 
server is left to the manufacturer or administrator of the substations. Standardi-
zation is the way that the LNs are predefined with.  This fact makes LNs the most 
crucial point of the information model. In terms of this restriction, interoperabil-
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ity between different IEDs from various manufacturers can be achieved (IEC 
61850-7-2 2003) (IEc 61850-7-4 2003) (Zhang etc. 2009).  
 
Figure 11. Hierarchy of  the IEC 641850 data model. 
As such, the data are grouped into 13 different groups. According to these groups, 
all of the substation operation data can be assigned to one of these groups, for 
instance, the metering and measurements function data group is begun with “M” 
and the protection function data group is begun with “P”, etc. In addition, the 
groups are further divided into LNs which are named based on their associated 
services that are logically related to functions in the substation. LNs can be de-
fined in terms of 86 different types. For instance, the “Switchgear” function 
group which begins with “X” comprises two different LNs: “XCBR” and “XSWI”. 
Each LN is constructed by seven categories of data classes, such as status infor-
mation, measured information, etc. Each of the data classes consists of a number 
of data attributes, as we have 355 different data attributes that have a specific 
name, a specific type and various purposes, as illustrated in Figure 12. Browsing 
to individual objects may be simple in this model given the fact that the data ob-
ject is named by means of its place and path through the information tree model. 
For instance, as in Figure 12 from the left to the right, the first name is the device 
name and the second part represents the LN. The third part is a functional con-
straint which is used to group the individual attribute which has a predefined 
function based on its functionality - in our example, “ST” stands for status attrib-
utes. Lastly, the “Pos” attribute represents the position of the circuit breaker and 
“q” contains the quality to the value of the status that has been sent (IEC 61850-5 
2003) (IEC 61850-7-1 2003). 
  
Server
Logical Device
Logical Node
Data
Data Attribute
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Figure 12. IEC 61850 Object Name Structure.   
1.3.6 Virtualization of the Physical Devices and LN, LD Concept 
The IEC 61850 standard provides for notion of an LN that can be considered as 
the major role of the standard, which by means of virtualization, is able to virtu-
al-ize the substation’s physical device in the data model. This data model consists 
of a number of LNs. These LNs, by a reasonable distributed allocation, can build 
the LD. The LD is often initiated in one physical device that cannot be distribut-
ed. The specific function in the SAS is often performed by different physical de-
vices which are called “distributed functions” while the devices are called “dis-
tributed devices”. In order to implement the distributed function correctly, the 
sharing of information is required among these devices. The interfaces are per-
formed based on the IEC 61850 standard’s communications services. These inter-
faces follow the predefined rules and the assigned performance requirements. 
The rules allow for interoperability between devices from various manufacturers. 
Figure 13 illustrates the modelling approach were the real physical substation 
devices in the right side are modelled into a virtual model. The virtual model con-
tains the LDs that have hosted the LNs, which encapsulates the real device and 
services. The data model and services with their associated information are 
mapped to a network communications protocol, such as manufacturing message 
specification (MMS), transmission control protocol TCP/IP, Ethernet, etc. 
(Zhang etc. 2009) (IEC 61850-7-1 2003). 
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Figure 13. The virtualization process. 
 
The LNs - based on their functionality - consist of a list of data associated with 
dedicated data attributes. These data have a predefined structure (a syntax and 
semantics). The LNs with the associated data are crucial for the description and 
for information sharing for the energy system’s protection and automation. Fig-
ure 14 illustrates more clearly the concepts of an LD, an LN, a CDC and a data 
attribute that map to the real world. The virtualization task started by specifying 
the container for the physical device containing one or more LD; each LD may 
contain one or more LNs, while each LN may comprise a set of CDCs. The idea 
be-hind introducing the CDCs was to group and a construct larger data object. 
The data classes may contain a set of data attributes. The terms “LD”, “logical 
nod” and “data object” are all virtual, representing real data. This real data is 
used by the energy protection and automation systems over a reliable, high-speed 
communications system network that links between the defined physical devices. 
Further, the information modelling and the sharing data are defined inde-
pendently of the programing software, the operating system and the storage de-
vice, which thus provides for the ability to use state-of-the-art technologies 
(Brand 2004).  
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Figure 14. IEC 61850 logical grouping.  
1.3.7 Communication and Logical Interfaces within SAS 
A substation architecture can be divided into three levels: station, bay and pro-
cess. These levels have been distinguished based on their functionalities. Howev-
er, they are nonetheless highly interconnected based on several logical interfaces. 
Figure 15 illustrates the three levels in addition to the associated logical interfaces 
numbers, from bottom to up. The process level has been linked to the bay level by 
interface numbers four and five. These logical interfaces provide the ability to 
exchange control commands and information data. Usually, the primary appa-
ratuses, such as circuit breakers, transformers, switchgears, etc., are located at 
the process level, which may also have IEDs such as intelligent sensors and ac-
tuators. The input and output messages of these apparatuses basically consist of 
information, such as the transformer voltage and current values, as an analogue 
signal format, and control commands from the bay relays as a binary signal for-
mat. In order to convert the analogue signal into a digitalized standard packet, 
this is done by a so-called “merging unit” (MU). The MU might be located in the 
yard next to or else be integrated with the instrument transformer, and should 
contain the LNs’ voltage and current transformer (TVTR, TCTR). This conversion 
has many advantages - for instance, increasing the reliability of the protection 
and automation systems in terms of broadcasting the data, making it available for 
the entire system. Further, it reduces the overall SAS cost in terms of limiting the 
copper wires’ utilization. This reduction can be achieved by replacing the electri-
cal wires’ connection with the logic interfaces. The output packet stream samples 
that the MU may transfer over the point-to-point-type connection to any IED are 
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v
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broadcasted over the local area network (LAN) in a similar manner to GOOSE 
messages (IEC 61850-9-1 2003) (Brand 2008). 
 
Figure 15. SAS levels and logical interfaces. 
Within the bay-level, IEDs such as the protection and control units provide pro-
tection functions by means of implementing the functions’ output signals initiat-
ed on one bay such that they may perform an action on the primary apparatus of 
the primary (level one) bay. The IEC 61850 standard offers the feature whereby 
the SAS functions may be freely or logically allocated between IEDs. Nowadays, 
state-of-the-art IEDs may provide multiple functions such as monitoring, protec-
tion and control within an individual IED. On the other hand, different functions 
within an individual bay unit have the ability to share data, as illustrated by inter-
face number three. Various bays - in terms of the horizontal communication 
GOOSE messages - are able to communicate with each other by interface number 
eight. Interfaces four and five illustrate the communication between the bay level 
and the process level, and interfaces one and six illustrate the communication be-
tween the bay level and the station level. The station level equipment, such as the 
HMI, the station workplace, the alarm unit and its features, the remote control 
centre, the database, etc., communicates with the bay level within interface one to 
exchange protection data and interface six to exchange control data. Further, 
interface nine illustrates the sharing data within the station level. Interfaces sev-
en and 10 illustrate the sharing data outside the local station operator. These 
tasks have been carried out using the second version of standard IEC 61850-7-
420. 
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1.3.8 The IEC 61850 Communication Protocols 
The main idea behind the IEC 61850 standard is that the data object model and 
services are separated from the communication ISO/OSI layers’ stack. This ap-
proach offers the opportunity to implement the state-of-the-art of communica-
tion technologies. The mainstream technologies are the communication schemes 
that have been used for the ISO/OSI reference model. The ISO/SOI stack is based 
on the concept of layering communication functionality, consisting of seven lay-
ers as illustrated in Figure 16. Layers one and two are the Ethernet physical and 
link layer, layers three and four comprise the TCP/IP layer, and layers six and 
seven comprise the MMS layer. The IEC 61850 object models are mapped over 
different layers in terms of their services and requirements. The object model 
based on the client/server services ACSI is mapped to the five-seven MMS layers, 
whereas the high-speed time-critical messages, such as SV, the status indications 
blocking the trip commands and GOOSE, are mapped directly to the Ethernet 
link layer (IEC 61850-8-1 2003) (Brand 2004). 
 
Figure 16. IEC 61850 application messages mapping to the OSI layers. 
 
1.3.8.1 The Abstract Communication Service Interface  
The IEDs are described by the standardized method that allows all of them to 
share data by means of an identical structure that is related to their functions. 
From the network behaviour perspective, the ACSI provides the specification for 
the basic model that represents the definition for the substation-specific infor-
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mation models. Further, it specifies a set of information exchange service models 
and the response to those services. This specification allows various IEDs to ex-
hibit identical behaviour. The abstraction technique that has been adopted by 
IEC 61850 is one of the most significant features which separates the SAS appli-
cation from the underlying communication protocol and operating systems, as 
illustrated in Figure 17. (Adamiak etc. 2009). 
 
Figure 17. Abstract communication service interface concept. 
An ACSI concept has two approaches. Firstly, based on the basic information 
model, only aspects of real devices or real functions that are visible and accessible 
over the network are modelled, resulting in hierarchical class models, such as 
LOGICAL-DEVICE, LOGICAL-NODE, DATA and DataAttribute. Secondly, based 
upon the exchange service model, the abstraction can be defined from the way in 
which the devices are able to share the information in terms of the definition, 
focusing on aspects of the purpose of the services instead of describing how the 
services are built (IEC 61850-7-2 2003). In a real implementation, the basic in-
formation model and services’ model are mapped into an existing communica-
tion stack. The mapping schemes are achieved through the SCSM. In IEC 61850, 
two mapping schemes are specified (IEC 61850-9-1 2003) for the transmission of 
the SV (IEC 61850-8-1 2003) and for the transmission of wide station events and 
all other communication services. Further, the ACSI provides abstract interfaces 
that describe communications between client and server. This type of interface 
can be used for real-time applications, such as data access, data recovery, device 
control, publisher/subscriber applications, event reporting and transferring, self-
description, self-healing, data typing and data reading. Further, it describes 
communications between applications on one device as a publisher to many ap-
plications on various devices as a subscriber for fast and reliable system-wide 
event distributions, such as GOOSE, generic substation events (GSEs) and SV. 
The ACSI interfaces which are defined above allowed the client to observe the 
data model, to get and set data, to manipulate data-sets, to log, etc., by means of 
a calling method such as GetDataValues or SetDataValues. These methods em-
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ployed in the programing language are reasonably traditional methods, with as-
signed arguments leading to returned output values (Pedersen 2010). Conse-
quently, the ACSI model defined the services set within the client application 
while the server application defined the response to the requested services. It also 
defined the concept of “application associations”. This feature represents the con-
trolling access mechanisms to an object within a device. In order to restrict a par-
ticular devices’ visibility, different access-control schemes can be used.  
1.3.8.2 GSSE, GOOSE and SV 
The GSE service model is one of the main features of IEC 61850 that offers fast 
and reliable real-time applications to deliver SAS data values over the communi-
cations system network. The GSE service model is based on the concept of inde-
pendency decentralization. It uses a multicast/broadcast services model based on 
an efficient method. This multicast/broadcast services model provides for the 
simultaneous distribution of the SAS event values to all of the SAS subscriber 
IEDs. The generic substation event distributions also support peer-to-peer and 
client/server communication models. IEC 61850-7-2 defines two control classes 
and the structures of two messages, such as, 
1 GOOSE, which supports a wide variety of the SAS’s common data, 
such as analogue, binary and integer value data-types grouped by Da-
ta-Set. 
2 GSSE, which supports only the status change information events, 
fixed structure binary events and bit pairs.  
Therefore, the type of shared information is the major difference between the 
GOOSE and GSSE services. The flexible GOOSE model is used by all new sys-
tems, and conveys a wide range of messages and binary and analogue data. 
Meanwhile, GSSE is older and only delivers binary values within its messages. 
Figure 18 illustrates the GOOSE model. The message is based on the publish-
er/subscriber exchange mechanism. From an implementation point of view, at 
the publisher side the values are written in the local buffer, while at the receiving 
side the subscribers read the values from the local buffer. The local buffers of the 
sub-scribers are updated by the communications system where the GSE control 
class has been used as a controller for the procedure from the publisher side (IEC 
61850-7-2 2003).       
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Figure 18. GOOSE service operation mechanism. 
The substation IEDs recognize the changing status as well as when the last status 
changes occur upon receiving the GOOSE messages, which contain all the needed 
information. Further, the local timer of the subscriber can be set based on the re-
lated time of the latest status change event. At this point, GOOSE has been identi-
fied as having one of the fastest times for critical messages within an SAS. There-
fore, GOOSE messages are mapped directly to the Ethernet layer in order to sup-
port the real-time operation requirements. Typical protection events, such as 
trip, interlock and status indication, are recognized as high priority services in 
which the processing time must be less than a quarter of a cycle. For instance, the 
message transmission time for the 50 Hz cycling frequency system is specified as 
<4 ms. Moreover, since the GOOSE messages are directly mapped over the 
Ethernet layer, which does not guarantee delivering services. The retransmission 
scheme should be used to ensure that the messages are received based on a mul-
ticast transmission. Lastly, since the GOOSE message can serve various applica-
tions with different performance requirements and various data types, it may be 
considered as a flexible tool, (Zhang & Kumal 2008).  
Another high-speed time-critical message within the SAS are the SV messages, 
which are used to deliver measured values from switchyard-to-bay IEDs in a dig-
itized form. Multicast is a transmission scheme whereby the measured values at 
one location can be delivered to any number of subscribers. Either an intelligent 
instrument or the MU is responsible for the digitalization process. A particular 
target may require a distinctive sampling rate which can be freely selected based 
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upon their needs (Hou & Dolezik 2008). More details about SV are provided in 
Chapter Three. 
1.3.8.3 Manufacturing Messaging Specification (MMS) 
The object model and service that are defined in IEC 61850-7-x are mapped over 
the application layer of the MMS (layer seven), which is a part of ACSI that does 
not utilize time-critical messages. The MMS is an international standardized 
mes-saging system (ISO 9506) that has been used to exchange real-time data and 
ser-vices among network devices. The mean feature of the MMS is that it is ind-
pendent of the application function being performed as well as the device and 
software manufacturer. Further, based on the highly generic nature of the mes-
sage services provided by MMS, it is appropriate for different types of functions, 
de-vices and industries - for instance, based on ACSI’s implementation require-
ments the information modelling and services that are provided by MMS precise-
ly meet its needs (Stalling 2007). When looking at the benefit of implementing 
MMS messaging services, three major effects that can be evaluated contribute to 
reduce costs. First, there is interoperability, which allows network applications 
and IEDs to share their real-time information without the need to create infor-
mation environments. Second, there is independence, which provides interoper-
ability independently of the developer of the application, network connectivity 
and functions based on provide common communication services. Last, there is 
data access, which facilitates applications to provide useful functions by obtain-
ing the information that is required through the network application (IEC 61850-
7-2 2003). From the implementation perspective as regards MMS services, the 
object of the ACSI server class is mapped based on IEC 61850-8-1 by SCSM one-
to-one over the virtual machine device (VMD) object. The VMD is the key feature 
of the MMS services, specifying how the server behaves based upon the client 
application’s point of view. Moreover, it represents that part of an application 
task that enables the monitoring and control of services by means of a set of re-
sources and functionality associated with one or more devices. Generally, the 
VMD defines the objects that the server consists of. Further, the services enable a 
client to access and manipulate these objects by means of assigning one or multi-
ple communication addresses that create service access points (SAPs) where the 
MMS services can be exchanged. Figure 19 illustrates the VMD concept (SISCO 
1995). 
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Figure 19. MMS concept. 
1.3.9 GOOSE Retransmission deterministic approach 
The GOOSE message structure clarifies that it is a routable message which is de-
livered to the assigned IED subscriber network address as opposed to the IED 
address which uses a multicast scheme. The network address represents the mail 
group subscription address and not the IED address, which routes the GOOSE 
messages inside the LAN rather than via the WAN. The multicast scheme creates 
technical challenges inside the LAN for the message delivery process. The chal-
lenge in conventional LAN is when the substation event is broadcast by the IED 
inside the LAN and other IEDs receive the message and duplicate to the same 
LAN, such that data collisions with the sending IED and transmission delays may 
accrue. Therefore, the unpredictable behaviour for the LAN makes each IED re-
sponsible for handling various LAN network circumstances, such as message 
drop, message delay, asynchronous delivery and outages (McDonland 2003). The 
Ethernet network is based on carrier sense multiple access collision detection 
(CSMA/CD), which is a non-deterministic protocol that is based on its imple-
mentation, and senses the channel and detects other transmission signals if they 
appear to eliminate data collisions. This concept is used within the existing 
Ethernet network, which introduced the queuing scheme and which increases the 
non-deterministic factor and latency. Further, it can be very difficult to predict 
the number of data across the network (Curtis 2000). Increasing the number of 
devices connected into the LAN sees that the expected data collision is increased 
exponentially. Modern Ethernet switching, token ring and token bus, retransmis-
sion scheme and priority tagging are used to enhance the real-time deterministic 
performance suitable for the SAS (Thomas & Ali 2010). 
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IEC 61850-8-1 defined the retransmission scheme to achieve a proper level of 
reliability, as illustrated in Figure 20. GOOSE messages are constantly published 
and indicated to substation actions that request a SendGosse service which con-
tains a set of data that may consists of binary and analogue data entities. Within 
the substation configuration processes, every GOOSE message is associated with 
a specific max time (mt) parameter as a waiting time between the first GOOSE 
message publication and the retransmission event in a stable condition as a T0 
GOOSE heartbeat transmission. The next retransmission of the GOOSE message 
happens when the data element is changed or else T0 expires. In this case, the 
data element that will have changed the time of transmission (tot) that separates 
the GOOSE messages is reduced to a very short period, as illustrated in Figure 
20, as (T1) to increase the probability of receiving GOOSE messages by all the 
sub-scribers. After a few retransmissions, the (tot) will increase gradually until 
reaching the assigned T0 parameter. For each message in the retransmission 
process, the publisher assigned a time to live (ttl), which is used to calculate the 
time to wait (ttw) by the subscriber. When the ttw interval has expired and the 
message has not been received by the subscriber, it indicates that the association 
is lost, which is one of the most intelligent features added by the IEC 61850 
standard to the SAS. 
 
Figure 20. GOOSE retransmission concept. 
1.3.10 Substation Configuration description Language (SCL) 
IEC 61850-6-1 specifies the substation configuration language SCL based on the 
XML. The system integrator may need to configure the system devices both be-
fore utilizations and also in the case of adding new devices to the system. The 
SCL exhibits a hierarchical file configuration in which it allows unambiguous 
descriptions within multiple levels of the system based on the standardized XML 
files. It is a uniform description of the system configuration and the relation be-
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tween the system and the allocated functions. Therefore, using the SCL file for-
mat makes it possible to describe - in a standardized manner - communication 
and function-related device capability, the device parameters, the communica-
tions system configuration and the allocation of the system devices. These de-
scriptions’ files for the entire system and its devices can be shared between devic-
es, engineering tools and various system engineering tools to build up the auto-
mation system (Brand 2004).  
In order to achieve the systems’ integration in the standardized way in compli-
ance with the IEC 61850 data model, the SCL defined an object model that de-
scribes the IEDs’ connection, allocation and how the object model can be pub-
lished with-in various SCL files. These files can be exported or imported with 
various system engineering tools. Six different SCL files data types are defined 
based on the configuration step, their content and their needs. They are con-
structed using an identical format and method; however, they have varying scope 
and numerous extensions. From these files’ system configuration tool can be ob-
tained all the needed information, such as the substation network topology, the 
IED’s description, the communications system’s description and the data-type 
templates. Table 3 describes the six file types and their extinctions (IEC 61850-1 
2003). 
Table 3. SCL file types and extinctions. 
Ex. Name Description 
.icd IED Capability Description Describe the capabilities of an IED, IED 
allocation, IED communication de-
scription and system description 
.ssd System Specification De-
scription 
Describe the SAS and the required LNs 
.scd  Substation Configuration 
Description 
Specify all IEDs, communication con-
figuration and substation description 
.cid Configured IED Description Facilitate the communication between 
an IED configuration tool, IED alloca-
tion within the substation 
.IID Instantiated IED Descrip-
tion 
Describe the configuration for an IED 
.SED System Exchange Descrip-
tion 
Describe the exchanging configuration 
between substations 
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1.3.11 Time Synchronization (TS) 
The digitization of the SAS based upon the IEC 61850 standard with the associat-
ed strict performance requirements deems that all devices in the substation 
should be accurately synchronized for the time stamping of data and motion con-
trol. For a better understanding of the TS approach, lets us ask a most important 
question: where, in an SAS, several IEDs are connected together, how will accu-
rate and coordinated time services with a vast amount of information be made 
available at a fast rate? In addition, there are most of the substation functions - 
for instance, the distance function which requires the voltage and the current to 
be synchronized, and the synchrony-check function which needs to make a com-
parison between voltages in order to possess a common reference, etc. This func-
tion will not operate properly if their events are not organized in a way such that 
the accruing order is the same as when they are published.  
Time reference is one simple solution, where by means of electing one IED as a 
time reference all the other IEDs should synchronize with it. However this solu-
tion works satisfactorily with small SASs, since the IED time will lag from the 
time reference with the LAN’s delayed value, which is the time that the messages 
need to travel from the time reference to their destination (Ozansoy et al. 2008). 
IEC 61850 states that the TS model is needed to provide a synchronized coordi-
nated universal time  (CUT) to all IEDs in the LAN based on use of the simple 
network time protocol (SNTP) which can achieve accuracies within the range of 1 
ms. The TS requirements should be met whether the SNTP or another protocol 
has been used. Figure 21 illustrates the TS model with a time-server that has been 
externally synchronized with an external resource, such as a GPS receiver. All the 
IEDs in the substation are synchronized with the time-server, which represents 
the source for the substation’s internal TS and time stamping (IEC 61850-7-2 
2003). 
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Figure 21. Time synchronization model. 
Various classes of TS accuracy have been defined by the IEC 61850 standard, as 
illustrated in Table 4. The first two time-performance classes (T1, T2) are defined 
for normal events that are not time-critical events. The rest (T3, T4 and T5) are 
defined for the critical time events, such as protection and metering. As regards, 
the TS protocol that is chosen and the performance of the underlying hardware 
plays a critical role in the accuracy of the TS model. Therefore, the accuracy that 
is provided by the conventional solution is 1 ms, which does not meet the re-
quirements that are assigned for the raw data SV.  
Alternatively, one solution is to use the Inter-Range Instrumentation Group time 
code B (IRIG-B) which is not a time source itself. It provides accuracy of 5 µs and 
requires an external time source, such as GPS. Another solution is to use preci-
sion time control (PTC), which was defined in IEEE 1588. It is a standard control 
mechanism for ensuring interoperability between IEDs while meeting the best 
individual application requirements and provides accuracy of 0.5 µs. The PTC 
has been considered as a form of network core synchronization with a minimum 
hardware assist and soft-ware (Dominicis etc. 2011). 
Table 4. Time performance requirements. 
Performance Class Accuracy Application 
T1 ± 1ms Events 
T2 ± 0.1ms Synchrocheck 
T3 ± 25µs Sampled Values 
T4 ± 4µs Sampled Values 
T5 ± 1µs Sampled Values 
IEC61850 Client
Server
IEC61850 Time
Server
Time Request
Time Response
Time synchronization
UTC Synchronized 
Time
Master UTC Time
Externaly Synchronized
Time information from 
external source
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1.3.12 Reliability Criteria and Redundancy 
Redundancy has been identified as a key enabling reliability criteria for SASs in 
terms of avoiding taking down the whole system due to a single failure. However, 
the IEC 61850 standard does not specify the required architecture issues in order 
to achieve an extremely reliable SAS. The result is that discussion and testing 
work is left to the end users in order to make this approach available in practice 
and provide a highly fault-tolerant system. Therefore, in order to achieve a high 
degree of system tolerance, redundancy in devices and communication paths 
should be ensured at each substation level. The extent of the redundancy provid-
ed is based upon the size of the substation - for instance, large, high-voltage sub-
stations often have two individual parallel communication paths and redundant 
protection IEDs, whereas, in a small substation with a lower voltage, no parallel 
communication paths are used but redundant IEDs may be implemented. The 
redundancy scheme is a way to increase reliability. However, in other hands it 
creates system complexity in hardware and software and also increases costs. 
Therefore, it requires more practical and careful implementation (IEC 61850-6 
2003).  
From the single device perspective, redundancy can be provided by duplicating 
relays or IEDs - for instance, a high-voltage transmission line may require dupli-
cated mains protection with a duplicate HMI, either for operational reasons or 
redundancy. Both duplicated HMIs have the capability to switch-over upon a 
failure event. An alternative solution is to provide redundancy in the communica-
tion path where the modern Ethernet switch with be used. An Ethernet switch is 
an IED that has multiple ports which may require configuration based on its op-
erating system, firmware and power supply. This provision of the Ethernet switch 
creates genuine full-duplex communication between the operator and the process 
level with a high data rate, a minimum number of collisions and a high degree of 
reliability (Hou & Dolezilek 2008) (Kasztenny 2006). 
According to IEC 61850-6, all the substation devices can be connected in a ring 
topology and based on network redundancy, whereby each IED has two Ethernet 
ports to create redundant network communication, as illustrated in Figure 22. 
Here, we can observe that each IED has been connected with a separate connec-
tion port to each closed-loop ring. These closed-loop rings are redundantly estab-
lished in parallel in order to limit the cause of failure by offering an alternative 
connection link within the bay IEDs. However, in the communications perfor-
mance requirements mentioned before, fast GOOSE messages have a strict per-
formance requirement that the messages should be delivered in less than 4 ms.  
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A virtual local area network (VLAN) is a one of the technical solutions that at-
tenu-ates the effect of the broadcast/multicast phenomenon in LAN. This can be 
done by originating a needed network segment by dividing the physically con-
nected network and reducing the traffic flow by restricting it into a single indi-
vidual VLAN (Ali & Thomas 2006). 
 
Figure 22. Double parallel redundant ring. 
1.3.13 Cyber Security 
Cyber security is a term that is introduced with respect to the digital environ-
ment, whereby devices with an embedded microprocessor are now commonly 
used for control and automation functions. Since SASs based on IEC 61850 were 
firstly designed to operate within a secure network - the individual substation – 
the IEC 61850 standard does not provide a security solution (and so it is not cov-
ered by the first version of the standard). However, in terms of a WAN, where the 
client is located outside the secured LAN and attempts to access the SAS’s func-
tions, in this case data security is a critical issue. As such, different control access 
schemes, such as secure connection, authentication and encryption, should be 
considered (Apostolov 2003). IEC 61850-7-2 provides an access control model 
that addresses the data security aspect. The data-access process can be restricted 
at various levels throughout the access control model in relation to a specific 
server. Therefore, for instance, the group of data attributes might be visible with 
accessible permissions for a selected client; however, they are invisible to the 
other clients through the access control model restriction. As a result, the access 
control specification of the server and the identification of the client play a key 
role in the restriction process. The set of restrictions is called a “virtual access 
view”. The virtual access view also provides the capability to restrict supported 
HMI GW
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services in addition to the restriction on the visibility of the instances to a specific 
client. Various proposed security schemes have been investigated recently (Pre-
maratne et al. 2010); however, they are not covered by this work.   
1.4 IEC 61850 Technical Challenges Implementation 
 Issues 
From the first step, since the IEC 61850 standard has been published, the major 
scope of the standard has been to clarify the communication issues within the 
SAS that compose various manufacturers’ devices. This task has been fulfilled by 
defining several communication protocols that facilitate the sharing of infor-
mation among those various manufacturers’ devices. However, several imple-
mentation issues have been left to the researchers’ design engineers to deal with, 
such as the reliability of the SAS and the reliability of the IEC 61850 distributed 
functions, improving system reliability based on a redundancy approach and the 
type of redundancy, the commissioning of various manufacturers’ devices’ tasks, 
the clarification of actual complete system designs and their operation and 
maintenance issues. Moreover, the open nature of the IEC 61850 standard gives a 
wide ranging freedom for manufacturers to operate with that may increase the 
complexity of the IEC 61850 implementation task. In addition, the emerging con-
cept of the SG places a high degree of pressure on existing utilities’ infrastructure 
operations. Following several of the available automation and protection func-
tions, their fundamental operational schemes have been collapsing, as mentioned 
earlier. Therefore, further discussions and testing works need to be processed in 
order to meet end users requirements and for the successful implementation of 
the IEC 61850 standard. In this section, the technical challenges and the IEC 
61850 standard’s implementation issues have been highlighted, and in the rest of 
this thesis these issues are analysed and appropriate solutions are developed. 
These developing solutions have been carried out to facilitate and bring about a 
complete SAS that has the ability to utilize the vision of the IEC 61850standard. 
1.4.1 IEC 61850 SAS Functions Reliability Estimation Challenging 
An automation system’s reliability is directly related to the reliability of its IEDs, 
protection and automation functions. The IEC 61850 standard defines the con-
cept of a distributed function to allow for the free allocation of functions within 
various IEDs (IEC 61850-1). As a result, functions may split into parts, executed 
within various IEDs. These functional parts need to communicate with each other 
to implement the assigned function successfully. Further, based on IEC 61850’s 
defined reliability restriction, no such single point of failure should exist that can 
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cause the whole system to enter into a failed state. However, to my knowledge the 
reliability of IEC 61850’s functions have not been discussed or analysed before 
the present literature. Most of the available previous research focused on the 
whole system’s reliability calculation using various existing calculation methods. 
Kanber and Sidhu (2009), Andersson et al. (2005) and Yunnis et al. (2008) have 
been using the reliability block diagram (RBD) and fault-tree methods based on 
their system reliability calculations for different SAS topologies. Further, Jisng 
and Singh (2010) add another parameter (repair rates) to the system reliability 
calculation. A Markov model was used for a reliability estimation model in An-
derson et al. (1997), Anderson et al. (1992) and Singh and Patton (1980). There-
fore, it is important to carry out an estimation of the reliability and probability of 
failure for IEC 61850 functions based on different practical Ethernet communica-
tions bus topologies to prove the feasibility of the IEC 61850 distributed function. 
Furthermore, it is also important to develop a novel reliability and probability of 
failure estimation method RaFSA  that may facilitate the reliability and probabil-
ity of failure estimation tasks, as well as well as facilitating the system reliability 
estimation with various adding parameters (e.g., the repairing time, the load 
flow, reconfiguration, optimization, etc.) were these parameters are hard to esti-
mate within the analytical approach. 
1.4.2 IEC 61850 SAS Performance Analysis and Evaluation Challenging 
1.4.2.1 IEC 61850 Communication System Network Latencies 
Estimation Challenging  
The IEC 61850 standard defines a high priority and specific time delay for the 
high-speed time-critical messages’ latencies, such as GOOSE and SV, that need to 
reach their destinations in less than 3-4 ms. In order to reduce the processing 
time for the high-speed messages, the IEC 61850 standard specifies a direct im-
plementation over the OSI layers, whereby these high-speed messages have to 
mapped directly over the Ethernet link layer. However, given the dynamic behav-
iour of the IEC 61850 communications network, the overall system performance 
and traffic latency cannot be easily estimated. Moreover, in IEC 61850-5, the 
part-estimated messages’ latencies within the communications network were de-
fined based on a simple approach. This simple latency estimation approach (one-
way messages, publisher-to-subscriber) actually does not reflect or guarantee the 
actual system’s performance, which is really important for an SAS’s practical, 
real-time applications. Sidhu and Yin (2007), Chen et al. (2012), Ali et al. (2012) 
and Ridwan et al. (2012) analysed the performance of the IEC 61850 communica-
tions network using various simulation tools based on the defined simple laten-
cies estimation approach. Therefore, there is a need to develop a proper approach 
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for estimating the critical-time messages’ latencies which reflects the real behav-
iour within the system (a round-trip approach) (Steinhauser et al. 2010). Moreo-
ver, it is possible to utilize this round-trip development approach within an actual 
physical SAS rather than a simulation environment, which increases the chal-
lenges to the system’s commissioning, especially when the actual AS devices 
come from various manufacturers. In addition, several assumptions were made 
by the author in order to facilitate the communications system’s network laten-
cies estimation task.     
1.4.2.2 Challenges for System Interoperability and Commissioning  
One of the most challenging issues is evaluating and confirming the performance 
of the complete AS composed of a set of various manufacturers’ IEDs. This is be-
cause the IEC 61850 standard specifies the performance of a single IED based on 
the required response times for various events within the SAS (the conform-ance 
test). From the cumulative experiences that have been gained by working with 
the DEMVE 1 and DEMVE 2 projects, wide ranging issues are raised based on the 
various manufacturers’ IEDs’ integration tasks, such that IEDs which con-form to 
the IEC 61850 standard and which also pass the conformance test still risk being 
incapable of operating with each other. Researchers and developers have noted 
that the open nature of the IEC 61850 standard gives wide ranging freedom for 
manufacturers to operate with. Further, the interpretation of the IEC 61850 
standard by different manufacturers remains different based upon the ambigui-
ties that still exist. These issues may vary the interoperation of the standard from 
one manufacturer to another and may increase the complexity of the interopera-
bility tasks within the SAS. Therefore, IEDs passing the conformance test cannot 
ensure interoperability and are not sufficient for end users’ requirements. End 
users must include the interoperability test as an element through the IED ac-
ceptance process. Ali, Mini and Thoma (2012), Holbach et al. (2007), Chen et al. 
(2012), Ridwan et al. (2012), Ridwan et al. (2014), Niejahr, Englert and Dawid-
czak (2010), Hong et al. (2013), Mekkanen et al. (2013) and Falk (2011) have 
identified the importance of end user interoperability testing based on various 
practical pilot projects. Therefore, the University of Vaasa has set up an in-house 
research and testing laboratory, DEMVE. This project supports the vision and 
spirit of IEC 61850 based on SASs’ sharing information and executing it is in the 
mean concern view. The outputs of this project offer a complete guide as to how 
to integrate various manufacturers’ IEDs and how to characterize data sharing 
among the whole integrated system. Moreover, they offer a solution for the most 
complicated system integration tasks by developing a novel approach to the ven-
dor/natural system configuration tool.   
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1.4.2.3 Challenges for the System’s  Configuration   
A practical system interoperability testing project requires various methods and 
tools. However, the IEC 61850 standard defines the IEDs model, communication 
services and their various common files in order to describe those models and it 
does not try to specify the IED or the system configuration tool. The various 
manufacturers’ IEDs and system configuration tools present significant challeng-
es for protection and integration engineers while configuring individual IEDs or 
even the whole system. The challenges have been raised based on the IED protec-
tion and configuration settings’ parameters and are different for each manufac-
turer, requiring proprietary software for each IED. Moreover, engineers need to 
be trained to implement different proprietary configuration tools for the same 
pur-pose. Ali, Mini and Thoma (2012), Holbach et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2012), 
Ridwan et al. (2012), Ridwan et al. (2012), Niejahr, Englert and Dawidczak 
(2010), Hong et al. (2013), Mekkanen et al. (2013) and Falk (2011) have identi-
fied the major challenges facing the implementation of the IEC 61850 standard in 
multi-vendor IEDs, such that the most costly and time-consuming process was 
the configuration task (based on the available SAS configuration tools). Most of 
the above-mentioned works were pilot projects that were used commercial IEDs 
on a designed laboratory platform and commercial software configuration tools. 
Moreover, the commissioning task needs the full support of manufacturers’ 
products lines. Therefore, in order to reduce costs, the effort involved and the 
time taken, a novel approach for a new SAS configuration tool must be developed 
that is independent of any commercial IED brand. In addition, it must have the 
ability to import SCL files from various manufacturers, IEDs, systems and data-
bases, creating and increasing the IEDs’ configuration to the system level. As a 
result, in this thesis the vendor’s natural system configuration tool approach is 
invented and proposed in order to enhance the SAS configuration task. In addi-
tion, it may go beyond the SAS that it supports - for example, large utilities com-
posed of various manufacturer units, IEDs or the SG concept.                         
1.4.2.4 Technical Challenges IEC 61850-9-2 Process Bus 
Implementation  
The evolution of the IEC 61850-9-2 process bus as a high data-rate communica-
tions network has greatly improved the capability of SASs. This evolution has led 
to significant growth in product development and process bus commissioning. 
Several process bus projects have been commissioned worldwide. However, re-
gardless to this growth, the available knowledge about the real behaviour of the 
process bus network (especially when there is a large number of SV traffic re-
sources connected within the same communications system network) remains 
slight. Moreover, the dynamic behaviour and the traffic latencies within the pro-
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cess bus operation have been considered as a unique critical characteristic. These 
characteristics have hard real-time requirements and can be increased and de-
creased based on changes in the network topology and traffic in the network be-
ing tested. As a result, process bus network analysis is a focus of research for both 
industry and academia, and several network process bus models have been sub-
ject to testing. However, their hard assumptions limit their effectiveness (Amelot 
et al. 2011). In Sidhu and Yin (2007), the modelling and simulation of the distri-
bution substation regards 69 kV and 220 kV; however, the raw data of the SV 
traffic’s characteristics that has been used is not compliant with IEC 61850-9-
2LE. In Gurbiel et al. (2009), several studies are conducted based on a test bench 
that calculates and compares the characteristics of the SV traffics’ differences 
between the two paths direct from the MU and the source of the digital reference 
signal. David Ingram has performed several studies that have discussed the pro-
cess bus’s critical issues, such as TS, routing and process bus traffic analysis. 
Most of the studies were done using the GTNET card with the SV firmware to 
generate the MU stream, and the Endace DAG7.5G4 network card to monitor the 
traffic. The weak point of those works is that they cannot reflect the real behav-
iour of the system, since they generate streaming traffic based on a mathematical 
calculation (the number of MUs in the network multiplied by the traffic that each 
MU can generate every second) and they then injected the traffic into the process 
bus net-work. Accordingly, the injected traffic calculation of the behaviour of the 
rest of the network components was performed (Ingram et al. 2013; Ingram et al. 
2012). However, none of these above-mentioned above works presents or reflects 
the real dynamic behaviour of the process bus communications networks or as-
sesses the limits of the process bus networks based on this dynamic behaviour. 
There-fore, as a first step, it is important to assess the limits and simulate the 
dynamic performance of the process bus communications system network using 
OPNET, which is and industry-trusted simulation tool. This task requires model-
ling various IEDs, such as MU, ESW, the communication link and the receiving 
IED, which they have not developed yet and which do not exist in the simulation 
tool library. These modelled IEDs’ various communications network parameters 
need to be considered (e.g., various communication link speeds, the IED’s micro-
processor processing time, the packet the enter-arrival time, the switch buffers’ 
sizes, the number of queues, the capacity of the queue, etc.). Within the second 
step, a hardware laboratory for a typical IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus network 
using commercial physical devices is set up. Various MUs, SV traffic sources, me-
dia convertors, a network synchronizer and a network analyser are constructed 
with this developed laboratory testing facility. This practical test attempts to re-
flect actual SASs’ real behaviour in the process bus network and to assess their 
performance within each SAS. Moreover, the practical testing process offers 
complete guidance for the real challenges that are faced during the process bus 
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analysis. Firstly, the hardware challenges based on integrating various commer-
cial merging MUs’ IEDs and media converters. Further, the number of the SV 
traffic sources is not enough to assess the limit and capacity of the process bus 
network, whereby the testing steps require 1-22 SV traffic sources. Secondly, the 
SV traffic stream latencies’ estimation challenges based on developing a novel 
approach for estimating the sample value packets’ stream latencies for the pub-
lishing/subscribing time analysis for a series of successive receiving packets. This 
novel SV estimation latency approach needs to be implemented over various net-
work analyser tools to test the performance of the novel approach with the help of 
MATLAB. Finally, comparisons between the IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus prac-
tical experiments and the IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus OPNET simulation mod-
els’ result outputs have been carried out. By implementing the comparison, two 
benefits have been noted. From a practical experiment point of view, it proves the 
correctness of the design and the implementation of the IEC 61850-9-2LE pro-
cess bus; from an OPNET simulation model point of view, it shows the rightness 
of the IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus modelling and the novel time analysis of the 
SV traffic stream latency. Further, it demonstrates the power of the OPNET 
simulation tools that can model a high data-rate, real-time system based on the 
new IEC 61850-9-2LE. 
1.5 Motivation  
The positive impact of the IEC 61850 standard on automation system offers a 
reduction in the overall labour and operational costs, and can be clearly seen in 
terms of increasing the power quality and reducing the outage response. Howev-
er, this goal requires paying attention to how to implement this relatively new 
IEC 61850 standard in order to upgrade, build and operate the energy system’s 
automation in an efficient way. Further, it should involve solving the ambiguity 
issues that are related to the implementation of the IEC 61850 standard. This is 
because we are moving towards the concept of an SG energy system and a digital 
environment that sets completely new requirements for electricity distribution 
and production automation. Distributed production requires distributed automa-
tion, which in turn requires standardization and advanced communications solu-
tions in order to operate reliably. Therefore, one of the significant challenges is to 
examine the feasibility of the IEC 61850 standard for the energy system in terms 
of the reliability of the protection functions and the performance of the SAS con-
sidering the high-speed messages’ critical latencies within the energy system 
communications network.  
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1.6 Contributions of the Thesis and Methodology 
According to these motivations, an analysis and investigation were carried out 
based on a comprehensive research work to present the impact of the IEC 61850 
standards on SASs’ operations considering the reliability of the SASs’ functions 
and the robustness of the SASs’ communications system network in various cir-
cumstances. The highlights of the research tasks were classified based on the the-
oretical and practical tests variously throughout Chapters 2-4 as mentioned earli-
er, and are listed below. 
1 To investigate the impact of the IEC 61850 standards on SASs’ reliability, 
the availability of the breaker failure protection (BFP) function has been 
analyzed. Reliability and availability are two of the primary considera-
tions in current and future SAS design. The importance for this investiga-
tion has been to provide the reliability and availability of the BFP function 
in which, with n = 1, the other protection-related SAS functions are a sub-
set of the BFP function. The analysis was carried out over the small 
transmission substation 220/132 kV platform classified as T1-1 with a 
single bus which is assigned by the IEC 61850 standard using an RBD 
method. Comparisons between the reliability and availability results for 
various substation communications network topologies have been carried 
out. Redundancy has been identified as key to increasing SASs’ reliability 
(Mekkanen etc. 2012).  
2 A generic, novel reliability and probability of failure estimation algorithm 
(RaFSA) had been invented. The RaFSA estimation method is suitable for 
estimating the reliability and probability of failure for any individual de-
vice, function, subsystem or system. The RaFSA estimations are imple-
mented over a practical, small transmission substation, T1-1. Various SAS 
communications bus topologies are considered. A stochastic simulation 
approach is the way in which RaFSA estimations are implemented. The 
RaFSA estimation method attempts to examine and predict the actual be-
haviour pattern for each device in the automation system. Various ad-
vantages were noted through the implementation of the novel method 
RaFSA, as illustrated in Chapter 2.2. (Mekkanen etc. 2013a). 
3 To evaluate the system’s reliability and probability of failure functions, it 
was developed based on the simulation of a novel approach to various 
SAS communications bus topologies and experimental tests were carried 
out. A sequential Monte Carlo simulation method was used based on the 
reliability and probability of failure evaluations of the RaFSA estimation 
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method. These evaluations were implemented over the small transmis-
sion substation T1-1 for the BFP function. According to the developed so-
lution, various advantages were achieved (e.g., it is a flexible solution that 
has the ability to change, expand input data and include various parame-
ters in the calculation without the need to change the underlying process) 
(Mekkanen et al. 2013b). In addition, comparisons between the mathe-
matical and RaFSA reliability and probability of failure results’ output 
values were carried out, showing that significant variations in the RaFSA 
results values about the true value occur when the number of trials is 
small. In contrast, the number of variations is significantly reduced as the 
number of trials increases, converging on the true values.       
4 Within the practical analysis and in the first step, a proper approach for 
estimating the high-speed priority messages’ latencies has been developed 
which is suitable for the dynamic characteristics of the SAS communica-
tions network (a round-trip approach). Further, this approach reflects the 
real behaviour of the devices in the system. In the next step, the utiliza-
tion of the developing approach is carried out based on the design of the 
actual physical SAS. The output results values from these practical exper-
iments show that the devices under testing (DUTs) are compliant with the 
IEC 61850 criteria. Furthermore, it proves the interoperability concept 
such that the DUTs subscribe to the GOOSE messages from a third-party 
IED within the designed SAS (Mekkanen etc. 2013d). (Mekkanen etc. 
2014a). 
5 The second issue related to the practical study was, firstly, to enhance and 
relax the system configuration task using a novel approach for which a 
new vendor/natural SAS configuration tool has been invented which is in-
dependent of any commercial IED brand. The vendor/natural system 
con-figuration tool has the ability to import various types of IEC 61850 
specific configuration files from different manufacturers, IEDs, systems 
and da-tabases, and increases the relay configuration to the system level 
based on the full IEC 61850 standard, including the protection and fea-
ture setting levels. Further, this tool is expected to reduce costs and effort 
involved as well as the time taken for AS configuration and commission-
ing tasks. Secondly, the vendor/natural system configuration tool has 
been proposed for large utilities that comprise various manufacturer units 
and IEDs to re-lax the system configuration task and support the expan-
sion of the IEC 61850 standard so as to go beyond SASs, emerging to-
wards the SG concept (Mekkanen etc. 2014b) (Mekkanen etc. 2014c). 
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6 The last issue related to the practical study was, firstly, to facilitate the de-
sign of the SAS by assessing the capacity of the process bus communica-
tions network. For testing purposes, the modelling of various IEDs, such 
as MUs, ESW, the communication link and the receiving IED (which have 
not been developed yet and do not exist in the OPNET simulation tool li-
brary) has been carried out. Within these modelled IEDs, various com-
munications network parameters need to be considered in order to simu-
late a typical IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus. The SV traffic stream laten-
cies were successfully measured in two scenarios that confirmed that the 
first Ethernet switch experienced more latency than the subsequent 
switches, such that the limits and capacity of the process bus network’s 
critical components (such as the communication links and the Ethernet 
switch) have been assessed successfully. Secondly, a novel approach for 
estimating the SV packets’ stream latencies based on a time analysis for a 
series of successive receiving packets has been developed. The developed 
SV packets stream latency approach has been implemented and tested 
over the typical designed IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus communications 
network. Lastly, comparisons between the IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus 
laboratory’s practical experiments and the IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus 
OPNET simulation models’ output results have been carried out (Mek-
kanen etc. 2014d) (Mekkanen etc. 2014e) (Mekkanen etc. 2014f).  
7 To reduce and enhance the energy system’s operational costs, an alterna-
tive novel framework for the communications system in an SG has been 
proposed. The novelty of the proposed communications model is that it 
at-tempts to bring about a reasonable change in SG’s communication in-
fra-structure. The study considers wireless communication as a medium 
and introduces the CR technology. Further, the feasibility of CR in identi-
fying the available spectrum (even with a very low SNR based on sub-
scribing and sensing) has been demonstrated. This task was carried out 
by using the feature detection method “cyclostationary” within the 
MATLAB soft-ware environment. The alternative novel framework has 
many advantages that can be summarized as a reduction in the network’s 
communications system infrastructure costs based on avoiding wired ap-
plications and reusing the licensed frequency bands, thereby providing 
more affordable services (Mekkanen etc. 2013c). 
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1.7 Organization of the Theses  
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, SAS communications 
network bus topologies are illustrated. The analysis of the various SAS communi-
cations network bus topologies attempts to explore some fundamental issues 
with-in the SAS design. The thesis’s analysis is carried out based upon the BFP 
func-tion. Reliability and availability are identified and calculated for the various 
SAS topologies. Further, a novel RaFSA estimation method is presented. The 
novel RaFSA estimation method attempts to examine and predict the actual be-
haviour pattern for each IED in the system. 
In Chapter 3, we design and discuss various practical testing experiments. In the 
first section, an analysis and methodology for measuring and calculating the 
high-speed GOOSE messages’ latencies within the multi-vendor SAS communica-
tions network is presented. A novel approach to the vendor-independent SAS 
configu-ration tool (which has the ability to import different SCL files) is pro-
posed in the second section. In the third section, the modelling of the modern 
IEDs is present-ed and discussed in order to build an SAS process bus network 
and evaluate the performance of the simulated network under different circum-
stances using OPNET. Lastly, we present a novel approach to estimate the SV 
packets’ stream latency within a LAN based on IEC 61850-9-2LE by means of 
implementing var-ious practical laboratory tests. Further, a comparative evalua-
tion of the practical and simulation SV traffic streaming latencies’ results values 
is carried out.  
In Chapter 4, we propose an alternative framework for the communications sys-
tem network within an SG. This proposed communications model attempts to 
bring about a reasonable change in the SG’s communications infrastructure with 
the introduction of CR technology, where it has various advantages. 
Chapter 5 concludes this work and highlights several steps for future research.    
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2 RELIABILITY AVAILABILITY AND PROBABILITY OF 
FAILURE 
The performance of electrical generation, transmission and distribution are di-
rectly related to the reliability of their components, mainly IEDs and the SAS’s 
pro-tection functions. Modern IEDs and protection functions can fail for any rea-
son. As such, 100% reliability is impossible. Therefore, in order to assess the sys-
tem’s performance parameters, several reliability, probability of failure and avail-
ability analyses were carried out on different SAS communications bus topolo-
gies.  
2.1 Reliability Availability of IEC 61850 BFP 
This part of Chapter 2 analyses the reliability and availability computation of the 
typical protection BFP function, which requires that all of the communications 
systems’ network paths work properly upon the successful implementation of the 
assigned function. Reliability and availability computations are implemented 
over a typical transmission substation T1-1 using the RBD method, considering 
various communications system network bus topologies. The computational re-
sults’ values are compared with each other in order to specify and facilitate the 
SAS design task.      
 2.1.1 Introduction 
The IEC 61850 standard offers a feature whereby the substation’s automation 
functions may be freely or logically allocated between IEDs. Nowadays, based on 
current microprocessors, individual bay IEDs may provide multiple functions, 
such as protection and automation. Various bays grounded on GOOSE messaging 
are able to communicate with each other via so-called “horizontal communica-
tion”. Communications system networks in substations based on substation bus-
es comprise a wide and involved topic, since no specific solution is identified by 
the IEC 61850 standard. Further, IEC 61850 standards are thus based on an 
Ethernet network implementation, which provides flexible physical variants. 
Therefore, various solutions need to be determined and tested in order to fulfil an 
SAS’s functional requirements based on performance, reliability and availability. 
In addition, based upon the IEC 61850 reliability requirements, there should not 
be a single point of failure that can cause the whole system to enter a failed state. 
However, and to the best on my knowledge, the reliability of IEC 61850’s func-
tions have not previously been discussed or analysed by other researchers. There-
fore, there needs to be a study of the reliability and availability of IEC 61850 
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functions’ profiles over various SAS communications bus topologies in order to 
evaluate the SAS’s performance.  
According to the implementation perspective, substation bus topologies have var-
ious advantages and disadvantages, and usually an appropriate trade-off can be 
made (Brand et al. 2004). A typical substation bus architecture comprises cas-
cad-ed, star and ring topologies. Often, in order to meet the best standard re-
quirements, mixed solutions such as a star/ring topology may be implemented 
within the SAS design project. In this chapter, we investigate the reliability and 
availability of the BFP function in relation to various SAS communications sys-
tem network bus topologies for the T1-1 small transmission substation that is 
assigned by IEC 61850 using the RBD method. The RBD method represents a 
success-oriented system network based on simplifying the function’s integration 
within the system by showing the logical connections among the system’s com-
ponents. The other protection or automation functions related to the SAS’s oper-
ation (except command sequence interlocking) are mostly a subset of the BFP 
function, with n = 1 (Andersson et al. 2005). The parameter n represents the 
number of paths that the function-action entities need to use upon a successful 
implementation of the assigned function. Therefore, the impact of the various 
SAS communications system network bus topologies and redundant bus net-
works on reliability and availability are investigated. Comparisons between the 
reliability and availability estimation and computation output results values for 
various SAS communications system network bus topologies are carried out in 
order to identify the most reliable SAS bus topologies (Zima etc. 2005). 
2.1.2 Possible Failure of the SAS Protection Functions 
Stability is an essential part of successful design, whereby each system has a sta-
bility margin. Lost stability can be accrued in cases where the stability margin is 
less than the disturbance. Accordingly, for the SAS operation this case leads to 
the collapse of the electrical power system either partially or entirely, which is 
called “blackout” .Typically, unexpected disturbances can occur in the case of the 
sudden plugging of a new load across the network or the tripping of one of the 
mean transmission lines upon a failure within the substation apparatus or else 
upon the assigned energy systems’ maintenance schedule. These possibilities 
imply that the stable states to the energy system will be disrupted.   
Failure within a switchyard apparatus could cause significant damage to crucial 
operational components, such as power transformers, switchgear, transmission 
lines, etc. Therefore, protection and control devices are often employed by SASs 
to allow for the faster isolation of failed subsystems, which can reduce the dam-
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age and can prevent bringing down the entire system. As a result, one of the main 
crucial protection functions related to an SAS’s operation is switching operation 
control. These switches (disconnectors), based on its design restriction, have the 
ability to connect or disconnect very low currents - for instance, loaded lines are 
not allowed to switch on or off by themselves if they follow the right sequences. 
Figure 23, for instance, illustrates a sequence that must be followed in order to 
switch off a loaded line. Firstly, cut off the current using circuit breaker Q11. Sec-
ondly, switch off the line disconnector Q23. This step attempts to clear and iso-
lated the transmission line from the active side of the circuit breaker. Thirdly, 
switch off the bus bar disconnector Q21 or Q22, depending on which bus bar is 
the feeder that the line connects with. This step performs isolation clearance be-
tween the circuit breaker and the feeder. 
 
Figure 23. SAS protection function serious actions. 
In the case of clearing the line fault upon applying this sequence in the wrong 
way by sending a command to switch off the disconnector Q21 or Q22 initially, 
the damage will occur to the disconnector contact points based on an electrical 
arc arising between them. This fault leads to an interphase short circuit. In addi-
tion, it may cause considerable material loss due to the fact that the complete 
damage to the disconnector might affect (partially or completely) other apparat-
uses within the substations. According to this example, we might consider that 
such an absence in the following entities within an SAS operation may increase 
the probability of failure, 
Q11
Q21Q22
Q23
Q31
Q32
Q33
Busbar
Line
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1 The measurement of analogue quantities in the substation may cause a 
very serious result in terms of loss or delay. 
2 Protections based on the quick detection and elimination of faults. 
3 Controls of the sequence of switching operations based on programmable 
interlocking, synchronization and continuity checking of the control cir-
cuit of the circuit-breaker and disconnectors. 
4 Monitoring, control and automated fast acting based on alarms or warn-
ing messages. 
5 Communication and sharing information in order to facilitate efficient 
decision-making. 
Therefore, one of the main tasks for consideration for energy system planning is 
maintaining stability (Brand & Wimmer 2008). 
2.1.3 The Typical Small Transmission Substation Architecture T1-1 
IEC 61850 specifies T1-1 as a typical, small transmission substation 220/132 kV 
layout, as illustrated in Figure 5. T1-1 comprises five bays, three line bays, one 
transformer bay and one bus bay. Each bay may have a protection IED (PIED), a 
control IED (CIED), even for the bus bay which may require these IEDs based 
upon the distrusted function allocation that is assigned by IEC 61850. These 
IEDs may be used to clear faults related to any breaker (Kezunovic 2007). Fur-
ther, the bus and the transformer bays may have two MUs for each of them based 
upon the CTs’/VTs’ primary three-set apparatus measurements, whereas there is 
one MU for each feeder. The MU is responsible for the digitalization of the 
CTs’/VTs’ measured values in which is requires a TS source IED. In this case 
study, the TS source for each MU has been considered. Table 5 tabulates the T1-1 
IEDs’ specification.   
Table 5. T1-1 substation IEDs specification 
Bay name P. IED C. IED MU TS 
Line-1 1 1 1 1 
Line-2 1 1 1 1 
Line-3 1 1 1 1 
Transformer 1 1 2 2 
Bus 1 1 2 2 
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2.1.4 The Breaker Failure Protection Function BFP 
SAS functions and devices are often employed by a substation to prevent failure 
and allow for the faster isolation of failure subsystems, which reduces damage 
and prevents bringing down the entire system. Various types of functions are 
implemented for this reason, such as interlocking, BFP, fast auto-recluse, inter-
tripping, disturbance recorders, etc. All these functions, upon successful execu-
tion, require that all the communications system network paths are operated suc-
cessfully. According to the BFP function, the hosted bay that represents the loca-
tion where the BFP function resides (protection unit, control unit) is called the 
“local bay”. In case of failure, when the local circuit breaker is in a non-
operational state or where there are unexpected measurement values (CTs/VTs), 
a distributed trip signal from the BFP to adjacent n bays must be achieved in or-
der to execute the BFP function successfully. Four circuit breakers within the T1-1 
layout are each connected with a single-bay Ethernet switch. In case of a breaker 
failure and upon successful execution of the function, the current measurement 
from the MU in the local bay, to the PIED in the path (MU-ESW-PIED), and the 
trip signal to other bays in the paths (PIED-ESW-(ESW-BIED) * n), are initiated. 
Hence, the trip signals to initiate the BFP function might be initiated from differ-
ent protection functions either within or outside the protection terminal (ABB 
2002). Therefore, various communications system network bus topologies have 
been analysed and it is assumed that the trip signal might be sent directly to the 
breaker BIED based on the merging concept of the process bus to the station bus.  
2.1.5 Reliability and Availability Definition and Calculations  
The common meaning of the used term “reliability” indicates the capability to 
successfully execute the assigned function within the defined period upon the 
stated condition. Observations and analyses of the available test data related to 
performance, under either actual or simulated conditions, comprise the parame-
ters that are used in order to assess reliability. These data are governed by a par-
ametric probability distribution which represents the probability that the given 
system will or will not fail within a specified time (Billinton & Allan 1992). An-
other commonly used reliability index is the failure rate λ(t), which represents 
the instantaneous rate of failure per unit time.  
A typical failure rate curve for the many physical components is the bath-tub 
curve, which can be separated into three distinct regions, as illustrated in Figure 
24. Region I represents a burn-in that is characterized by a varying, higher failure 
based upon manufacturing faults or else unsuitable design. Region III represents 
a wear-out fatigue phase such that the failure rates are increased rapidly with 
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time upon the device ageing. Region II represents the useful life or normal opera-
tion, which might be specified by a constant failure rate, and the failure rates are 
independent of each other where the Poisson curve and exponential distribution 
are acceptable and used for the availability and reliability calculations.  
 
Figure 24. Physical device typical failure rate curve.  
In addition, the mean time to fail (MTTF), the mean time to repair (MTTR) and 
the mean time between failures (MTBF), etc., might be used to represent reliabil-
ity and availability (for simplicity). The mathematical representation of the data 
can be implemented by one of the specific statistical probability distribution 
functions. For instance, if we assume that the underlying failure distribution is 
exponential (Region II), the reliability representation equations are, 
(2.1)  𝑄(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑡)𝑑(𝑡)𝑡0  
(2.2)  𝑅(𝑡) = 1 − ∫ 𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡𝑡0  
(2.3)  𝑄(𝑡) = ∫ 𝜆. 𝑃−𝜆𝑡𝑑𝑡 =𝑡0 1 − 𝑃−𝜆𝑡  
(2.4)  𝑅(𝑡) = ∫ 𝜆. 𝑃−𝜆𝑡∞𝑡 𝑑𝑡 = 𝑃−𝜆𝑡 
(2.5)  𝐸(𝑡) = ∫ 𝜆𝑡. 𝑃−𝜆𝑡𝑑𝑡 = 1
𝜆
= 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀∞0  
where Q(t) is the cumulative failure distribution function, R(t) represents the 
reli-ability over time, t, and E(t) is the mean.  
Other crucial SAS operation parameters are availability, which is usually estimat-
ed based on two separated event failures, and repair as time-to-failure and time-
to-repair, which can be considered as reliability-representing components. The 
simple definition of availability based upon time-to-repair is the probability that 
the system will be available based on demand. As to the time-to-failure concept, 
 Acta Wasaensia     61 
  
this is the capability of the system being used over a given time. Consequently, 
determining the availability of the system depends on the communications sys-
tem network bus topologies and the interconnections between the devices within 
the system. Two typical devices’ interconnection conditions may be considered. 
First, there is a series interconnection if a failure in one device causes a failure to 
another device. Second, there is a parallel interconnection if a failure in one de-
vice leads to other devices operating over the failed one within the system. The 
equations for the calculation of availability upon the MTTF and MTTR are as fol-
lows, 
(2.6)   𝐴 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀+𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
 
Availability for series systems is, 
(2.7)   𝐴𝑠 = 𝐴1..𝐴2 
Availability for parallel systems is, 
(2.8)   𝐴𝑝 = 𝐴1 + 𝐴2 −  𝐴1.𝐴2  
where A represents the availability. Clearly, 100% availability indicates a fully 
operable case while 0% indicates the unavailability (i.e., failure) case (Yunus et al. 
2008). The failure case might be considered as a component of failure when it is 
not working as intended or else some functions within an IED do not operate 
successfully. These inoperable function cases may occur due to an application 
within an IED no longer being integrable or reachable in the case of failure within 
the communications system network buses.  
The calculation of the reliability and availability was carried out based upon the 
following assumptions. Firstly, we assume that the failure event modes exhibit 
independence. Secondly, the reliability for substation functions has been repre-
sented by the MTTF while the reliability of the communication links is 100%-
connectable based on its higher MTTF value of 300 y. Lastly, it is assumed that 
the MTTR is eight hours based on the availability calculation for individual com-
ponents. The MTTF values and the availability for various devices within the SAS 
are calculated and tabulated in Table 6 (Billionton & Allan 1992) (Kanbar & 
Sidhu 2009) (Andersoon etc.2005).  
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Table 6. Reliability and availability for Individual devices. 
SAS compo-
nent 
MTTF/y Availability 
PIED 150 0.999993911757006 
CIED 150 0.999993911757006 
MU 150 0.999993911757006 
E. Switch 50 0.999981735493416 
TS 150 0.999993911757006 
2.1.6 Substation Communications Network Bus Topologies and 
Reliability Availability Calculation Results 
In this section, the impact of the various communications network bus topologies 
and different redundant communications network concepts on the reliability and 
availability of the BFP function is analysed using the RBD method. Firstly, the 
reliability (based upon the MTTF data observation) and the availability (based up 
Equation (2.6) for individual devices) are calculated, as illustrated in Table 6. 
Secondly, the individual bay typical general protection function, reliability and 
availability are calculated for simplicity and the purpose of demonstration. Last-
ly, various communications network bus topologies’ reliability and availability 
are calculated in the rest of this chapter.       
2.1.6.1 General Bay Protection Function 
Regardless of the substation communications network bus topologies, a typical 
general bay protection function within an individual bay may comprise an Ether-
net switch, PIED, CIED, an MU, BIED and TS, since it is typical for various sub-
station communications network bus topologies. The general bay protection 
func-tion typically requires measurements from the primary devices, the analysis 
of these measurements within the protection IED, and taking decisions based 
upon the pre-assigned protection function parameters.  
The trip signal is sent directly to the BIED to trip the circuit breaker. Figure 25 
illustrates a typical general protection function and the required IEDs. Therefore, 
upon successful implementation of the general bay protection function, the signal 
needs to deliver across the paths TS-MU-PIED-ESW-BIED such that all the con-
tributed IEDs have to operate successfully. This indicates that the IEDs within 
the system are connected according to the series connection concept, as illustrat-
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ed by the RBD in Figure 26. The MTTF and the availability results values pre-
sented by the RBD of the general bay protection function are as follows,  
 
Figure 25. Typical bay protection function. 
 
Figure 26. RBD for typical bay protection function. 
The calculation of the MTTF and the availability based upon the RBD in Figure 
26 of the general bay protection function is:  
(2.9)𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑆 = 1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇 + 1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑇𝐸 + 1𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃  
MTTF =21.428571428 y 
From Equation (2.7) the availability of the general bay protection function is, 
A= 0.999957383   
From the results value of the MTTF, this indicates that the reliability of the gen-
eral bay protection function has only one-seventh of the MTTF for an individual 
PIED. Therefore, we can argue that it varies its configuration and any redundan-
cy should be considered and analysed as essential aspect in order to improve 
overall system reliability and availability.       
2.1.6.2 An SAS Cascaded Topology 
After analysing the general bay protection function from the reliability and avail-
ability perspective, various substation communications network bus topologies 
should be analysed. Firstly, a cascaded architecture that indicates all six substa-
tion bays is connected via a chain upon an open-loop bus topology, as illustrated 
in Figure 27, whereby all the bays’ IEDs based upon the proper implementation 
PIED
BIED
ESW
MU
TS MU ESWPIED BIED
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of the BFP function need to operate successfully. Therefore, the RBD in Figure 28 
illustrates the merging process bus and station bus concept as well as the as-
sumption that the trip signal can be delivered directly to the BIED (worst case 
condition). 
 
Figure 27. SAS cascaded topology. 
 
Figure 28. SAS RBD cascaded topology. 
The reliability and the availability calculation values for the cascaded SAS topolo-
gy are as follows: 
MTTF= 5.357142895 y 
A= 0.999829543 
2.1.6.3 An SAS Ring Topology 
The ring topology (ring redundancy) is illustrated in Figure 29, such that the 
Ethernet switches for the SAS’s six bays are linked together in a closed-loop. The 
RBD of the SAS ring topology based upon the rapid spanning tree protocol 
(RSTP) provides automatic pickup paths in case of any failure in an active link. 
Therefore, four Ethernet switches out of five are required to execute the BFP 
function properly, as illustrated in Figure. 30. 
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Figure 29. SAS ring topology. 
 
Figure 30. SAS RBD ring topology 
The reliability and the availability calculation results values for the SAS ring to-
pology are as follows: 
MTTF= 7.627118644 y 
A= 0.999920852 
2.1.6.4 An SAS Redundant Ring Topology 
Mixing SAS topologies - such as a star/ring topology - can introduce two addi-
tional, redundant Ethernet switches connected in a star to the six SAS Ethernet 
switch bays. With this SAS star/ring topology, each SAS bay’s IEDs have tow 
paths, one with the main Ethernet switch and the other with the Ethernet redun-
dant switch; both the main and the redundant Ethernet switches are connected in 
parallel, as illustrated in Figure 31. In Figure 32, the SAS star/ring topology RBD 
is illustrated. The RBD specifies the required paths to deliver the trip signal over 
the SAS topology communications network bus and facilitate the reliability and 
availability calculation upon the concepts of series and parallel combinations. 
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Figure 31. SAS star ring topology. 
 
Figure 32. SAS RBD star ring topology. 
The reliability and availability calculation results values for the SAS star/ring 
topology are as follows, 
MTTF= 6.923076923 y 
A= 0.999920852 
According to the MTTF and availability calculation output results values for the 
SAS BFP within the star/ring topology, it had lower MTTF and availability values 
compared with the ring architecture. The reasons for this degradation within the 
MTTF and availability calculation’s results values are due to the introduction of 
two additional Ethernet switches. Although these switches are connected in par-
allel with each other, they are connected in series with the rest of the system.  
2.1.6.5 An SAS Full Redundant Ring Topology 
In the case of achieving a higher level of redundancy, each IED within the SAS’s 
six bays should be connected to two redundant Ethernet switch communications 
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network ring topology buses. Theses redundant Ethernet switch communications 
network ring topology buses are connected with a common HMI, which is often 
used within the protection function (Brand et al. 2004), as illustrated in Figure 
33. Based upon these redundant Ethernet switch communications network ring 
topol-ogy buses, the six bays’ IEDs have tow paths in two separated Ethernet 
switch communications network ring topology buses. Figure 34 illustrates the 
RBD of the fully redundant ring topology. 
 
Figure 33. SAS Full redundant ring topology. 
 
Figure 34. SAS RBD Full redundant ring topology. 
The reliability and the availability calculation results values for the fully redun-
dant ring topology are as follows: 
MTTF= 9.712230215y  
A= 0.999957382 
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2.1.7 Discussion 
Up to this point, the analysis of the reliability and availability of the BFP function 
in the SAS communications network bus topologies has been carried out using 
the RBD method. From among the four practical, typical topologies, Table 7 pre-
sents a summary of the four analyses’ (MTTF, availability) output results values. 
Table 7. SAS reliability and availability calculation result values. 
SAS bus topologies MTTF (years) Availability 
Cascaded 5.357142857 0.999829543 
Ring 7.627118644 0.999920852 
Star/Ring 6.923076923 0.999920852 
Fully Redundant-Ring 9.712230215   0.999957382 
According to the calculation results values of the MTTF and availability in Table 
7, we observe that the BFP function in the SAS cascaded communications net-
work bus topology provides the lowest values (5.357142857, 0.999829543), since 
the cascaded topology has non-redundant Ethernet switches which constitute the 
bottleneck of the communications system’s reliability. Furthermore, all Ethernet 
switches within the SAS cascaded communications network bus topology should 
work properly (series connection) in order to execute the BFP function success-
fully. The advantages that can be achieved by an SAS cascaded communications 
network bus topology are a lower cost and a simpler configuration.  
For comparison of the ring communications network bus topology calculation 
output results values (7.627118644, 0.999920852) with the cascaded communi-
cations network bus topology, we can observe that there is an improvement in the 
BFP function’s reliability and availability results values. The reason for this is 
that four-out-of-five Ethernet switches should operate properly in order to exe-
cute the BFP function successfully. However, the SAS ring communications net-
work bus topology requires RSTP to give a suitable performance upon the pre-
assigned protection function requirements.  
In the case of the SAS star/ring communications network bus topology, there is 
an improvement in the BFP function’s reliability and availability results values 
(6.923076923, 0.999920852) compared with the cascaded architecture, whereas 
there is some degradation in the BFP function’s reliability and availability results 
values compared with ring architecture. The reason for this is that we have intro-
duced two additional Ethernet switches that do not affect the performance of the 
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overall communications network bus topology Ethernet switches upon execution 
of the BFP function. Although these two Ethernet switches are connected in par-
allel, they are connected in series with the rest of the SAS.  
Finally, a fully redundant ring SAS communications network bus topology that 
provides for higher BFP function reliability and availability results values 
(9.712230215, 0.999957382) saw increased reliability compared with the cascad-
ed by (4.3551 y) and the availability by  (1.278384253e-004). From the above 
analysis of the BFP function’s reliability and availability calculation output re-
sults values, it is indicated and clearly proven that introducing redundancy with-
in the Ethernet network has a greater impact on improving an SAS’s reliability 
and availability. However, and on the other hand, it also increases the SAS’s 
complexity and cost. Therefore, we argue that varied SAS communications net-
work bus topologies should be analysed in various circumstances, and that the 
trade-off between simplicity, lower costs and lower reliability and availability SAS 
values as against complexity, higher costs and higher reliability and availability 
SAS values should be made, so that the overall SAS reliability and availability 
values and the cost of the SAS are not compromised.  
2.1.8 Conclusion 
Analysis of the SAS communications network bus topologies attempts to explore 
some fundamental analyses in an SAS’s design. These analyses were carried out 
using the BFP function by investigating several practical SAS bus topologies from 
a reliability and an availability point of view. The overall system reliability and 
availability are based upon combinations of use-cases within SAS communica-
tions network bus topology design. Reliability and availability have been identi-
fied and calculated for various SAS topologies. Comparisons among these SAS 
topologies were made based on the reliability and availability calculation output 
results values. Redundancy has been identified as a key feature to increase the 
reliability and availability of the SAS upon addressing the feasibility, perfor-
mance and implementation of the BFP function in various SAS communications 
network bus topologies. 
2.2 Reliability and Probability of Failure Simple 
Algorithm RaFSA Estimation Method 
In the second part of Chapter 2, for reliability and probability of failure, a simple 
algorithm (the RaFSA estimation method) was invented. This task was based up-
on the estimation of the reliability and probability of failure extant in individual 
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IEDs, the typical general bay protection function and the BFP function further 
based upon several SAS communications network bus topologies. The RaFSA 
estimations are implemented over a practical, small transmission substation, T1-
1. Various practical SAS topologies are considered. The RaFSA estimations are 
im-plemented with a stochastic simulation approach. 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The traditional way to evaluate the reliability or probability of failure for a system 
is by using one of two basic approaches: direct analytical techniques and stochas-
tic simulations. In the previous sections, we were concerned with the analytical 
approach, which instantiates the system based on a mathematical model that 
sim-plified it. According to this system simplification, the direct implementation 
of the mathematical solutions over the mathematical model needs to be made 
based upon the calculation of the reliability, probability of failure and availability. 
On the other hand, the simulation approach is a highly valuable method. This 
method is widely used to simulate the actual behaviour of real-time systems by 
simulating both the actual process and the system’s random behaviour. There-
fore, simulation techniques provide solutions for the simulated system as a se-
quence of real testing events sorted by the simulation time. Both approaches have 
advantages and dis-advantages. The analytical technique has a relatively short 
solution time and al-ways gives the same numerical results for the same model 
and the same input data, whereas the simulation technique has the ability to 
handle huge amounts of input data with different kinds of probability distribu-
tion models, and not only the exponential ones. In addition, a simulation solution 
has the ability to include other analysis tools and parameters, such as the repair-
ing time, the load flow, reconfiguration, optimization, etc., while changing the 
input data or expansion is easily implemented without modification during the 
simulation process. From the above-mentioned points, we can see that each ap-
proach has its own merits and demerits. Moreover, neither approach can be con-
sidered better than the other. In selecting any solution from the announced ap-
proaches, it must be based upon the system, its characteristic and on meeting the 
depth and detail of the analysis requirements. A mixed solution of the two ap-
proaches can be implemented in different circumstances and in particular cases 
(Billinton & Allan 1992). It is important to note that, in the rest of this chapter, 
the evaluation of the reliability and probability of failure for a small transmission 
substation protection function (BFP)  (rather than the availability and downtime 
of the system) are carried out. 
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The mathematical representation of the observation data can be implemented by 
one of the specific statistical probability distribution functions. The system’s reli-
ability can be determined by taking the integral of it, which represents the area 
below the curve of the probability density function (Kezunovic & Popovic 2005). 
Table 8 shows the analytical calculation output results values for the reliability 
and probability of failure considered for each individual SAS IEDs. 
Table 8. Reliability and probability of failure for each individual SAS IEDs. 
SAS MTTF/y Failure rate f/y Reliability Probability of 
failure 
PIED 150 0.006666666 0.935506985 0.064493014 
CIED 150 0.006666666 0.935506985 0.064493014 
MU 150 0.006666666 0.935506985 0.064493014 
E-switch 50 0.020000000 0.818730753 0.181269246 
TS 150 0.006666666 0.935506985 0.064493014 
From Table 8, it might be considered that the analytical calculation output results 
values indicate an identical reliability and probability of failure for identical 
IEDs, which represent a weak point of the analytical solution method. This is 
because in real-time operations each IED within the SAS (even if they are identi-
cal) may experience different reliability and probability of failure profiles.     
Therefore, the estimation of the reliability and probability of failure was carried 
out upon inventing a novel RaFSA estimation method. The analysis and discus-
sion of the estimation of the system’s reliability and the probability of failure us-
ing the RaFSA estimation method takes place for one protection IED, a general 
bay protection function and the BFP function in various SAS communications 
network bus topologies. The novel RaFSA estimation method is implemented 
over a practical, small transmission substation, T1-1. The RaFSA estimation 
method is implemented with a stochastic simulation approach.  
2.2.2 The RaFSA Estimation Method  
In general, the novel RaFSA estimation method has been developed under the 
assumption that the failure rate distribution function is based on an exponential 
distribution (useful life) in Region II of the bath-tub curve in Figure 24. The most 
unconvincing fact derived from the analytical calculations of the reliability and 
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probability of failure is the calculation of the output results values - for instance, 
the reliability and probability of failure for n identical IEDs in the same environ-
ment are identical. However, the behaviour patterns for n identical IEDs in the 
real world will all be different. These differences can exist in varying functionali-
ties, including the survival time, the number of failures, the time between fail-
ures, the restoration time, etc. Therefore, the strongest aspect of the novel RaFSA 
has been considered, since it intended to examine and predict the actual behav-
iour pattern for each IED in the system. These examination and prediction fea-
tures are provided based on nature, although the process that is involved in the 
RaFSA is random. 
2.2.2.1 RaFSA Individual IED 
To better understand the novel RaFSA estimation method, individual IED is con-
sidered firstly. According to the RaFSA process’s steps, we generate a set of uni-
form pseudo-random numbers based on a deterministic algorithm. The generat-
ed numbers are distributed randomly over the interval (0, 1), as follows: 
(2.10)  𝑋𝑖+1 = (𝐴 ∗ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝐶)(𝑃𝑚𝑑 𝐵) 
where A is the multiplier, B is the modulus and C is the increment, and where all 
are non-negative integers. After generating the sequence of pseudo-random 
numbers, a uniform random number can be found by dividing the generated 
numbers over the modulus as follows: 
(2.11)  𝑈𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝐵  
The uniform input data can be converted into another distribution by using one 
of the converting methods. The main procedures that are used for conversion are 
the inverse transform method, the composition method and the acceptance rejec-
tion method. Within the novel RaFSA process, the inverse transform method was 
used - it is the most efficient converting method. However, the inverse transform 
method can be used only if the distribution can be inverted analytically. This 
method is suitable for the exponential distribution that we assumed for the fail-
ure rate distribution function for the proposed IED model. Therefore, the con-
verted operation time for the IED is based on the inverse transform method, and 
can be achieved from the formula as follows (Billinton & Allan 1992), 
(2.12)  𝑀𝑖 = 1𝜆𝑖 ln (𝑈𝑖) 
where T is the operation time (TTF) based on an exponential distribution and λ is 
the failure rate. The classical modelling of the system’s IEDs is based on two 
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states of probability models, namely “operate” and “failed”. Transitions between 
states are defined based on the probability distributions over the TTF and TTR. 
After developing the operation time, as the next step, we need to examine wheth-
er the SAS’s IEDs are in the operative state or else whether they enter into the 
failure state. This task can be performed by comparing the operation time with 
the assumed mission time. In order to specify the success events, we need to con-
sider the operating time in which the IED remains in its up (or operating) state 
before it fails. Next, if the operating time is greater than or equal to the mission 
time, we mark these events as successes (reliable). If the operating time is less 
than the mission time, we sign these events as failures. In order to estimate the 
values of the reliability and probability of failure for an individual IED or SAS 
(considering the internal connection between the SAS’s IEDs), success and fail-
ure events should be defined and counted. Figure 35 illustrates the flowchart of 
the novel RaFSA estimation process,  
 
Figure 35. RaFSA flow chart estimation process for an individual IED.   
The estimated output results values can be processed in many ways, including 
plots. A plot is one of the most significant representation methods and is one of 
the merits of Mont Carlo simulation (MCS). Therefore, in order to give a clear 
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pictorial representation of the way in which the reliability or probability of failure 
can vary, we plot the estimated results values to give a clear pictorial representa-
tion of the ways in which the reliability or probability of failure can vary. 
Firstly, the reliability of the individual IED is estimated based upon the novel 
RaFSA estimation method. The estimation reliability results values for the ana-
lyt-ical and novel RaFSA are plotted in the MATLAB environment. From Table 8, 
the analytical results given by Equation (2.4) for the reliability of the single IED   
are (R(t) = 0.935506985) (true value). Figures 36-40 illustrate both the true val-
ue and the reliability estimation output results values based upon the RaFSA es-
timation method for t = 1 year for 100, 1,000 and 10,000 trials for an individual 
IED.   
 
Figure 36. Reliability for individual IED within 100 trials. 
 
Figure 37. Reliability for individual IED within 1000 trials. 
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Figure 38. Reliability for individual IED within 10000 trials. 
 
Figure 39. Reliability and the mean for single IED. 
 
Figure 40. Reliability error bar for single IED.  
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Several observations can be made from Figures 36-40. Firstly, based on the ana-
lytical results, the true value of the reliability is (R(t) = R = 0.935506985), which 
occurs in the trials (15, 30, 32 and 60) within the RaFSA estimation results val-
ues. However, this would not be known for a real system, as illustrated in Figure 
36, at 100 trials. Secondly, from Figure 36, the RAFSA estimation output results 
values are randomly variate about the true value when the number of trials is 
small (±0.0350) at 100 trials. Thirdly, the number of instances whereby the val-
ues of the reliability are greater than the true value is approximately equal to the 
number of instances where the reliability values are less than the true value. The 
mean of the reliability values is (0.940196437) and the standard deviation is 
(0.054404264). Lastly, as the number of trials was increased, the variations in 
the RaFSA estimation reliability results values is reduced. However, the values of 
the reliability remain variable even at trial 10,000, although the variation is re-
duced significantly and has a tendency towards the true value. The mean is 
(0.935524025) and the standard deviation is (0.007278546), as illustrated in 
Figure 38.  
2.2.2.2 The RaFSA General Bay Protection Function 
In this subsection, the typical general bay protection function in the SAS is con-
sidered. According to the IEC 61850 standard, an SAS’s functions are distributed 
over different IEDs based on specific real-time restrictions. The typical general 
bay protection function may consist of a single Ethernet switch, PIED, an MU, 
BIED and TS, as illustrated in Figure 25. Regardless of the SAS topology, the 
general bay protection function is identical and needs the same set of IEDs for 
various SAS topologies. Therefore, the general bay protection function always 
needs IEDs that are interlocked in a path, such as (TS-MU-PIED-ESW-BIED), 
upon the successful implementation of the protection function. Moreover, all the 
interlocked-path IEDs must work successfully. Within these interlocking paths 
and with successful IED working conditions, the underlying SAS communications 
network bus for all these IEDs is considered as a series connection.  
Reliability and probability of failure for an SAS series connection are, 
(2.13)  𝑅𝑠(𝑡) = 𝑅1(𝑡) ∗ 𝑅2(𝑡) 
(2.14)  𝑄𝑠(𝑡) = 𝑄1(𝑡) + 𝑄2(𝑡) − 𝑄1(𝑡) ∗ 𝑄2(𝑡) 
while the reliability and probability of failure for an SAS parallel connection are, 
(2.15)  𝑅𝑃(𝑡) = 𝑅1(𝑡) + 𝑅2(𝑡) − 𝑅1(𝑡) ∗ 𝑅2(𝑡) 
(2.16)  𝑄𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑄1(𝑡) ∗ 𝑄2(𝑡) 
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where R is the reliability and Q is the probability of failure. The same procedure 
within the RaFSA can be followed as in the case of the above individual IED. 
However, in this case, two failure rates (λ1, λ2) need to be assigned and another 
check condition (the same type as for the SAS communications network bus 
IEDs’ connection) needs to be considered. By counting the success and failure 
events, we are able to estimate the value of the reliability and the probability of 
failure, as explained in Figure 41 which shows the flowchart of the RaFSA estima-
tion process for a typical general bay protection function. More details about the 
analytical calculation made be found in (Mekkanen etc. 2012).  
 
Figure 41. RaFSA flowchart for an SAS’s typical general protection function. 
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From Equation (2.13), the analytical output results value for the reliability of the 
typical general bay protection function based on t = 1 year is (R(t) = 
0.954405479), where the novel RaFSA estimation results values for the estima-
tion of the reliability for a typical general protection function after 100, 1,000 and 
10,000 trials is illustrated in Figures. 42- 46. 
 
Figure 42. Reliability for general bay protection function within 100 trials. 
 
Figure 43. Reliability for general bay protection function within 1000 trials.  
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Figure 44. Reliability for general bay protection function within 10000 trials. 
 
 
Figure 45. Reliability and the mean for general bay protection function. 
 
 
Figure 46. Reliability error bar for general bay protection function. 
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The observation that we discussed above can also be made for the reliability esti-
mation for the typical general bay protection function. From the reliability ana-
lyt-ical results value, the true value of the reliability is (R(t) = 0.954405479). 
From Figure 42, the RaFSA reliability estimation results values are randomly 
variate about the true value when the number of trials is small (±0.00559) at trial 
100. In addition, and infrequently, the true value occurs in some trials (22, 44, 
67, 87 and 88) and the number of instances where the value of the reliability is 
greater than the true value is approximately equal to the number of instances 
where the reliability values are less than the true value.  
The mean of the reliability values is (0.959896583) and the standard deviation is 
(0.032408827). Lastly, as the number of trials is increased, the variations in the 
RaFSA reliability estimation results values are reduced. However, the values of 
the reliability remain variant, even at trial 10,000, although the variation is re-
duced significantly and has a tendency towards the true value. The mean is 
(0.954452063) and the standard deviation is (0.006022050), as illustrated in 
Figure 44.  
2.2.2.3 An RaFSA Cascaded Communication Network Topology 
Within this subsection, we consider the reliability RaFSA estimation for the BFP 
function in the SAS communications network cascaded topology for the small 
transmission substation T1-1. The BFP function, upon successful implementation 
in a typical SAS cascaded topology, requires that all six bays be connected via a 
chain upon an open-loop SAS bus topology, as illustrated in Figure 27. Therefore, 
based upon the SAS cascaded topology, it may require that all the path IEDs 
(such as Ethernet, switches, TS, MUs, related PIEDs and BIEDs) work success-
fully (a series connection).  
The same procedure can be followed as in the cases above. However, in the cas-
caded SAS topology with various failure rates of IEDs numbering more than two, 
the RaFSA estimation method needs to assign various (λj) failure rates for each 
participant SAS IED. Further, the SAS communications network topology needs 
to be considered within the RaFSA implementation process. By counting the suc-
cess and failure events, we are able to estimate the values of the reliability and the 
probability of failure as explained in Figure 47, which shows the flowchart of the 
novel RaFSA estimation process for a cascaded SAS topology,  
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Figure 47. RaFSA Flow chart estimation process for SAS cascaded topology. 
The analytical result based on t = 1 year is (R(t) = 0.829720263), while the novel 
RaFSA reliability estimation results values for 100, 1,000 and 10,000 trials are 
illustrated in Figs. 48-52, 
 
Figure 48. Reliability for BFP SAS cascaded topology within 100 trials. 
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Figure 49. Reliability for BFP SAS cascaded topology within 1000 trials. 
 
Figure 50. Reliability for BFP SAS cascaded topology within 10000 trials. 
 
Figure 51. Reliability mean for BFP function for the cascaded SAS topology. 
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Figure 52. Reliability error bars for BFP function SAS cascaded topology. 
We can observe from Figure 48 that the RaFSA reliability estimation results val-
ues of the BFP function for the cascaded SAS topology are randomly variate 
about the true value (R(t) = 0.829720263) when the number of trials is small (± 
0.0102) at trial 100. In addition, and infrequently, the true value occurs in trials 
(6, 18, 24, 27, 29, 41 and 71), and the number of instances where the values of the 
reliability are greater than the true value is approximately equal to the number of 
instances where the reliability values are less than the true value, whereby the 
mean of the reliability values is (0.823838307) and the standard deviation is 
(0.082451292). Moreover, as the number of trials increases, the variation in the 
reliability values is reduced. However, the values for reliability remain variable, 
even at trial 10,000, but the variation is reduced significantly and has a tendency 
towards the true value. The mean is (0.829789372) and the standard deviation is 
(0.011974237), as illustrated in Figure 50.  
2.2.2.4 An RaFSA Redundant Ring Communication Network Topology 
Lastly, the novel RaFSA estimation process for the BFP function of the redundant 
SAS ring topology is carried out. In order to achieve a higher level of redundancy, 
each IED is linked within the SAS with two redundant communications network 
ring topologies. Based upon this SAS communications network topology, all the 
IEDs have tow paths within two separated ring networks, as illustrated in Figure 
33. The same procedure can be followed as in the cases above. However, in the 
redundant ring system with different failure rats for the IEDs, the novel RaFSA 
needs to assign different (λj) failure rates for each SAS participant IED. The IEDs’ 
connections within each communications network subsystem need to be consid-
ered, since we have mixed series and parallel IED connections. For instance, for 
parallel IEDs, a failure in one IED leads to other IED operating over the failed 
one. Moreover, for any other intermediate situation, four-out-of-five IED subsys-
tems can be modelled as three IEDs in series with two IEDs in parallel (Billinton 
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& Allan 1992). By counting the success and failure events, we are able to estimate 
the value of the reliability and the probability of failure, as illustrated in Figure 
53, which presents the flowchart of the novel RaFSA estimation process for a re-
dundant ring SAS topology, 
 
Figure 53. RaFSA flowchart for an SAS redundant ring topology. 
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The redundant ring architecture has (R(t) = 0.902160386) as a true value based 
on t = 1 year using the reliability analytical solution, whereas the novel RaFSA 
esti-mation reliability results values based upon the SAS redundant ring topology 
are illustrated in Figures 54-58 for 100, 1,000 and 10000 trials. 
 
Figure 54.  Reliability for BFP SAS redundant ring topology within 100 trials. 
 
Figure 55. Reliability for BFP SAS redundant ring topology within 1000 trials. 
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Figure 56. Reliability for BFP SAS redundant ring topology within 10000 trials. 
 
Figure 57. Reliability mean for the BFP function of the redundant ring topology. 
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Figure 58. Reliability error bar of the redundant ring topology. 
We can observe from Figure 54 that the RaFSA estimation reliability output re-
sults values for the SAS redundant ring topology are randomly variate about the 
true value (R(t) = 0.902160386) when the number of trials is small (±0.0316) at 
trial 100. In addition, and infrequently, the true value occurs in trials (32, 55, 75, 
81, 82 and 90) and the number of instances where the values of the reliability are 
greater than the true value is approximately equal to the number of instances 
where the reliability values are less than the true value. The mean of the reliabil-
ity values is (0.910451766) and the standard deviation is (0.058272275). Moreo-
ver, as the number of trials increases the variations in the reliability values are 
reduced. However, the values of the reliability remain variant even at trial 
10,000, although the variation is reduced significantly and has a tendency to-
wards the true value. The mean is (0.902201402) and the standard deviation is 
(0.009636179), as illustrated in Figure 56. 
2.2.3 Discussion and Comparison of the Analytical Reliability, 
Probability of Failure and the RaFSA Estimation Method Results 
Values 
From the novel RaFSA reliability estimation method, the mean and standard de-
viation output results values and the reliability analytical output results values for 
the above SAS communications network topologies are tabulated in Table 9.  
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Table 9. Reliability, analytical results, means and standard deviations.  
Single IED 
trials 
Mean STD Reliability anaytical 
result 
100 0.940196437 0.054404264 0.935506985 
1000 0.935590617 0.017980619 0.935506985 
10000 0.935524025 0.007278546 0.935506985 
GBPF trials    
100 0.959896583 0.032408827 0.954405479 
1000 0.954447701 0.016076721 0.954405479 
10000 0.954452063 0.006022050 0.954405479 
Cascaded 
trials 
   
100 0.823838307 0.082451292 0.829720263 
1000 0.829630730 0.031831826 0.829720263 
10000 0.829789372 0.011974237 0.829720263 
Ring trials    
100 0.910451766 0.058272275 0.902160386 
1000 0.901740971 0.037374331 0.902160386 
10000 0.902201402 0.009636179 0.902160386 
Further, based upon our observation about achieving results values, we were able 
to conclude as follows:      
• Generally, significant variations (errors) in the RaFSA reliability estima-
tion results values about the true value occur when the number of trials is 
small.   
• Infrequently, the true value occurs, in particular during random trials. 
However, for a real system this would not be known. 
• The number of instances where the values for the RaFSA reliability esti-
mation results values is greater than the true value is approximately equal 
to the number of instances where the reliability values are less than the 
true value. Therefore, the mean of the reliability values is approximately 
equal to the true value.   
• The variation of the RaFSA reliability estimation results values away from 
the true value was reduced as the number of trials increased. Moreover, 
the reliability estimation values remained variant even after 5,000 trials; 
however, the variation was reduced significantly to the lowest value.   
 Acta Wasaensia     89 
  
• For each analysis procedure, we needed to estimate the reliability values 
from several simulations. Each simulation had different output data (re-
sults). However, all the simulation results shared the same characteristic 
such that the results had a tendency to move towards the true values.    
According to the results values for reliability based on the analytical and RaFSA 
estimation solutions, we observed that the SAS cascaded topology provided lower 
values than the SAS redundant ring bus topology, since it had non-redundant 
Ethernet switches (which constitute the bottleneck of the SAS’s reliability). Fur-
thermore, all the Ethernet switches needed to work successfully (in series) in or-
der to execute the SAS BFP function. The advantages that are exhibited by the 
SAS cascaded topology are that it is less expensive and has a simple configura-
tion, whereas the redundant SAS ring provides higher values that increase relia-
bility. This result indicates that introducing redundancy to the Ethernet network 
has a greater impact on improving the SAS’s reliability. However, and on the oth-
er hand, it also increases the SAS’s complexity and cost. Therefore, it needs more 
practical and careful consideration upon its implementation. 
It is important to note that the probability of failure estimation results values 
through the RaFSA estimation method for the BFP in various SAS communica-
tions network bus topologies based upon various numbers of trials are illustrated 
in Appendix 1. 
2.2.4 Conclusion 
The performance of electrical generation, transmission and distribution is direct-
ly related to the reliability of the components involved, mainly IEDs and the 
SAS’s protection functions. Modern IEDs and protection functions can fail for 
any rea-son. As such, 100% reliability is impossible. Therefore, in order to assess 
the reli-ability and stability of the system, an actual system behaviour estimation 
method is required. This can be achieved by implementing the invented novel 
RaFSA estimation method. 
The novel RaFSA estimation method attempts to examine and predict the actual 
behaviour pattern of each IED in the system. These examination and prediction 
features are provided given that the nature of the process that is involved in the 
RaFSA process is random. RaFSA provides specific benefits: it is easy to carry out 
in various PC software environments (such as MATLAB, C, C++, etc. Further) 
and it supports different kinds of probability distribution models (not only the 
exponential one). It can handle a huge amount of input data. Moreover, other 
analysis tools and parameters, such as the repairing time, the load flow, reconfig-
90      Acta Wasaensia 
 
uration, optimization, etc., can be considered whereby these parameters are very 
difficult to carry out under the analytical solution approach. Lastly, changing the 
input data can easily be applied throughout RaFSA without major modifications 
to the underlying process.  
2.3 Conclusions 
In this chapter, SAS communications network bus topologies were discussed and 
analysed and several of their designs were tested. These tests attempted to ex-
plore some fundamental issues in SAS design based upon analysis of the BFP 
function. Meanwhile, reliability, the probability of failure and availability were 
also identified and calculated for these SAS topologies. Comparisons among these 
SAS topologies were then carried out based upon the reliability and availability 
calculations output results values. Redundancy was identified as a key feature in 
increasing the reliability and availability of SASs. Further, a novel RaFSA estima-
tion method was presented. This method attempts to examine and predict the 
actual behaviour pattern of each IED in the system, and it has many advantages. 
These advantages are that it is easy to perform in various PC software environ-
ments, it supports different kinds of probability distribution models, it can han-
dle a huge amount of input data, and other analysis tools and parameters (such 
as the repairing time, the load flow, reconfiguration, optimization, etc.) can be 
considered in the system’s reliability, probability of failure and availability calcu-
lations.  
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3 PRACTICAL PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The proper operation of the planned SASs may require different testing levels, 
especially when trying to implement new technologies or standards in the initial 
version. Therefore, in Chapter 3, several practical testing experiments for an SAS 
based on the relatively new IEC 61850 standard are designed, constructed and 
carried out. These practical testing experiments are implemented to evaluate and 
prove the feasibility of the IEC 61850 standard as a promising solution for com-
munications system networks in energy system 
3.1 Performance Evaluation of IEC 61850 GOOSE 
 Based Interoperability Testing 
In this section, we analyse the timed response of the SAS by implementing one of 
the fastest possible critical messages in the IEC 61850 standard, namely a 
GOOSE message. GOOSE messages are published over a designed prototype SAS 
platform that presents the various manufacturers’ IED environments. Upon this 
designed prototype SAS, interoperability testing is performed. The GOOSE mes-
sages’ timed responses are successfully measured based upon the proposed 
round-trip method for the DUTs. The achieved output results values show that 
the DUTs were compliant with the IEC 61850 criteria. Furthermore, they prove 
the concept of interoperability such that the DUTs subscribe to the GOOSE mes-
sages from the third-party IEDs. A discussion of the various IED configuration 
tools, network load issues and deterministic GOOSE completes the vision.  
3.1.1  Introduction 
There are many steps involved in order to achieve the proper operation of a com-
plete, designed SAS based on the specific assigned requirements from a develop-
ment and production (of the IEDs) point of view. In IEC 61850 draft part (10), 
the standard defines a methodology for testing IEDs (the conformance test). Such 
IEDs must be compliant with the standard before they are accepted and imple-
mented by end users. The IEC 61850 conformance test refers to a communica-
tions test that could significantly decrease any associated interoperability issues. 
It establishes the SAS communications network based upon laboratory testing 
and increases confidence that the DUT has complied with the IEC 61850 stand-
ard. Moreover, it also shows that the DUT is capable of operating with third-party 
IEDs in a specified way. It certified by the UCA International User Group 
(UCAlug). However, from the cumulative experiences that have been gained by 
employing it in DEMVE I-II since 2011, such DUTs which passed the conform-
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ance test still risked possibility that they would be incapable of operating in a 
multi-vendor environment. This is because various other factors might affect the 
integration and commission of IEDs in an SAS. Moreover, the conformance test 
might be considered as a form of product testing. This kind of testing can be han-
dled by the manufacturers themselves. Furthermore, it is a specific type of test 
that only considers the functions and services that are requested by the IED ven-
dor. Testing the functions and services may not be enough to cover the end user’s 
requirements. As such, the most important aspect of the open nature of the IEC 
61850 standard is that it gives wide ranging freedom for manufacturers to oper-
ate. Further, the interpretation of the IEC 61850 standard by different manufac-
turers remains different given the ambiguity that still exists. These issues may 
vary the interoperation of the standard from one vendor to another and may in-
crease the complexity of the interoperability tasks within an SAS.  
In addition, it requires various methods and configuration tools in order to con-
figure IEDs from different manufacturers in order to achieve interoperability. 
Therefore, DUTs passing the conformance test cannot ensure interoperability 
suf-ficiently to meet end users’ requirements. End users must include the in-
teropera-bility test as a part of the IED acceptance process. The University of 
Vaasa has set up an in-house research and testing laboratory, the “Development 
of the Education Services of IEC 61850 in a Multi-Vendor Environment”, 
DEMVE. This project maintains the vision and spirit of IEC 61850 for SASs such 
that sharing in-formation and executing it is the main concern.  
3.1.2 The GOOSE Model 
Multicasting GOOSE messages are designed to replace hardwired legacy inter-
locking signals with a logic interconnection. GOOSE is a high-speed time-critical 
message with high priority that should be transferred to the final destination 
with-in <4 ms. In order to increase the reliability of the GOOSE messages, several 
rep-licas of the original GOOSE message must be published when the status 
changes. This mechanism is used to guarantee that the subscriber IED is able to 
receive a copy of the originally published GOOSE messages and operate success-
fully. 
The GOOSE protocol can be considered as a multicast publisher/subscriber mod-
el such that the published GOOSE messages can be received by various IEDs 
which have been configured to subscribe to them. Further, GOOSE supports the 
sharing of wide types of any available common data (binary, analogue measured 
values etc.) that are grouped into the GOOSE DATA-SET. IEC 61850-7-1 part  
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defines the GOOSE model such that several parameters are used to control the 
publishing process, as follows; 
DataSet: comprising various object references whereby the values of the dataset 
member groups can be published using GOOSE Control Block (GoCB). 
GoEna: to remotely enable/disable the publishing of the GOOSE messages. 
AppID: associated within the GoCB such that it may use GOOSE as an identifier 
of the LOGICAL-DEVICE, as well as with a handler for the selection of and sub-
scription to various GOOSE messages from different IEDs at the same time. 
ConRev: containing the configuration revision, which indicates any changes or 
updates within the dataset associated with the GoCB. 
StNum: a state number that presents a counter which increments whenever there 
are changes within the GOOSE dataset’s member values, such that these changes 
are detected and the GOOSE messages are published. 
SqNum: a sequence number consisting of a counter which increments by a fixed 
number in the case of the publishing of GOOSE messages for instant ABB IED 
SqNUm increment by 100 each time. 
GoRef: representing the reference for the GoCB. 
Test: indicating the implementing of the values to the message based on TRUE 
(testing purpose) or FALSE (operation purpose). 
NdsCom: this needs commissioning - it would indicate that the GoCB requires 
furthe configuration. 
3.1.3 Measuring Latencies The Round-Trip Concept 
A common starting point for the discussion comprises the issues relating to the 
time taken for transferring the time-critical GOOSE messages. The transfer time 
should be less than 4 ms for a GOOSE command. IEC 61850-5 part highlights the 
different times involved in the transfer process of the messages from one point to 
another, as illustrated in Figure 59. 
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Figure 59. Overall transfer time IEC 61850-5. 
In Figure 59, the performance evaluation of the SAS communications network 
based upon the above process may not reflect or guarantee the actual system per-
formance, which is particularly important for practical, real-time applications. 
Therefore, the idea of achieving an appropriate evaluation of GOOSE’s perfor-
mance within the DUT might be by measuring the round-trip time, as illustrated 
in Figure 60 (Steinhauser etc. 2010).  
 
Figure 60. The round_trip concept 
According to the proposed round-trip measuring process for the DUT response, 
firstly, stimulus GOOSE messages are published to the DUTs over the SAS com-
munications network. The DUTs were configured to subscribe to the published 
GOOSE messages. Secondly, the DUTs next attempt to extract and execute the 
associated information and then try to publish other GOOSE messages as quickly 
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as possible. Measuring the round-trip time involves seven individual times that 
may affect GOOSE’s performance. Therefore, two assumptions have to be made 
in order to achieve useful measuring results. The first assumption that can be 
fulfilled in most cases is that the network time t_LAN can be neglected under the 
condition that the communications network between the test set and the DUT is 
kept as simple as possible while using a single high-performance Ethernet switch 
within a 100 Mbit/s network. This is because the GOOSE message is very short at 
several hundred bits (for instance, Vamp IED is 952 bits, ABB IED is 1,280 bits, 
etc.).  
The second assumption is that of the symmetry of t_in and t_out for both the 
DUT and the test set, since the processing time for the same number of data 
(packet size) within the same processor and the same environment is expected to 
be constant, as illustrated bellow (Ingram etc. 2013)  
(3.1)  𝑡?̅?𝑀 = 𝑡?̅?𝑜𝑡.𝑀𝑆 + 𝑡?̅?𝐿𝐿+ 𝑡?̅?𝑖.𝐷𝐷𝑀 + 𝑡?̅?𝑝𝑝 + 𝑡?̅?𝑜𝑡.𝐷𝐷𝑀 + 𝑡?̅?𝐿𝐿 + 𝑡?̅?𝑖.𝑀𝑆   
(3.2)    𝜎2𝑀𝑀 = 𝜎2𝑜𝑜𝑡.𝑀𝑆 + 𝜎2𝐿𝐿𝐿 +  𝜎2𝑖𝑖.𝐷𝐷𝑀 + 𝜎2𝐿𝑝𝑝 + 𝜎2𝑜𝑜𝑡.𝐷𝐷𝑀 + 𝜎2𝐿𝐿𝐿 +                    𝜎2𝑖𝑖.𝑀𝑆  
3.1.4 Performance Evaluation of the DUT Using GOOSE Messages 
In this section, the practical performance evaluation of the DUTs using GOOSE 
messages and their timed response needs to be assessed. The main objective of 
the testing task is to verify that the DUTs’ performance given a timed response 
such that the publishing of the GOOSE messages is compliant with the IEC 61850 
requirements (i.e., not exceeded 4 ms). Furthermore, the DUT has the ability to 
operate within a multi-vendor environment for interoperability testing.  
In terms of implementation, the first scenario is to design the testing of a multi-
vendor environment for modern IEDs employed within an SAS. The experi-
mental testing begins by designing a small SAS consisting of hardware and soft-
ware. The hardware instruments are an Ethernet switch (MiCOM H35x), a Vamp 
257 feeder protection IED and a PC. The Software comprises the Vampset con-
figuration tool, Omicron IEDScout, Wireshark and Sigra (Siemens) or TransView 
(Omi-cron). According to the testing process, the first step is to configure 
IEDScout, which attempts to generate the GOOSE messages as a Boolean value 
and publish them based on the assigned GOOSE parameters to the communica-
tions network, as illustrated in Figure 61. 
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Figure 61. IEDScout GOOSE messages. 
In the second step, configuration of the Vamp 257 IED with the Vampset configu-
ration tool takes place, assigning all the subscription GOOSE parameters that are 
related to the IEDScout GOOSE messages’ parameters. Furthermore, Vamp 257 
IED attempts to publish other GOOSE messages. This task can be achieved by 
designing a GOOSE receiving function within the Vampset IED configuration tool 
(the logic view window) to execute the round-trip scenario. We use the outputs of 
these functions within the signal matrix to associate these values with the GoCB 
dataset for publishing the Vamp 257 GOOSE messages, as illustrated in Figure 
62. 
 
Figure 62. Vampset configuration tool. 
The t_App IED sequence is related to the subscribing GOOSE messages and 
Boolean values can be extracted from the EVENT BUFFER within the Vampset 
configuration tool. Further, Vamp 257 IED is synchronized based on the PC in-
ternal clock within the Vampset configuration tool. It is credible to assume that 
the GOOSE status change occurs at the same time as it is seen in IEDScout and 
the DUT. The visualization and analysis of the recorded GOOSE messages is im-
plemented within the TransView software, as illustrated in Figure 63. This shows 
the t_RT, which is the time from publishing the GOOSE messages by IEDScout 
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until the time of receipt of those GOOSE messages within the DUT, which exe-
cutes the internal functions and publishes other GOOSE messages through the 
SAS communications network.  
 
Figure 63. Fault analyzer software. 
From Equation (3.1) the time  t_DUT is calculated as follows, 
(3.3)   𝑡_𝐷𝐷𝑀 =  𝑡_𝑀𝑀 −  𝑡_𝐿𝑝𝑝 
where the outcomes from Equation (3.3) are divided into two based on the as-
sumption that was mentioned earlier, namely that t_in and t_out for the DUT are 
symmetric. Table 1 shows the calculation for the DUT GOOSE performance eval-
uation output results values. 
Table 10. Measuring of DUT GOOSE messages latencies. 
Experiments 
Time ms 
t_RT    (ms) 
t_App  
(ms) 
DUT GOOSE 
(ms) 
1 22.4610 20 1.2305 
2 24.4610 20 2.157 
3 16.0610 10 3.0305 
4 18.7060 10 4.353 
5 22.1140 20 1.057 
6 23.8410 20 1.9205 
7 17.2800 10 3.640 
8 15.5660 10 2.830 
9 18.9510 10 3.4755 
10 24.8030 20 2.4015 
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Using a normal distribution probability density function, the mean and the 
stand-ard deviation of the DUT GOOSE timed response was calculated, such that 
(mean = 2.6095) and (std = 1.06). From the GOOSE performance evaluation 
output results values, it can be observed that the testing trials have successfully 
measured the timed response and publishing of the GOOSE messages for the 
DUT through the communications network, and it shows that the DUT is compli-
ant with the IEC 61850 criteria. Furthermore, it proves the interoperability con-
cept, such that the DUT subscribes to the GOOSE messages that were published 
by the third-party IED simulated by the Omicron IEDScout. 
Consequently, according to the second scenario, we design a multi-vendor testing 
environment for the DUT IEDs within a modern SAS. The experiment begins by 
designing a small SAS from hardware and software. The hardware comprises an 
Ethernet switch (MiCOM H352), two Vamp 257 IEDs as GOOSE message sub-
scribers and publishers, ABB REG 670 as the GOOSE message publisher, and a 
PC. The software comprises the Vampset configuration tool, ABB PCM 600, the 
IET600 configuration tools, Omicron TransView, Wireshark and Sigra. In terms 
of the test implementation process, the first step is to configure the Vamp 257 
relays with the Vampset IED configuration tool and assign all the GOOSE param-
eters for subscribing and publishing.  
The ABB REG 670 IED is configured by the ABB IED configuration tool PCM600 
as the GOOSE publisher. The entire system is configured by the ABB system con-
figuration tool IET600. Furthermore, we design protection functions and use 
their outputs with the signal matrix to associate those values with the GoCB da-
taset of the GOOSE messages within the Vamp IEDs as before. In the second 
step, the status indication within the ABB REG 670 occurred based on connecting 
the external signal to the digital input (DI) ABB REG 670 connectors. These sta-
tus indicators must be published upon the GOOSE messages through the SAS 
communications network. In the third step, Vamp 257 relays must subscribe to 
the REG670, thereby publishing the GOOSE messages, extract the information 
from them, and then execute the de-signed functions. Furthermore, the Vamp 
257 IEDs attempt to publish other GOOSE messages. All the IEDs are synchro-
nous, and the time reference for calculation is the PC internal clock. Lastly, the 
visualization and analysis of the recorded GOOSE messages are implemented 
within the TransView application. The achieved output results values show the 
t_RT, which is the time from publishing the GOOSE messages by REG 670 until 
the receipt of those GOOSE messages within the DUTs and their publishing of 
another GOOSE to the SAS communications network, as illustrated in Figures 
64-65. 
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Figure 64. ABB PCM 600 IED configuration tool.  
 
Figure 65. Fault analyzer tool. 
The same procedure as the first scenario can be implemented here, such that the 
performance evaluation of the timed response of the DUTs upon receipt of the 
GOOSE messages is carried out. The main difference between scenario one and 
scenario two is that the GOOSE messages were published by IEDScout as the 
publisher to the Vamp 257 IED DUT as the subscriber. In scenario two, however, 
the GOOSE messages were published by ABB REG 670 as the publisher and two 
DUTs, namely Vamps 257 IEDs, as the subscribers. Table 11 shows the calcula-
tion for the GOOSE performance evaluation output results values for DUT1 and 
DUT2. 
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Table 11. Measuring of DUTs GOOSE messages latencies. 
Ex 
t_RT 1 
t_App
1 
DUT1 GOOSE 
t_RT2 t_App2 DUT2 GOOSE 
1 22.477 20 1.2385 23.029 20 1.5145 
2 22.078 20 1.039 22.715 20 1.3575 
3 21.220 20 0.61 21.663 20 0.8315 
4 19.636 10 4.818 15.814 10 2.907 
5 19.382 10 4.691 15.615 10 2.8075 
Using a normal distribution probability density function, the mean and the 
stand-ard deviation of the timed response GOOSE DUT1 are calculated, such that 
(mean = 2.4793) and (std = 2.0898). Further, the mean and the standard devia-
tion of the timed response GOOSE DUT2 are calculated, whereby (mean = 
1.8836) and (std = 0.9248). From the timed response GOOSE performance eval-
uation output results values, it can be observed that the experiment has success-
fully measured the timed response of the GOOSE messages for the DUTs, and it 
shows that the DUTs are compliant with the IEC 61850 criteria. Furthermore, a 
comparison between the responses of the DUTs for the same stimuli signal can be 
made. Lastly, it proves the interoperability concept such that the DUTs subscribe 
to the GOOSE messages from the third-party IED ABB REG 670. The main ad-
vantage of using Vamp IEDs as subscribers is that all the subscription GOOSE 
parameters can be assigned manually based on the ABB REG 670 GOOSE pub-
lishing parameters within the Vampset IED configuration tool. 
The third scenario involves configuring modern test devices (the Omicron CMC 
test set) based on the subscribing and publishing of GOOSE messages, such that 
they can be used the measure the round-trip time of the GOOSE messages for 
different DUTs’ IEDs. In terms of the testing implementation process, the first 
step is to design the testing prototyping platform environment for the multi-
vendor modern IEDs. The prototyping platform consists of hardware and soft-
ware. The hardware comprises an Ethernet switch (MiCOM H35-V2), ABB 
REG670, the Omicron CMC356 test set, two Vamp 257 IEDs and a PC. The soft-
ware comprised PCM600, IET600, the Vampset configuration tools, Omicron 
Test Universe, IEDScout, Wireshark and Sigra (Siemens) or TransView (Omi-
cron). During the second step, ABB REG670 is configured as a GOOSE message 
publisher using the PCM600 and IET600 system configuration tools. The 
CMC356 test set, based on the GOOSE configuration module, is configured as a 
subscriber and publisher for the REG670 GOOSE messages using the Omicron 
Test Universe software. The CMC356 inverts the received signal from REG670 
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and sends it to the SAS communications network. In the third step, the two Vamp 
257 IEDs are configured as subscribers for the Omicron CMC356 test set GOOSE 
messages. The subscription process needs to extract the information from the 
GOOSE messages and execute the internal function; it then publishes other 
GOOSE messages through the SAS communications network using the Vampset 
configuration tool. The two Vamp 257 IEDs are synchronized based on the PC 
internal clock. All the measuring and latency calculations are based on the same 
reference time (the network analyser). It is credible to assume that the GOOSE 
status change occurred at the same time as seen in the network analyser tools 
and the DUTs. The same configuration steps as for scenarios one and two are 
used in scenario three. The CMC356 configuration is illustrated in Figure 66.  
 
Figure 66. The CMC GOOSE configuration module. 
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Figure 67. The fault analyser tool. 
The timed responses of the GOOSE messages for the DUTs have been calculated 
and the output results values are tabulated in Table 12. 
Table 12.  Measurements of the DUTs GOOSE message latencies. 
Ex 
t_RT 1 
t_Ap
p1 
DUT1 GOOSE 
t_RT2 t_App
2 
DUT2 GOOSE 
1 23.628 20 1.814 
24.54
9 
20 2.274 
2 21.498 20 0.749 
21.50
8 
20 0.754 
3 16.499 10 3.249 
17.60
0 
10 3.800 
4 15.499 10 2.749 
16.67
4 
10 3.337 
5 21.632 20 0.816 
22.65
3 
20 1.326 
6 21.592 20 0.796 
22,71
0 
20 1.355 
7 17,626 10 3.813 
18.81
9 
20 4.409 
8 16.558 10 3.279 
16.55
8 
10 3.279 
9 23.474 20 1.737 
24.50
3 
20 2.251 
10 18.839 10 4.3195 
19.99
4 
10 4.997  
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Using a normal distribution probability density function, the mean and the 
stand-ard deviation of the timed responses of GOOSE for the DUTs are measured 
and calculated, such that DUT1 (mean = 2.3321) and (std = 1.3267), while for 
DUT2 (mean = 2.7782) and (std = 1.4124). For the GOOSE timed response per-
formance evaluation output results values s, it can be observed that the experi-
ments successfully measured the timed responses of the GOOSE messages for the 
DUTs based on the measurement of the round-trip time for the GOOSE messag-
es. Furthermore, the results show that the DUTs are compliant with the IEC 
61850 criteria. Moreover, it proves the concept of interoperability such that the 
DUTs sub-scribe to the GOOSE messages from the third-party CMC 356, as 
simulated by the Omicron Test Universe GOOSE configuration module. CMC 356 
subscribes to the GOOSE messages that are published by ABB REG670, inverts 
them and then publishes further GOOSE messages to the DUTs. 
In the last scenario, we design and test a prototype platform multi-vendor envi-
ronment for a modern SAS. The prototype platform consists of hardware and 
software. The hardware comprises an Ethernet switch (MiCOM H35-V2), ABB 
REG670, ABB REF615, Vamp 257 IED and a PC. PCM600, IET600, the Vamp-
set configuration tools, Omicron IEDScout, Wireshark and Sigra (Siemens) or 
TransView (Omicron) are the software. According to the testing initialization, the 
first step is to configure REG670 as a GOOSE message publisher. As a second 
step, we configure the VAMP257 relay and ABB REF615 as subscribers for the 
ABB REG670 GOOSE messages, we then extract the information that is associat-
ed with these messages, execute the internal functions and then publish other 
GOOSE messages to the SAS communications network. All the timed responses, 
measurements and calculations are based on the same reference time (the net-
work analyser). It is credible to assume that the GOOSE status change occurred 
at the same time as seen in the network analyser tools and the DUTs.  
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Figure 68. The fault analyser tool. 
The GOOSE messages timed responses for the DUTs are tabulated in Table 13. 
Table 13. Measuring of DUTs GOOSE messages latencies. 
Ex 
t_RT 1 
t_App
1 
DUT1 GOOSE 
t_RT2 t_App
2 
DUT2 GOOSE 
1 2.763 1 0.881 24.029 20 2.224 
2 2.654 1 0.827 24.086 20 2.043 
3 2.648 1 0.824 24.000 20 2.000 
4 2.593 1 0.796 23.730 20 1.865 
5 2.605 1 0.802 23.500 20 1.750 
6 2.589 1 0.7945 23.163 20 1.581 
7 2.462 1 0.731 22.885 20 1.442 
8 2.530 1 0.765 22.615 20 1.307 
9 2.445 1 0.722 22.533 20 1.266 
10 2.411 1 0.705 22.272 20 1.136 
Using a normal distribution probability density function, the mean and the 
stand-ard deviation for the timed response GOOSE messages of the DUTs is 
measured and calculated, such that DUT1 (mean = 0.7848) and (std = 0.0545), 
while for DUT2 (mean = 1.6614) and (std = 0.3710). From the timed responses of 
the GOOSE performance evaluation output results values, it can be observed that 
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the experiments successfully measured the timed responses of the GOOSE mes-
sages for the DUTs based on the measurement of the round-trip time for the 
GOOSE messages. Furthermore, it shows that the DUTs are compliant with the 
IEC 61850 criteria. In addition, it proves the interoperability concept such that 
the DUTs sub-scribe to the GOOSE messages from the third-party IED. 
3.1.5 Conclusion 
Performance evaluation and interoperability testing are an important issue that 
must be realized by utilities in the design and implementation of modern SAS 
processes based on the IEC 61850 standard. Performance evaluations and in-
teroperability testing comprise crucial tasks that may require special efforts 
based on several modern hardware and software tools which have to be used. 
One element of such performance evaluation and interoperability testing involves 
the timed responses for the DUT based upon GOOSE messages. Therefore, the 
analysis of the timed response of the DUTs was carried out by implementing one 
of the quickest high-speed time-critical messages under the IEC 61850 standard, 
namely the GOOSE message. The obtained output results values show the suc-
cessful measurement and calculation of the timed responses of the GOOSE mes-
sages for the DUTs based on the proposed round-trip approach. Furthermore, it 
shows that the DUTs are compliant with the IEC 61850 criteria. Moreover, it 
proves the concept of interoperability such that the DUTs subscribe to the 
GOOSE messages from the third-party IED as well as from the CMC test set. In 
addition, a comparison between the timed response GOOSE messages of the 
DUTs was made. Cumulative experiences were gained based upon designing, 
configuring and implementing an SAS within a laboratory environment using 
modern IEDs and modern configuration software tools. For future work, several 
assumptions are made in this part so as to simplify what work could be waived. 
Furthermore, the measurement of the latencies for the round-tip time of the 
GOOSE messages based on various bus topologies with more than one Ethernet 
switch may need to be considered. Similar issues can be raised to calculate the 
accumulation jitter for the GOOSE messages when there is interference with traf-
fic propagating within the same SAS communications network.  
3.2 A Novel Approach to the Needs of a Vendor- 
 Neutral System Configuration Tool 
In this section, we demonstrate a novel approach to a new SAS configuration tool 
which is independent of any commercial IED brand. It has the ability to import 
SCL files from various manufacturers’ IEDs, systems and databases, and creates 
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and raises the IEDs’ configuration to the system level based upon the full IEC 
61850 standard approach, including the protection and feature-setting level.  
3.2.1 Introduction 
The internationally accepted IEC 61850 standard has stimulated researchers and 
developers to go a long way towards plug-and-play IEDs within SASs. However, 
and on the other hand and from cumulative experiences, broad issues have been 
raised as regards SASs’ integration and commissioning, especially where the SAS 
consists of various manufacturers’ IEDs, as mentioned in Section 3.1.1. Moreover, 
this task needs full support from manufacturers. Several research works (Ali et al. 
2012; Holbach et al. 2007; Chen et al. 2012; Ridwan et al. 2012; Englert & 
Dawidczak 2010; Hong et al. 2013; Mekkanen et al. 2013; UCA 2011) have iden-
tified that the major challenges facing the implementation of the IEC 61850 
standard among multi-vendor IEDs are the cost, effort involved and time re-
quired for the configuration of the IEDs as well as the entire SAS based on the 
existing SAS configuration process (in order to achieve smooth communication 
and interoperability). The challenges have been raised based upon IED protec-
tion and configuration settings parameters as regards the differences for each 
vendor, who require proprietary software for each IED. Moreover, engineers 
need to be highly trained in order to utilize different proprietary configuration 
tools for the same purpose. Most of the above-mentioned works are pilot projects 
that have considered commercial IEDs for designed laboratory platforms and 
commercial software configuration tools. Therefore, in order to reduce costs, ef-
fort and the time taken, a novel approach for a new proposed SAS configuration 
tool is adopted. The novel configuration tool is independent of any commercial 
IED brand. It has the ability to import SCL files from different vendors, IEDs, 
systems and databases, creating and increasing the relay configuration to the 
system level based on the proposed full IEC 61850 standard, including the pro-
tection and feature setting levels. Moreover, it can separate the SAS configuration 
tasks between various SAS engineer groups. For instance, the protection engineer 
is able to focus for the design and implementation of the protection scheme ra-
ther than the underlying communications infrastructure. 
3.2.2 Challenges Within the Existing IEDs and System Configuration 
Tool 
The IEC 61850 standard assigns several SCL files to describe the SAS’s aspects. 
Each IED within the SAS has the ability to generate the SCL files with different 
extinction to describe its capabilities and to define itself relative to the system 
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configuration tool. According to the existing SAS configuration process, the SCL 
files need to be created by a proprietary IED configuration tool or else are provid-
ed by the vendors. In order to configure the entire SAS, all the SCL files for the 
various manufacturers’ IEDs have to be imported to one of the available system 
configuration tools as chosen by any the IED manufacturers participating in the 
SAS project, as illustrated in Figure 69.  
 
Figure 69. The existing SAS configuration process. 
However, these imported SCL files have to be updated constantly during the sys-
tem configuration process to a final configuration containing the protection set-
tings parameters as well as the final communications settings. It was considered 
that, during the importing process, an error report might be produced by the IEC 
61850 validator tool such that some of the created SCL files would have some 
format errors based upon the ambiguity explained earlier, and as illustrated in 
Figure 70. These errors were the first hurdle that had to be resolved. 
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Figure 70. An SCL files Validator Tool error report. 
Even if the final system configuration is established, in some cases there will still 
be a chance that the configured IEDs will not be able to receive the GOOSE mes-
sages that they were configured to subscribe to. The reason for this is that the 
GOOSE messages’ description is different to what was actually described in the 
imported SCL files. In addition, based on the different vendors’ system configura-
tion tools, in some cases the system configuration tool will not show all the 
GOOSE parameters for the publisher and subscriber to match between them-
selves. Moreover, in some other cases the system configuration tool may not offer 
the modification of the GOOSE parameters (offering it only for the native IED 
within the SAS). In order to analyse the problem, it is necessary to use a network 
analyser tool (Wireshark, Ethereal, IEDScout, etc.) that has the ability to detect 
the network traffic based on the specific protocol. It must display the entire 
GOOSE structure so that a view of the specific relay GOOSE parameters can be 
analysed and so that the GOOSE messages can be subscribed to manually – for 
example, within the Vamp relays, GOOSE parameters can be entered manually 
based on the Vampset configuration tool.  
The next step of the existing SAS configuration process is to export the final SCL 
file that contains all the system configuration parameters to the different proprie-
tary IED configuration tools. Each proprietary IED configuration tool needs to 
update its native IEDs based upon the final system SCL file (associated with 
GOOSE). The reason for this is that each manufacturer has a proprietary way of 
linking the configuration tool with their IEDs. Moreover, they have a proprietary 
file format to describe their features and settings.  
At the time of publishing of this thesis, interoperability has not yet reached this 
level (i.e., the parameter settings level). Furthermore, such proprietary parameter 
settings’ file formats and specific means of communicating between IEDs and 
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vendor software tool booths underlie vendors’ business strategies, such that they 
prefer to keep a particular setting file format and they may also look to develop 
their own products without being constrained by the restrictions of the standard.  
Another crucial issue within the system configuration process is the need to buy 
and install all the different manufacturers’ software configuration tools and then 
jump from the proprietary IED configuration tools to the system configuration 
tool, and vice versa. In relation to this task, in some cases, it may be necessary to 
make backup files for the project before proceeding through the system configu-
ration process because, if any fault within the system configuration occurs, re-
turning to the previous configuration will not be available.  
According to the previous overview of the existing SAS configuration process and 
the associated crucial issues deriving from the proposed full IEC 61850 standard 
(all the levels are standardized, including the parameter settings level), the exist-
ing SAS configuration methodology needs to be modified. The modification can 
be achieved by using a novel, vendor-neutral configuration tool.  
3.2.3 A Vendor-Neutral System Configuration Tool  
The novel, vendor-neutral system configuration tool is independent of any com-
mercial IEDs brand. It has the ability to import SCL files from manufacturers, 
IEDs, systems and databases, and creates and increases the relay configuration to 
the system level based on the proposed full IEC 61850 standard, including the 
protection and feature setting level, as illustrated in Figure 71. 
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Figure 71. A novel approach for the SAS configuration tool vendor independent. 
3.2.4 The Vendor-Neutral System Configuration Tool Process 
According to the proposed novel, vendor-neutral system configuration tool, Fig-
ure 72 presents the table of the SAS’s participant IEDs within the sub-network 
“W1”. The participating IEDs are listed vertically for the subscriber IEDs and 
horizontally for the publisher IEDs. The listed IEDs are taken from the imported 
SCL files (from the SCD, the SSD system files, or else by manually adding IEDs to 
the system based on the ICD files). As a result, when the checkbox is checked (for 
instance, between IED1 and IED2, as illustrated in Figure 72), another window 
pops out, as illustrated in Figure 73. This window, for instance, shows all the 
communication GOOSE parameters for the publisher (IED1) and the subscriber 
(IED2) based on the preprogramed GOOSE messages. Those GOOSE parameters 
are the most important parameters that have to be assigned to achieve smooth 
communication between multi-vendor IEDs. These parameters are either filled 
automatically upon the imported SCL file or else manually. Moreover, these pa-
rameters can be modified for the different manufacturers’ IEDs based upon the 
proposed novel, vendor-neutral SAS configuration tool within the system level to 
update the entire SAS. For the last step, it has the ability to write the final SAS 
SCL file to the various manufacturers IEDs since, based upon the proposed full 
IEC 61850, all the SAS system levels are standardized; therefore, there is no need 
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for the proprietary IED configuration tools in order to write the final system SCL 
to the native IEDs.      
 
Figure 72. The SAS configuration process IEDs. 
 
Figure 73. The SAS configuration process GOOSE parameters. 
3.2.5 Utilities Operation Enhancements Upon the Vendor-Neutral Tool 
From the proposed novel, vendor-neutral system configuration tool, several 
bene-fits can be realized by reducing the cost and effort involved and the time 
taken, as follows, 
• Creating a simplified system Vendor-Natural tool by raising the IED con-
figuration to the system level which does not requires any proprietary 
(configuration tools and communication links). 
 IED Publisher 
MAC
IED Subscriber
MAC
DATA
TIMETIME
TEST
Hold
StNum
CnRev
GoID
GcRef
DatSet
Remaining
SqNum
NdsCom
.
.
.
PPID
VID
Pirority
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
DATA
TEST
Hold
StNum
CnRev
GoID
GcRef
DatSet
Remaining
SqNum
NdsCom
PPID
VID
Pirority
112      Acta Wasaensia 
 
• Offering a cost-effective solution based on reduction within the tools that 
can be used to configure the automation system. 
• Reducing the operation and maintenance costs associated with staff train-
ing, such that interoperability and interchangeability are applicable 
among the technical staff. 
• Reducing the operation and maintenance costs associated with the add-
ing, to upgrading and expanding of the AS functionality (IED inter-
changeability). 
• Implementing the Vender-Natural tool and based on the full IEC61850 
standard the AS is reliable and independent of the vender and vendors’ 
product lines. 
• Allocating AS engineering tasks between different AS engineers. For in-
stance, the protection engineer is able to focus on the design and imple-
mentation of the protection scheme rather than the underlying communi-
cation infrastructure. 
• Vendor-Natural tool provides full AS interoperability including all the AS 
levels. 
Furthermore, it can be extended to include the entire SAS events (SV, report con-
trol block, etc.), as well as the future extension of the IEC 61850 standard’s func-
tions. 
3.2.6 Practical Example for Utility with Various Manufacturers Nodes 
For the purpose of our discussion, let us consider a large energy company that 
has extensive internal multi-vendor electrical nodes. These nodes are connected 
within an enterprise communications network (for instance, Interconexion Elec-
trica S.A.E.S.P., which is a Colombian energy company). The company’s main 
product is the transmission of electricity. Table 15 describes the various manufac-
turers’ substations in ISA. 
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Table 15. Various substations in ISA (MacDonald etc. 1999). 
Substation Vendor LAN 
San Marcos 230kV Schneider APRILNet 
Primavera 230 kV AEG Modbus Plus 
La Sierra 230 kV AEG Modbus Plus 
Pumio 230 kV Schneider Ethway 
San Marcos 230 
kV 
Automatizacion Avanzada Ethway 
Paez 230 kV Alstom ILSA 
Sabanalarga 
230kV 
Schneider LAN 7000 
Fundacion 230 kV Schneider JBUS 
Cerromatoso 230 
kV 
Schneider Modbus Plus 
Sochagota 230 kV ABB LON 
Guatiguara 230 kV ABB LON 
Chinu 500 kV Siemens SINEC-HI 
La Virginia 230 kV Cegelec CONTRONET 
San Marcos 500 
kV 
Automatizacion Avanzada Ethway 
Controlled from Sabanalarga 
The company has 10 different digital control system (DCS) solutions from six 
different manufacturers and, as realized in MacDonald et al. (1999), “there was a 
need for a change to a standardized design.” Now, let us consider that the com-
pany upgrades its DCS and SAS to the existing IEC 61850 standard and links all 
the electrical nodes to the standard communications system network. Based on 
the above proposed framework, the management (operation and maintenance) 
centre will be filled with dozens of independent proprietary configuration tools 
for each manufacturer’s instruments. Moreover, each manufacturer’s tools and 
instruments will require their own staff, who will need to undergo intensive train-
ing for them. Further, any extensions or changes made in order to provide the 
required functionality impose complications, since they requires specific 
knowledge and details of each different manufacturer’s particular system (tools 
and instruments). Therefore, one consideration can be raised such that the utili-
ties will become dependent upon the manufacturers, since it is impossible to add 
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and integrate IEDs or functions from other manufacturers to the existing system. 
This underlies the manufacturers’ business strategies.  
On the other hand, staff can be knowledgeable; however, such knowledge will 
only be about a subset of any given instruments and tools (of a specific manufac-
turer). Moreover, the staff themselves will be neither interoperable nor inter-
changeable. Therefore, the design, operation and maintenance of a large system 
comprises instruments and tools from different manufacturers (as anticipated for 
large utilities and based on the SG concept) and, given the above-mentioned ex-
ample, may also require a huge staff; fault isolation may require combined ef-
forts, coordinating among multiple proprietary system tools and providing in-
formation based on different proprietary formats. High levels of investment may 
be required given the needs of multiple IEDs and system configuration tools, as 
well as a large stock of different specific spare parts for each manufacturer’s sys-
tem.  
From the earlier discussion, it can be noted that even if a utility has been upgrad-
ed to a standard solution (existing IEC 61850), it will still suffer from high lifecy-
cle costs and investment needs based on the impositions of various manufactur-
ers (staff, training, tools and various instruments and spare parts). As a result of 
the above discussion and given the increased demand to overcome the lack and 
limi-tations of existing (IED, system) configuration tools, a platform for a simple 
net-work vendor-neutral configuration tool had been invented which can be used 
to design and configure different vendors’ instruments and systems. The vendor-
neutral configuration tool provides an answer to a genuine end user need. There-
fore, the vendor-neutral configuration tool is expected to supplant almost every 
vendor-proprietary configuration tool, since it provides several benefits as men-
tioned earlier, 
3.2.7 Conclusion 
The lack of an existing SAS configuration process was studied and analysed based 
on the cumulative experiences that have been gained from the DEMVE I-II pro-
jects, as well as the study of several previous pilots of IEC 61850 multi-vendors 
projects. This section presents a novel approach for a vendor-neutral SAS config-
uration tool. It has the ability to import SCL files from various vendors, IEDs, 
systems and databases, and makes and raises the relay configuration to the sys-
tem level based on the full IEC 61850 standard, including the parameter and fea-
ture setting levels. Moreover, it separates out the SAS configuration tasks among 
different SAS configuration engineers. The vendor-neutral configuration tool 
provides a simple, cost-effective solution for multi-vendor (IEDs, nodes) integra-
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tion. Several benefits overcome the lack and limitations of vendors’ proprietary 
(IED, System) configuration tools, such as the reduction in the number of utiliz-
ing configuration tools, the operation and maintenance costs associated with staff 
training, and the interoperability and interchangeability as applicable among 
technical staff. Further, based on the reduction of operation and maintenance 
costs, the adding to and upgrading and expanding of the AS functionality is ap-
plicable, with the result that IED interchangeability can be achieved. Further, it 
provides AS, which has better reliability and is independent of the vendors’ prod-
uct lines. The vendor-neutral tool separates out the AS engineering tasks. Moreo-
ver, it provides for full AS interoperability, including all the AS levels. 
3.3 Performance Evaluation of IEC 61850-9-2LE 
Process Bus Using OPNET 
In this section from Chapter three, we discuss the modelling concepts of the IED 
using the OPNET modeller simulation tool. Simulation tools offer extensive and 
adaptable environments for the systems under study. Considering the specifica-
tions for modelling, the system simulation also facilitates the performance evalu-
ation of the system under study. The performance evaluation of the various sys-
tem topologies can be handled easily, thereby providing an initial guide to the 
SAS network engineers based on planning and design. Several tests were per-
formed based on the modelled MU and IED which reflect the behaviour of the 
Ethernet switches within the SAS by delivering the SV traffic stream. In addition, 
the SV traffic stream latencies are evaluated to assess the limits and capacity of 
the process bus network’s critical components.  
3.3.1 Introduction 
The growth of IEC 61850-9-2 process bus as high data-rate communications net-
works have increased in number has greatly improved the capability of SASs. IEC 
61850-9-2 provides distributed measurements for monitoring, control and pro-
tection functions. In both industry and academia, engineers have been attempt-
ing to establish and test new approaches, taking advantage of PC-based technolo-
gy to build individual test situations based on modelling and simulating systems’ 
components. However, there are several another feasible system performance 
evaluation methods, such as analysis, mathematical modelling, test-bed emulat-
ing and hybrid simulation. These methods have several advantages and disad-
vantages - for instance, analysis and mathematical modelling can provide rapid 
answers to the problem being studied, but in general many of the cases are inap-
plicable and lack accuracy in terms of the approximation process. Moreover, it 
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cannot reflect the real behaviour of the system, especially when it is related to the 
communications network issues - such as queues and protocols - in which it can 
be decomposed or approximated by reducing the studied model to a typical mod-
el (to re-duce the analytical difficulties). Meanwhile, test-beds involve imple-
menting the studied case on real-world hardware on a much smaller scale which 
may still suffering from other real-world difficulties that may be completely irrel-
evant to the case in question. Moreover, the cost may be significant and unsuita-
ble for analysing a large system (Brand & Wimmer 2008; Sethi & Hanatyshin 
2013).     
Given the above discussion, system simulation provides a way to model a sys-
tem’s behaviour and analyse the interactions between the modelled components 
by using discrete event simulation (DES). DES is considered as the typical meth-
od in large-scale simulation studies, providing modelling and solutions in a more 
accurate and realistic manner, since it reflects the real behaviour of the system 
under study by creating extremely detailed system networks and a packet-by-
packet model of the events taking place within the network under study. As a 
result, this work takes the simulation approach to determine and predict the real 
behaviour of the process bus network by using OPNET, which is more suitable for 
development engineers than end users. OPNET offers an extensive and adaptable 
environment for the systems under study, with a wide range of support for differ-
ent communications technologies and systems, starting from individual LANs to 
global communications system networks (satellite networks).  
3.3.2 The SV Testing Methodology 
According to the process bus simulation process and as the first step, we provide 
for the modelling of the MU, which is an IEC 61850-9-2LE-compliant device that 
publishes digital measuring signals (such as current and voltage) from primary 
SAS components’ current and voltage transformers (CTs and PTs) to the bay con-
trollers and protection IEDs within the SAS. The MU is an interface between the 
existing analogue primary SAS components and the new command, control and 
protection digital IEDs based on the IEC 61850-9-2LE for building the digital 
bays or else a full digital SAS. It also allows for the replacement of expensive cop-
per cables by optical fibres. In the second step, a series of tests for the process bus 
network under different circumstances and based on various scenarios are im-
plemented. These scenarios are used to illustrate and determine the real behav-
iour of the process bus network based on calculating the latencies of the SV pack-
ets’ traffic stream through their transition from publishers to subscribers. The SV 
latencies have been considered as a unique critical characteristic that is a hard 
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real-time requirement and which can be increased and decreased based on 
changing the network topology and traffic in the network under consideration.   
Significant growth within the process bus network based on product development 
and several process bus SASs was commissioned. However, regardless of this 
growth, knowledge about the real behaviour of the process bus network especially 
when there is a large number of traffic resources connected within the same net-
work - is slight. The process bus network analysis is the focus of much research 
by both industry and academia. Several network process bus models have been 
subject to testing; however their hard assumption limits their effectiveness (Ame-
lot et al. 2011). In Sidhu and Yin (2007), they model and simulate distribution 
substation of 69 kV and 220 kV; however, the raw data of the SV traffic charac-
teristics that has been used is not compliant with IEC 61850-9-2LE. In Gurbiel et 
al. (2009), several studies were performed based on a test bench that calculates 
and compares the characteristics of the SV traffic differences between the two 
paths direct from the MU and the source of the digital reference signal. David 
Ingram has done several studies that discuss the process bus’s critical is-sues, 
such as TS, routing and process bus traffic analysis. Most of the work was done 
by using the GTNET card with the SV firmware to generate the MU stream and 
the Endace DAG7.5G4 network card to monitor the traffic. The weak point of 
these works is that they cannot reflect the real behaviour of the system, since they 
generate streaming traffic based on mathematical calculation (the number of 
MUs within the network multiplied by the traffic that each MU can generate eve-
ry second) and then inject the generated traffic into the communications net-
work. Accordingly, the injected traffic calculation of the behaviour of the rest of 
the network’s components was performed (Ingram et al. 2012, 2013).  
The strengths of the present work are that every node in the process bus network 
has been modelled using OPNET, which simulates the real physical SAS compo-
nents. Moreover, the traffic that was generated by every node was compliant with 
the IEC 61850-9-2LE standard, and the interactions between those nodes reflect-
ed the real behaviour of the SAS, since every node was connected to the network 
one-by-one. Furthermore, the interactions between the connected nodes were 
monitored based on the measurement of the end-to-end (ETE) latencies from the 
publisher’s and the subscriber nodes’ points of view. 
3.3.3 The SAS Time Critical Messages Sample Value 
SVs are peer-to-peer messages which are used to deliver measured values from 
the switchyard to bay IEDs in digitized form within the SAS. It is a multicast 
message such that, within the LAN, the measured values at one location can be 
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delivered to any number of subscribers. An individual target may require an indi-
vidual sampling rate, which can be freely selected according to their needs. For 
instance, 80 samples per nominal period for a protection application the sample 
rate of which is 4 kHz/s for 50 Hz frequency in which one set of samples can be 
sent in a single SV packet every 250 µs, and 256 samples per nominal period for a 
metering application in which eight sets of samples can be sent in a single SV 
packet every 78,125 µs. These sample values are located in the application service 
data unit (ASDU), where the application protocol data unit (APDA) may consist 
of one or more ASDUs within the SV packet frame. According to the IEC 61850-
9-2-LE, an ASDU consists of a sequence of bits that may translate to obtain the 
related information, such as the “tag”, “length” and “values” that may represent 
the actual information - for instance, svID, which is a unique SV identity. In addi-
tion, smpCnt is an SV counter that counts from 0-3999 for 4 kHz sample/s, and 
confRve is one the value of which increases each time that the SV parameters are 
reconfigured. A sample synchronization flag (smpSynch) represents the synchro-
nization status of the SV packet frame, while a sequence of data represents the 
actual dataset as illustrated in Figure 74. InnATCTR1.Amp.instmag.i, in Figure 
75, represents the magnitude of the instantaneous measured value of current 
phase one (Gurbiel etc. 2009). 
 
Figure 74. Packet Application Data Unit and Application Service Data Unit. 
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Figure 75. Magnitude and quality of SV of phase A current. 
3.3.4 OPNET Simulation Tool 
In order to build a simulation model that can produce results within an accepta-
ble timeframe, the real-life system network must be simplified. The simplification 
of the real-life system network can be made based on the simulation goals that 
were identified previously. The simulation goals are to examine and predict the 
real behaviour of the system under testing with respect to different parameters, 
such as the mean delay, delay variations, traffic lost, traffic dropped, error, etc. In 
this work, OPNET is used to model the IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus network in 
a simplified way, such that different SAS components are modelled and connect-
ed in several scenarios using the OPNET modelling tools. OPNET provides sever-
al editors that facilitate and simplify modelling tasks. In this section, a descrip-
tion of the most commonly used editors is given as an overview. These editors are 
organized in a hierarchical manner, from down to up, namely a parameter editor, 
a process editor, a node editor and a project editor. The parameter editor (includ-
ing the packet format editor) is always considered as a utility editor rather than 
modelling the domains by which the user could configure the modelled node pa-
rameters and traffic generation parameters, such as the MAC address, the desti-
nation address, the start time, the stop time, the inter-arrival time, the packet 
size, etc. Meanwhile, the OPNET process model editor is used to represent the 
logic flow that reflects the processors’ behaviour, protocols, resources, applica-
tions, algorithms and queues’ modules using a finite state machine (FSM) ap-
proach. The process model consists of a state transition diagram (STD) that is 
expressed in the languages Proto-C (with an extensive library of kernel proce-
dures) and C. The graphical representation of the states and transitions describes 
the process steps. These state transitions accrued according to the stimulus state 
response. In each state, the predefined library (or the more flexible language C) 
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can be used to identify the general logic, even linking to an external program. 
Figure 76 illustrates the process model for the traffic generation source module 
for the MU. 
 
Figure 76. The OPNET process model. 
 
The node editor was considered as a user interface tool in which a user might 
model a physical device and edit the internal structure of that device or node. A 
node model consists of several modules separated by logical functionalities. 
These modules might be connected through a packet stream or else be connected 
with static wires. Each particular node function can be represented by a particu-
lar module in which that module can be used to transmit packets, receive pack-
ets, process data, store data, route packets, etc. Figure 77 illustrates the modelled 
MU IED node model diagram that can be used within the process bus network to 
simulate the SAS. Where the Ethernet MAC node model is provided with OPNET 
nodes, the model library implements CSMA/CD and the retransmission mecha-
nisms specified in the IEEE 802.3 and IEEE 802.3z standards (Lu & Yang 2011). 
Within the Ethernet MAC model, the following features provide for the serializa-
tion of bit transfers to and from the physical layer, namely first input first output 
(FIFO) processing of the transmission request, propagation delay based on the 
distance between the connected nodes, carrier sensing and collision detection 
within the physical layer, and full- and half-duplex transmission. Ethernet MAC 
node models were used within these work process bus network test models. 
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Figure 77. The OPNET node model. 
Within the project editor, the system topology can be specified for the communi-
cations network under consideration as the one that might be used for every si-
mu-lation task. In the project editor, the user can define the position and the in-
tercon-nection of the modelled nodes that the system consists of. The network of 
the modelled system can be complex, since the project editor can support differ-
ent kinds of nodes, such as fixed, mobile and satellite. However, complexity can 
be eliminated by implanting the sub-network approach, which can be arranged in 
a hierarchical manner. In the sub-network’s lower level, this may only consist of 
nodes and communication links. The project editor can group all these sub-
networks where the communications links facilitate communication between 
those sub-networks. Figure 78 illustrates the MU IED nodes in the SAS. 
 
Figure 78. The OPNET project model. 
3.3.5 Modeling and Simulating of the IEC 61850-9-2LE Process Bus 
SAS  
The MU’s reliability and proper functionality plays a major role within the SAS. 
For instance, incorrect measurements, delays and errors may lead to the incor-
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rect resolution of protective and control IEDs, which may cause serious damage. 
Therefore, in this section, the SV traffic stream latency is evaluated. The purpose 
of this evaluation and testing is to assess the limits and capacity of the process 
bus network’s critical components. These components include the communica-
tion links, the Ethernet switch publishing IEDs, and the subscribing IEDs. Vari-
ous SAS circumstances were considered in various scenarios, such as the number 
of SV packets that the traffic stream may pass to reach their destination along 
with the associated latency experience when passing the same number of Ether-
net switches. In addition, it includes the capacity of an individual process bus 
net-work in relation to the number of MUs that might be created and handled.  
In the first scenario, and for the first step, the MU has been modelled as an SV 
messages’ publisher and the receiving IED has been modelled to subscribe to the 
publishing MU’s SV traffic stream, as illustrated in Figure 79. These nodes (the 
MU and the IED) have been used in both scenarios. A number of Ethernet 
switches are connected through the SAS communications network, one-by-one, 
in series between the MU and the receiving IED. The calculation and measure-
ment of the SV packets’ traffic stream ETE latency associated with the addition of 
an Ethernet switch each time that may the SV traffic experienced based on differ-
ent LAN speeds of 10 Mb/s and 100 Mb/s are carried out. It is worth noting that 
all nodes for both scenarios are synchronous based on the assigned simulation 
start time and stop time. 
 
Figure 79. A large SAS consisting of five Ethernet switches. 
MU SV packets are created based on IEC 61850-9-2LE such that the MU can 
send 4,000 packets per second as the sampling period (50 Hz and 80 samples/c) 
and the packet size is 126 bytes plus the header. This SV traffic was created with-
in the custom MU modelled node in which it allows SV traffic key parameters to 
be assigned specifically. Priority tagging has not been considered, since there is 
no other traffic within the simulated process bus network. Moreover, according 
to the modelled Ethernet switch quality of service (QoS) parameters, it has one 
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queue with a packet service rate of 100,000 packets/s. This scenario presents and 
simulates the approach of a large SAS when the SV packets need to pass more 
than one switch to reach their destination.  
3.3.6  Numerical Results and Discussion 
Within the first system project configuration, which consists of a single Ethernet 
switch, the SV traffic stream latency ETE was 245,534,992 µs, whereas in the 
second trial, when adding a second Ethernet switch to the SAS communications 
network, the SV packets’ traffic stream latencies were increased by 110 µs. As a 
result, we recognized that every Ethernet switch added to the SAS communica-
tions network increases the SV traffic stream latencies by an almost-fixed amount 
of latency 110-120 µs. Figure 80 illustrates the latencies for five SAS configura-
tions starting from the latencies of the SV packets’ traffic stream that have passed 
through a single Ethernet switch in the 10 Mb/s LAN to the fifth Ethernet switch-
es.  
 
Figure 80. SV Traffic stream average latencies LAN 10Mb/s. 
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Figure 81. SV Traffic stream average latencies LAN 100Mb/s. 
This result has been considered as significant since the first Ethernet switch ex-
pe-rienced more latencies than the subsequent switches based on its serialized, 
bunched SV packet frames, whereas the subsequent switches experienced less 
latency such that they could be used to connect a large SAS efficiently without 
significantly increasing the overall latency of the SV traffic stream. Therefore, 
according to Figure 80, the latest Ethernet switch increases the SV traffic stream 
latency to 693.8105 µs. Meanwhile, Figure 81 illustrates the latencies for five SAS 
configurations, starting from the latencies of the SV packets’ traffic streams that 
have passed through a single Ethernet switch within the 100 Mb/s LAN to the 
fifth Ethernet switches. The latency that the SV packets’ traffic stream experi-
enced when passing the first switch was 2.6654 µs, whereas every Ethernet 
switch adds an almost fixed amount of latency of 11-13 µs. The latest Ethernet 
switch increases the SV traffic stream latency to 78,274175 µs. 
3.3.7 Modeling and Simulating of the IEC 61850-9-2LE Process Bus 
Increasing the Number of MU within the SAS 
According to the second scenario process, several modelled MUs were connected 
to the process bus network by increasing the number of MUs by one for each tri-
al, as illustrated in Figure 78. The purpose of these tests was to evaluate the limits 
and capacity of the process bus network’s crucial components, such as the com-
munication links and the Ethernet switch. The calculation of the SV packets’ traf-
fic stream ETE latencies associated with adding MUs that may be SV packets are 
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experienced based on different LAN speeds of 10 Mb/s and 100 Mb/s. It is worth 
noting that all the nodes are synchronous based on the assigned simulation start 
time and stop time. In the first step, where the LAN speed is 10 Mb/s, several 
modulated MUs were connected to the process bus network. Each test, the num-
ber of MUs within the process bus network was increased by one and calculations 
for the SV packets’ traffic stream ETE latencies was associated with adding MUs 
that the SV packets may have experienced.  
In the second step, where the LAN speed was 100 Mb/s, the same procedure as 
mentioned above in step one was repeated. Calculations for the SV packets’ traf-
fic stream ETE latencies were associated with adding MUs by which the SV pack-
ets might be experienced. These tests might reflect the real behaviour of the pro-
cess bus network when the SV packets’ traffic stream increases with an in-crease 
in the number of MUs within the SAS communications network. Moreover, it 
shows the capacity of the process bus network based upon the assigned speed of 
the LAN network as well as the process bus tolerance based on the limitation of 
the number of MUs that have to be connected within the individual SAS and 
which can be handled.   
3.3.8 Numerical Results and Discussion 
Under the first configuration, where the LAN speed was 10 Mb/s, the first MU 
was connected in the process bus network. 60,000 SV packets were created based 
on 15 seconds of traffic generation, where the SV packets’ traffic stream latency 
was 250.5581 µs. This SV traffic stream latency is within the acceptable range, 
since the specified requirement latencies in the case of no packet losses was an-
ticipated to be 250 µs. In contrast, by connecting two MUs, the SV traffic stream 
latencies increased linearly to 0.72237s in 15 seconds, as illustrated in Figure 82. 
The theoretical throughput that every MU can create is 4.418 Mb/s with a 50 Hz 
80 sample/c and a 126 bytes frame size plus a header, which may lead the LAN 
communications network to reach its limits.  
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Figure 82. SV Traffic stream average latencies LAN 10Mb/s. 
 
In the second step, with a LAN speed of 100 Mb/s, each MU generates an SV traf-
fic stream of 4,000 packets/s. As a result, 19 MUs generate 1,140,000 packets in 
15 seconds, as illustrated in Figure 83. From Figure 83, the first MU latency was 
26.6613 µs whereas each MU adds an almost-fixed amount of latency to the SV 
traffic stream ≈ 6 µs. Further, the 19 MU increased the SV packets’ latency to 
144,914,583 µs, which is within the acceptable latency range of 250 µs. However, 
based on adding MUs 20-23, the latencies increased significantly, as illustrated 
in Figure 84. Table 16 tabulates the output results values which are not accepta-
ble based on the SV limitation (the SV traffic stream without packet loss is 250 
µs). 
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Figure 83. SV Traffic stream average latencies LAN 100Mb/s 19 MUs. 
 
Figure 84. SV Traffic stream average latencies LAN 100Mb/s 20-23 MUs. 
Table 16. MUs SV traffic stream latencies. 
 MU20 MU21 MU22 MU23 
T(s) 0.0958 0.1960 0.2712 0.3629 
These latencies have been recognized and defined such that they occur upon 
reaching the limits of the LAN speed of 100 Mb/s, whereas the Ethernet switch 
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still operates in a normal manner without dropping packets (23 MUs generate 
184,004 packets within two seconds; the station sink destroys 184.002 packets: 
OPNET statistic), since it can serve SV packets based on a processing rate of 
100,000 packets/s. The Ethernet queue size is 100 packets.    
3.3.9 Conclusion 
In future, mixed buses (process bus, station bus) promise to be seen within SAS 
networks since the process bus shows more reliability and flexibility for high da-
ta-rate network traffic. This can be achieved by utilizing modern technologies and 
network components, such as IEDs, links and Ethernet switches. In this work, 
the modelling of modern IEDs has been discussed in order to build an SAS pro-
cess bus network and evaluate the performance of the simulated network under 
different circumstances using OPNET. OPNET has been proven to be an efficient 
simulation tool for modelling and facilitating crucial performance evaluation is-
sues within SASs. According to the simulation of the process bus network, the 
unique characteristic of the SV networks is that it has hard real-time require-
ments, which were modelled and evaluated in several scenarios. Measurements 
from the modelled IEDs and several process bus network were confirmed such 
that the first Ethernet switch experienced more latency than the subsequent 
switches based on it serializing the bunched SV frames, whereas the subsequent 
switches experienced less latency, such that it can be used to connect a large SAS 
efficiently and without significantly increasing the overall latency of the SV traffic 
stream. Latencies were measured based on connecting several MUs in a process 
bus network to evaluate the limits of the capacity of the process bus network’s 
critical components, such as the communication links and the Ethernet switch 
(which may facilitate design and guide engineers to build the SAS in an efficient 
way). 
3.4 Laboratory Analysis and Methodology for 
Measuring IEC 61850-9-2LE Process Bus Packet 
Stream Latencies 
In this section, we present and discuss a novel approach to estimate the sample 
value SV packets’ stream latency within the process bus network. Moreover, it 
shows the successful implementation of the novel SV packets’ stream latencies 
estimation approach based on designing a practical IEC 61850-9-2LE process 
bus using commercial physical devices to evaluate their performance within the 
de-signed SAS. 
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3.4.1 Introduction 
IEC 61850-9-2 provides distributed measurements for monitoring, control and 
protection functions by using the MU. The MU has the ability to connect the ana-
logue world to the digital world within the SAS by converting the analogue data 
signals that are gathered from the primary instruments’ current and voltage 
trans-formers (CT, VT) into digitalized standard packets for subsequent trans-
mission through the process bus LAN. It can transmit over the point-to-point-
type connection to any IED or else broadcast over the LAN in a similar manner to 
GOOSE messages. According to IEC 61850-9-2, it specifies how SV measure-
ments can be transmitted over the LAN, whereas IEC 61850-9-2LE (Light Edi-
tion) reduces the ambiguity of the first version and facilitates the standard im-
plementation tasks. These improvements had been achieved by assigning the size 
of the datasets that need to be transmitted. Further, the sampling rates have been 
specified. The as-signed dataset consists of measurements for four voltages and 
four currents. These measurements represent the three phases’ lines and a neu-
tral line, as illustrated in Figure 85. 
 
Figure 85. The merging unit concept. 
3.4.2 A Novel Approach to Estimating the SV Traffic Stream Latencies  
The overall estimated SV traffic stream latency comprises three different estimat-
ed latencies, as illustrated in Figure 86. As a result, the estimated SV traffic 
stream latency (TESV) for each packet within the process bus network can be 
estimated as follows; 
(3.4)   𝑀𝐸𝑆𝐸 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷 + 𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝑀𝑃𝑃  
where, TMU is the processing time for the MU to process (sampling, encapsulat-
ing) the data set and transmit the SV Ethernet packet to the various destinations 
within the process bus network. TLAN is the estimated time required for the SV 
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packets to travel from the source to their destinations within the assigned process 
bus network, and TPC is the estimated time required for the received node (PC in 
this work) to process and present the received data. 
 
Figure 86. The SV packets latencies within the process bus network. 
As a result the estimated SV packet latency TELAN for every packet within the as-
signed communication process bus network based on the novel latency estima-
tion approach is such that the SV packet latency can be estimated from each of 
two successively received SV packets, as follows: 
(3.5)   𝑀𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝐸2 − 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝐸1 
where, TESV2 is the second successive received SV packet, and TESV1 is the first 
successive received SV packet. 
Since T2MU1 and T1MU1 and T2PC1 and T1PC1 are expected to be constant based on 
the assumption that the processing time for the same length sequence of data 
within the same processor and within the same environment are expected to be 
constant (Ingram etc. 2013) this supports this assumption. Nowhere, after substi-
tuting Equation (3.4) in Equation (3.5) the estimated latency (TELAN) that is ex-
perienced by each SV packet within the process bus communications network can 
be estimated as follows: 
(3.6)   𝑀𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐿 = 𝑀2𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑀1𝐿𝐿𝐿 
As regards the inter-arrival time between the sequences of successively published 
SV packets (250 µs), it is necessary to considered the calculation of the TELAN. 
This consideration has to be measured in the calculation in case the SV packets 
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stream from one source, such that there is a processing time between every 
gener-ated packet. However, in the case where several SV packet streams are 
generated from one source (as in CMC356 and CMC850) this consideration does 
not need to be measured in the calculation between (SV2-SV1), (SV3-SV2) and 
(SV3-SV1). From the discussion that has been mentioned above, the SV packets’ 
latencies within the assigned process bus communications network have been 
success-fully proven. Moreover, the implementation of the SV novel latencies 
estimation approach has been carried out based upon practical testing experi-
ments in two further scenarios, as now follows.   
3.4.3 Design and Implementation of the Process Bus Network on 
VAMP Merging Unit 
According to the first scenario, the design and implementation of the IEC 6180-
9-2LE process bus network was made within the DEMVE laboratory. The process 
bus network consists of OMICRON CMC356, VAMP MU, CMC850, CMIRIG-B, a 
modern intelligent Ethernet switch, media convertors, cables and a PC, as illus-
trated in Figure 87. VAMP MU was connected to the process bus network as the 
SV packets publisher, OMICRON CMC 356, and based on the Quick CMC module 
within the Test Universe software, it was used to inject the voltages and currents 
to the VAMP MU. The PC was configured to subscribe and analyse the receiving 
SV traffic stream packets using Wireshark to sniff the process bus net-work and 
define the SV packets receiving time. The CMC850 test set was used as the SV 
packets’ streams subscriber and analyser. Based on the subscription task 
CMC850, it has the ability to analyse the SV traffic and define the number of re-
ceived and lost SV packets. Moreover, it has the ability to read the voltage and 
current values that are associated with the SV packet frames based on the meter-
ing and oscilloscope view options. It is worth noting that all nodes are synchro-
nous, based on the assigned pulse per second (PPS) signal that is generated from 
the CMC356 as a reference time based on its internal time-based (CMC) master 
clock. 
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Figure 87. SV process bus design and connection diagram. 
From Figure 87, the PPS signal is generated from CMC356 and connected to the 
CMIRIG-B interface box. CMIRIG-B enables the connection between the CMC 
test set and those devices that have the ability to send or receive the PPS or IRIG-
B protocol signals. Moreover, it performs the level conversion between the CMC 
test set and the sources or receivers. The PPS signals output from the CMIRIG-B 
need to be converted from PNC/FO using a media convertor (an E/O convertor). 
A fibre optic medium has been used to connect the CMIRIG-B PPS port and the 
MU’s PPS port. The MU is synchronized based on the CMC test set master clock. 
Within each PPS signal, the MU sample counter starts from 0 and goes to 3,999, 
which leads to a synchronous SV that is different from the MU and which also 
lets us know the order of sequential samples.   
Testing was performed on a live SAS such that the MU provided the SV packets 
over 1GBASE-FX, which needed to be converted to CAT5e using a media con-
vertor FO/CAT5e (BlackBox). The CMC356 test set was used based on the 
QuickCMC test module to inject the analogue three-phase voltages and currents 
into the VAMP MU. The VAMP MU SV output packets were recorded for four 
seconds, resulting in four arrival measurements.  
These measurements were synchronized within the 1-PPS synchronizing signal. 
The VAMP MU published 4,000 SV packets every second with a packet frame 
length of 144 bytes. The inter-arrival between frames was 250 µs, resulting in 
16,000 SV packet measurements. The SV packets’ arrival measurements were 
recorded using Wireshark, which has the ability to filter the network traffic. As 
such, the SV packets’ traffic stream was captured and exported to MATLAB. 
Within the MATLAB environment, code was written to analyse the recorded 
measurements.  
 
PC
CMC 850
CMC 356
MU
CMIRIG-B
ESW
PNC/FO
FO/CATe
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From Equation (3.6), calculations based on the novel approach to find the esti-
mated latency TELAN were applied to each SV packet within the designed SAS 
process bus network. Figure 88 illustrates the TELAN for the 16,000 MU VAMP SV 
packet frames. Every packet experienced a different latency based on the process 
bus communications network, which is normal since every packet is sent inde-
pendently. These TELAN are within the acceptable range, since the maximum re-
quirement latency was 250 µs. The mean and standard deviation of the TELAN for 
the captured frames were (mean = 2.50033 µs) and (σ = 6.30073*10^-6). More-
over, in Figure 89 the TELAN for the SV-captured frames was filtered based on 
smpCnt = 0-3999 and was averaged to illustrate the behaviour of the SAS process 
bus network, whereby the SV traffic stream latencies were shown every second. 
 
Figure 88. VAMP MU SV packets latency for 16000 packets. 
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Figure 89. VAMP MU SV packets latency filtered and averaged. 
Concerning the second scenario employing OMICRON and CMC356 and based 
on the SV module, the Test Universe software was used as the MU SV publisher. 
The QuickCMC module in the Test Universe software was used to inject the volt-
ages and currents, such that the SV module needs to publish their values within 
the SV packets stream. The PC was configured to subscribe and analyse the re-
ceiving SV packets using Wireshark to sniff the SAS process bus network and 
define the SV packets’ receiving time. CMC850 was used as the SV subscriber and 
analyser, as illustrated in Figure 90. All the nodes were synchronized as in sce-
nario one.  In the case of using the CMC test set as the SV publisher, there is no 
need for the media convertor since the CMC test set provides their SV packets 
over the RJ45 ETH1 or ETH2 ports.   
 
Figure 90. The Test set CMC850 subscriber and SV traffic analyzer. 
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Testing was performed in a live substation and the CMC356 test set was used to 
publish the SV traffic stream. The SV output packets were recorded for eight sec-
onds, resulting in eight arrival measurements. These measurements were syn-
chronized to the 1-PPS synchronizing signal. The CMC356 published 4,000 SV 
packets every second with a packet-frame length of 127 bytes. The inter-arrival 
between frames is 250 µs, resulting in 32,000 SV packet measurements. The SV 
packets’ arrival measurements were recorded using Wireshark, which has the 
ability to filter the network traffic. As regards the SV traffic stream, this was cap-
tured and exported to MATLAB. Within the MATLAB environment, an analysis 
was made and calculations were performed for the recorded measurements to 
find the actual estimated latency of the TELAN experienced by every SV packet 
within the process bus network. Figure 91 illustrates the TELAN for the 32,000 
SV packet frames. Every packet experienced a different latency based on the pro-
cess bus communications network, which is usual since every packet is sent inde-
pendently. These TELAN are within the acceptable range, as mentioned earlier. 
The mean and standard deviation of the TELAN for the captured frames were 
(mean = 2.49700 µs) and (σ = 0.725500*10^(-6)). Moreover, in Figure 92, the 
TELAN for the captured frame was filtered based on smpCnt = 0-3999 and aver-
aged to illustrate the behaviour of the process bus network such that the SV traf-
fic stream latencies were shown every second.  
 
Figure 91. CMC356 SV packets latencies.  
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Figure 92. CMC 356 SV packets filtered and averaged. 
3.4.4 Design and Implementation of the Process Bus Network Based 
on the 
 CMC356, CMC850 and VAMP SVs 
In this section, testing was performed on a live substation, as illustrated in Figure 
87, such that five SV traffic streams were generated from the CMCs test sets and 
the Vamp MU, as follows: three SVs from the CMC850, one SV from CMC356, 
and one from Vamp MU, as before and according to the above-mentioned scenar-
ios. Figure 93 illustrates the TELAN for the SVs’ captured frames and was filtered 
based on smpCnt = 0-3999 and was averaged to illustrate the behaviour of the 
process bus network such that the SV traffic stream latencies were shown every 
second. The mean and standard deviation of the SV traffic stream latencies has 
been tabulated in Table 17. From Table 17, the mean latency that was added by 
each MU is ≈ 9.96 µs, which is almost the same as the result from the simulation 
model (≈ 6-9 µs).  
The small differences that may appear between the two output results values 
were based upon the simulation made in the PC environment, in which that 
means the generated SVs packets even they are from different simulated MUs, 
however,  the processing time to generate these SV packets is the same for every 
MU. In contrast, from a practical experiments point of view, every generated MU 
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SV packet stream was generated from a different source, such that the SV packet 
streams were related to the processing time and were characteristic of each gen-
erated source. Moreover, the standard assigned an SV packet length of 126 bytes 
plus the header; however, the SV packet generated from the CMC instruments 
was 127 bytes in length and the SV packet length that was generated from Vamp 
MU was 144 bytes. These differences in the SV packets’ lengths are strongly relat-
ed to the differences in the SV latency results, since the latencies are directly pro-
portional to the packet length. 
Table 17. The Mean and standard deviation of the SV packet streams. 
 SV1 SV2 SV3 SV4 SV5 
Mean (µs) 229 236 249 256 269 
STD 1.53× 10−6 0.746× 10−6 0.10× 10−6 1.065× 10−6 1.574× 10−6 
 
 
Figure 93. Filtered and averaged SV packets stream latencies.   
3.4.5 Comparative Evaluation of practical and Simulation SV Traffic 
 Streaming Latencies Results within Process Bus Network IEC 
61850-9-2LE 
In this section, comparisons between the output results values of the perfor-
mance testing of the practical (i.e., using commercial physical devices) prototype 
SAS process bus network and the simulated SAS process bus model based on 
OPNET are carried out. These comparisons show that there are small differences 
138      Acta Wasaensia 
 
between the output results values of both experiments, as mentioned above. By 
implement-ing the comparison, two benefits were achieved from the practical 
experiments point of view, thereby proving the correctness of the design and the 
implementa-tion of the IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus as well as the novel time 
analysis of the SV traffic stream latency. From the OPNET simulation models 
point of view, it shows the correctness of the IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus mod-
elling as well as the power of the OPNET simulation tools (which can model a 
high data-rate, real-time system based on the new standard IEC 61850-9-2LE). 
Within the work, cer-tain technical issues are confronted, such as that there are 
not enough SV re-sources to assess the limitations of the process bus network 
based on the number of MUs that can connect within the SAS. In addition, within 
the Wireshark environment, although the recorded traffic can be filtered based 
on the source address and destination address, etc., the calculation (for instance, 
the packet latency based on the previously received packet) is implemented upon 
the all received packets rather than upon the filtered received packets view. 
Therefore, MATLAB code was written to analyse, calculate and draw the SVs’ 
traffic stream latencies. 
3.4.6 Conclusion 
 
In this section, from Chapter 3 , we present a novel approach to estimate the SVs’ 
packets’ stream latencies within the SAS LAN based on IEC 61850-9-2LE by 
means of implementing various simulations and practical laboratory tests. Test-
ing is an important issue for the SAS process bus on IEC 61850-9-2LE in view of 
highlighting the capability of the process bus network and ensuring that the SVs’ 
packets’ latencies are within the acceptable range before the full-scope integra-
tion of the SAS in reaching “plug and play” solutions. During the laboratory test-
ing, advanced hardware and software configuration tools are demonstrated and 
used. The obtained output results values show that the successful implementa-
tion of the novel SV packets’ latencies estimation approach is based on designing 
a practical SAS IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus using commercial physical devices. 
Furthermore, it proves that the SV packet frames are compliant with the IEC 
61850-9-2-LE criteria and that the average SV packet latencies are within an ac-
ceptable range where no loss occurs. Lastly, the comparative evaluation of the 
practical and simulation SVs’ traffic streaming latency output results values was 
carried out. The obtained results show that, by implementing the comparison, 
two benefits are achieved. From the practical experiments point of view, it proves 
the correctness of the design and the implementation of the IEC 61850-9-2LE 
process bus as well as the novel time analysis of the SV packets’ stream latencies. 
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From the OPNET simulation, and from a modelling point of view, it shows the 
correctness of IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus modelling as well as the power of 
the OPNET simulation tools (which can model a high data-rate, real-time system 
based on the new standard IEC 61850-9-2L). Moreover, the work illustrates that 
the latencies of the practical and simulation SVs’ packets’ streaming output re-
sults values are almost the same, as well as explaining the reasons for the small 
differences that may appear between them.  
3.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the design and discussion of various practical testing experiments 
for IEC 61850, GOOSE and SV messages were carried out. Firstly, the analysis 
and methodology for the measurement and calculation of the high-speed GOOSE 
messages’ latencies within the multi-vendor SAS communications network were 
presented. The obtained output results values demonstrated the successful meas-
urement and calculation of the timed response GOOSE messages for the DUTs 
based on the proposed round-trip approach. Furthermore, it showed that the 
DUTs are compliant with the IEC 61850 criteria. Moreover, it proved the interop-
erability concept that the DUTs subscribe to, namely the GOOSE messages from 
the third-party IED. Secondly, a novel approach for the vendor-independent SAS 
configuration tool (which has the ability to import different SCL files) was pro-
posed.  
The vendor-neutral configuration tool provides a simple, cost-effective solution 
for multi-vendor (i.e., IEDs, nodes) integration by which several benefits can be 
achieved, such as a reduction in the number of configuration tools utilized, a re-
duction in the operational and maintenance costs associated with staff training, 
and the implementation of interoperability and interchangeability applicable to 
technical staff, showing that adding, upgrading and expanding SAS functionality 
is applicable, with the result that IED interchangeability can be achieved. Thirdly, 
the modelling of the modern IEDs was presented and discussed so as to build the 
SAS process bus network and evaluate the performance of the simulated network 
under different circumstances using OPNET.  
Lastly, the novel approach to estimate the SVs’ packets’ stream latencies in SAS 
process bus network based upon IEC 61850-9-2LE was proposed. The proposed 
approach was implemented within various practical laboratory tests. Further, the 
comparative evaluation of practical and simulation SV traffic streaming latencies’ 
results values was carried out. The obtained results show that, by implementing 
the comparison, two benefits are achieved. From the practical experiments point 
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of view, it proves the correctness of the design and implementation of the IEC 
61850-9-2LE process bus and the novel time analysis of the SV traffic stream 
latency. From the OPNET simulation modelling point of view, it shows the ap-
propriateness of the IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus modelling. In addition, an 
explanation for the small differences upon the comparative evaluation of the out-
put results values was given.      
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4 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM FOR SMART GRID 
4.1 Spectrum Sensing Techniques for Smart grid 
  Communication System 
In this Chapter, alternative novel framework for the communication system net-
work within the smart grid has been proposed. The novelty of the proposed 
communication model attempts to bring about a reasonable change in smart grid 
communication network infrastructure with the introduction of Cognitive Radio 
(CR) technology. Moreover, the alternative novel framework has many ad-
vantages such as providing a cost-effective solution, increase reliability, availabil-
ity of the smart grid and reducing scarcity of the available resources by imple-
menting of the most powerful sensing method (cyclostationary) within CR in 
which that has been described based on various simulation scenarios.    
4.1.1 Introduction 
The emerging concept of SG sets completely new requirements for the electricity 
distribution and production automation. Distributed production requires dis-
tributed automation, which in turn requires advanced communication solutions 
to operate reliably. On the same time, there is a common global tendency in the 
legislation to tighten the company’s responsibilities in the case of reduce resource 
consumption and emission, while improve power quality. These issues put great 
demands and lead to emerge the new wireless communication technologies with-
in the SG concept to enhance the reliability and flexibility of the energy systems. 
Where, wireless communications based CR not just provides valuable advantages 
over wired, it also enhanced the spectrum utilization.  
There are several reasons that we need to migrate to SG. As existing communica-
tion and information system infrastructure for power grid today, lack coordina-
tion among various operational entities. According to the existing infrastructure, 
various subsystems are separated. Data and information sharing is limited, which 
is usually the case of slow, delayed restoration. In addition, it was highly focused 
on vertical communications between control center and individual substation for 
local remote monitoring and data acquisition (Xie etc. 2002).  
To overcome these drawbacks and improve the energy system service quality, 
emphasis has been placed upon the development of the SG communication sys-
tem network. SG communication system network is consisted from a communi-
cation media and the assigned communication protocols, for instance, standardi-
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zation effort brought by IEC 61850 communication protocols that have a mark 
shift improvement within the interoperability scenario. Communication system 
network within the SG must be robust enough to address the enhancement in 
energy system efficiency as well as reliability and quality of power distribution.  
4.1.2 Cognitive Radio Technology for SG Communication System 
In concern about the limitations of the existing energy systems communication 
technologies, and according to the SG structure where most of distribute automa-
tion system and (DASs) and distributed energy resources (DERs) are scattered 
randomly and located within the rural areas, wireless communications are the 
most feasible solution. Since, most of the available communication technologies 
infrastructures are not existed in these areas. 
Technical issues arise based on implementing of the wireless technologies due to 
the fact that these technologies occupy the same spectrum with the licensed us-
ers. Since the licensed spectrums permit transmission over a higher power and 
cover a wide area which is suitable for rural area requirements (Gungor & Lam-
bert 2006). Therefore, the typical way of utilizing the licensed spectrums is by 
using the CR approach as proposed in this thesis to minimize the cost, overcome 
the restriction of utilizing the licensed spectrum. Moreover, communication sys-
tem network upon CR technology increases the reliability, availability of the pow-
er supply, reduce outages and offering a fast outage detection and restoration 
with the help of bidirectional communication, since DAS networks had almost 
negligible outage detection mechanism. In addition, wireless communication 
technologies contribute in increasing the communication redundancy as using 
these technologies as redundant communication system networks.   
In this chapter, the proposed SG communication system network can be divided 
into two levels higher-level and lower-level. Regardless to the lower-level com-
munication system technologies (wired, wireless). Wireless communication sys-
tem network based on CR technology has been used within the higher level. This 
proposed communication system network provides a full bidirectional communi-
cation system among the smart grid nodes as illustrated in Figure 94.  
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Figure 94. CR in Smart-Grid communication system network 
According to Figure 94 the higher-level communication system enables sharing 
the information among all the smart grid nodes. In case of disturbance or failure 
in one node, immediate actions need to be taken in order to substitute the failure 
node and limit the cascaded phenomenon in which that increase the reliability 
and availability of the power systems and enhanced the quality of service for the 
SG. 
4.1.3 Cognitive Radio Approach  
CR is the novel technology that significantly extends the user support functionali-
ty by makes the software functionality available for various classes of adaptivity. 
It is intelligent as much as it can select the best and lowest-cost service for radio 
transmission. For instance, in case the control center, want to send data to DASs 
and there are several communication system networks available within the SG for 
use upon the redundant communication system network concept, CR automati-
cally selects the reliable and lowest-cost network based on identifying the availa-
ble network characteristics and learning from the previous state. Moreover, it can 
predict about the current transmission status or soon available other resources. 
As a result, CR can be defined as, the smart radio that able to sense the outer en-
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vironment, learn from past events and attempt to specify a smart decision to 
adapt the operation parameters upon the available environment vision (Mek-
kanen 2010). From CR definition, two main features are arisen. These features 
can be illustrated as cognitive capability and reconfigurability in which that simp-
ly implemented in software supported by Software Defined Radio (SDR) devel-
opment. Cognitive capability refers to the ability to continuously sense, extracting 
information from the radio environment to independently specify the occupancy 
of the licensed spectrum by the licensed users, through this process. Reconfigu-
rability, exhibit software control of the radio gives an advantage to an individual 
system to operate over multiple assigned configurations. This functionality offers 
flexibility upon operation over various modulation techniques that meet the best 
user communication demands supported by its hardware design. As regards, the 
fundamental issue of cognitive radio is to get an unutilized spectrum in certain 
time and specific location through cognitive capability and reconfigurability as 
illustrated in Figure 95 and make it available for unlicensed users by two con-
cepts. First, since not all the licensed spectrums are utilized all the time in every 
location CR search for those targets which are referred as spectrum holes or 
white spaces. In case of suddenly licensed user claim the assigned band CR move 
to another spectrum hole if it is possible or searching for other opportunities. 
Second, the cognitive user shares the same spectrum band and adapting the 
transmission parameters in concentrate and to be sure there is no harmful inter-
ference provided to the active licensed users. In general we can capsulate the CR 
primary tasks in the three main tasks as fallows. First task, radio scene analysis 
(RSA), which includes, estimates of interference, detects spectrum holes and pre-
dicts modelling for the state. Second task, channel identification, which enhanced 
spectral utilization and third task, dynamic spectrum management (DSM) and 
transmit power control (TPC).This DSM can be seen when cognitive radio at-
tempts to access the white space or when CR shares the licensed bands with the 
licensed users by adapting its transmission parameters upon the receiver envi-
ronment observation, feedback stimulis. 
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Figure 95. CR concept 
4.1.4 Spectrum Sensing Method 
Manmade signals such as, telemetry, radar, sonar system and communication 
signals exhibit periodicity. Typically, periodicity can be introduced in the signal 
parameters such as phase of the sinusoidal carrier signal, time pulses, or direc-
tion of arriving, kind of modulation and coding, etc. These underlying periodici-
ties can be used to detect and identify the licensed user signals in case of a noisy 
environment and other modulating signals. Therefore, modulating signals are 
characterized as a cyclostationay in condition that the mean and autocorrelation 
are periodic. Since most modulated signals are constructed from information 
data, which is random, time varying stationary process and sinusoidal carrier 
wave that is deterministic and predictable. The final modulated signal is neither 
stationary nor deterministic, it is cyclostationary upon the underling periodicity. 
From the cyclostationary signal processing perspectives, which are characterized 
by mean and autocorrelation function that are periodic in time, the mean and 
autocorrelation are implemented to achieve a spectral correlation function (SCF). 
The SCF of the cyclostationary signals provides a highly rich frequency domain 
that can be used to implement the sensing task, by detecting a unique cyclic fre-
quency of different modulated signals as illustrated in Figure 96. 
 
Figure 96. Cyclostationary signal detection procedure. 
 Power
Frequency
Time
Dynamic Spectrum
Access
Spectrum in use
Spectrum 
holes
 
X(t) SCF 
generation
Unique cyclic 
frequency α searching detection
146      Acta Wasaensia 
 
4.1.5 Simulations of Signals Based Spectrum Sensing 
The distinctive features of the signals can be seen easily in the frequency domain 
rather than the time domain in which that can be used for detecting the presence 
of the licensed user signals. In practice, two methods can be used to accomplish 
this goal. One is called the FFT Accumulation method (FAM), and the other is 
Strip Spectral Correlation Algorithm (SSCA). Both methods shared the same 
characteristic and implemented upon the modifications into the cyclic cross au-
tocorrelation. In this section, we present the experimental result based on im-
plementation of the FAM to the several analog and digital modulated signals, also 
compare the resultant SCD function in which it is obtained as output from those 
methods with the theoretical results. Finally, this work explores the feasibility of 
the sensing method (cyclostationary) based on detecting licensed signals within a 
very low signal to noise ratio (SNR) and background of noise. Firstly, note that, 
the main characteristic of a Wight Gaussian noise (WGN) and interferences have 
no spectral correlation only at cyclic frequency equal to zero (α=0) as illustrated 
in Figure 97. According, to this fact feature detection (cyclostationary) allows 
cognitive radio to detect the licensed signals in case of a noisy environment or 
other modulated signals with a specific modulation variety. Secondly, we consid-
er within the rest of this chapter various modulated signals with a fundamental 
carrier frequency (fc) in Hz. 
 
Figure 97. WGN Spectral correlation density function. 
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4.1.5.1 Pure Sinewave 
Let first consider a pure analog sinewave signal as a carrier with the fundamental 
frequency (fc) in Hz, 
(4.1)   ( ) cos(2 )cp t f tp=  
The spectral correlation density function SCD for the sinewave and from the sig-
nal processing theory is given as, 
(4.2)  
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All details of the mathematical derivations are given in (William 1986). There-
fore, based on the fc= 1000Hz, the sampling frequency fs= 8000 and from Equa-
tion (4.2) in which that leading to the following result, 
(4.3)  
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Based on theoretical result and the above mentioned information, we expect to 
obtain peaks at f=±1000Hz for α=0 and at α=±2000Hz for f=0 in which that 
agree with the achieving experimental results as illustrates in Figures 98, 99. 
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Figure 98. Surface plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for pure sinewave. 
 
Figure 99. Contour plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for pure sinewave. 
In case of adding the WGN to the signal with the SNR (-5), the SCD for the origi-
nal signal did not mask by noise. Most of the noise peaks are replicas of the fun-
damental frequencies as illustrated in Figures 100, 101. 
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Figure 100. Surface plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy sinewave 
 
Figure 101. Contour plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy sinewave. 
In case of increasing the noise gradually and considering the SCD for the tested 
signal  it could be seen that the SCD for the tested signal is not fully masked by 
the noise since the SNR(-25db) as illustrated in Figures 102, 103. 
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Figure 102. Surface plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy sinewave. 
 
Figure 103. Contour plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy sinewave. 
4.1.5.2 Amplitude Modulation Single Side Band (AMSSB) 
Within the second scenario, the SCD function for the Amplitude Modulation Sin-
gle Side Band Signal (AMSSB) has been analyzed. Assume a massage signal as a 
tone for simplicity and to show the exact frequency of the massage fa= 1000Hz 
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such as (a(t)=cos(2*pi*fa*t)) and fc=2000Hz, as a result the signal of the AMSSB 
is x(t)=a(t)p(t) where p(t) is given in Equation (4.1) and the SCD function based 
the analytical derivation results are, 
(4.4) 
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Therefore, according to Equation (4.4) we expect to obtain peaks at f=±1000Hz 
for α=0, and at α=±2000Hz for f=0, in which that agree with the achieving ex-
perimental results as illustrated in Figures 104, 105. 
 
Figure 104. Surface plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for AMSSB. 
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Figure 105. Contour plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for AMSSB. 
In case of adding a (WGN) to the signal with the SNR (-5), the SCD for the origi-
nal signal did not masked by noise, most of the noise peaks are replicas of the 
fundamental frequencies as illustrated in Figures 106, 107. 
 Acta Wasaensia     153 
  
 
Figure 106. Surface plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy AMSSB. 
 
Figure 107. Contour plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy AMSSB. 
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In case of increasing the noise gradually and considering the SCD for the tested 
signal  it could be seen that the SCD for the tested signal is not fully masked by 
the noise since the SNR(-25db) as illustrated in Figures 108, 109. 
 
Figure 108. Surface plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy AMSSB. 
 
Figure 109. Contour plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy AMSSB. 
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4.1.5.3 Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) 
In this subsection, SCD function for a digital signal binary phase shift keying 
(BPSK) has been analyzed. The signal with a PSK is simply a phase modulated 
(PM) carrier such as; 
(4.5)   ( ) cos[2 ( )]ox t f t tp ϕ= +   
Where the phase ϕ(t) is a digital phase amplitude modulation (PAM) signal as; 
(4.6)   
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The SCD function for the BPSK signal based on analytical result is, 
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From Equation (4.7) we expect to obtain four entities of the SCD function forms. 
Four peaks at the points at f= ±fo = ±2000Hz, for α=0 and at the points α= ±2fo 
= ±4000Hz in which that agree with the achieving experimental results as illus-
trated in Figures. 110, 111.  
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Figure 110. Surface plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for BPSK. 
 
Figure 111. Contour plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for BPSK. 
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In case of adding a Wight Gaussian Noise (WGN) to the signal with the SNR (-5), 
the SCD for the original signal did not masked by noise, most of the noise is con-
centrated where alpha equal to zero and replicas of the fundamental frequencies 
as illustrated in Figs. 112, 113. 
 
Figure 112. Surface plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy BPSK. 
 
Figure 113. Contour plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy BPSK. 
158      Acta Wasaensia 
 
In case of increasing the noise gradually and considering the SCD for the signal 
under test, it could be seen that the SCD for the tested signal is not fully masked 
by the noise since the SNR(-25db) as illustrated in Figures 114, 115. 
 
Figure 114. Surface plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy BPSK. 
 
Figure 115. Contour plot of the SCD estimate magnitude for noisy BPSK. 
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4.1.6 Conclusions 
The alternative framework for the communication system network within the SG 
has been proposed. This proposed communication system network model at-
tempts to bring about a reasonable change in SG communication infrastructure 
with the introduction of CR technology. Moreover, it has various advantages such 
as; firstly, offering the cost-effective solution for the communication system with-
in the SG through avoiding the wired applications and reusing the licensed fre-
quency bands that provided more affordable services. Secondly, high reliability, 
availability upon the full bidirectional wireless communication among all nodes 
within the SG that support the decentralized decision approach. Thirdly, it might 
reduce the scarcity within the available resources. Fourthly, introduce the con-
cept of reusing the favorable low licensed frequency bands through utilizing the 
spectrum holes or sharing the available frequency band with the licensed users 
within some restrictions. Lastly, the feasibility of the proposed alternative 
framework for the communication network to detect the licensed spectrum occu-
pancy was examined within various scenarios. These testing show that the license 
user singles can be detected in a noisy environment and even with a very low 
SNR, in which that prove the feasibility of the proposed solution for the SG com-
munication system network as a mean solution for the communication network 
or as a backup for the existing one (redundancy concept).      
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This research work investigated some fundamental questions related to legacy 
power system infrastructures and the IEC 61850 standard’s implementation is-
sues. The existing power system infrastructure does not meet the requirements 
imposed by electrical utility deregulation power generation, transmission and 
distribution or ancillary services, which compromises various parties. Achieving 
the required power system flexibility, reliability and availability will entail the 
merging of new technologies and standards that can handle all the functions 
needed. The continuous development of the technology and standards (such as 
digital communications, microprocessors, IEC 61850, etc.) has a significant im-
pact on the feasibility and usefulness of SAS performances and designs. The new 
IEC 61850 standard for SASs provides tangible benefits in terms of more meas-
ured and calculated real-time information in relation to substation operations. 
This real-time information is available and easily accessed through the IEC 61850 
standard for use by operating, maintenance and engineering in order to trouble-
shoot substation events. However, based on the new SAS design approach and 
the related evaluation studies investigated in this work, several challenges raise. 
SAS communications network bus topologies based on the IEC 61850 BFP func-
tion’s analysis were considered in Chapter 2, part one. This work investigates 
several practical SAS bus topologies from the reliability and availability points of 
view. Reliability and availability were calculated for various SAS bus topologies 
and comparisons were made among the achieved reliability and availability re-
sults values. Redundancy was identified as a key feature to increase the overall 
reliability and availability of an SAS. In part two, the novel RaFSA estimation 
method was introduced. The novel RaFSA estimation method attempts to exam-
ine and predict the actual behaviour pattern of each IED within an SAS. These 
examination and prediction features are provided based on the nature of the pro-
cess that is involved within the RaFSA process being random. RaFSA provides 
specific benefits, such as being easy to carry out within various PC software envi-
ronments, supporting different kinds of probability distribution models and han-
dling large numbers of input data, in addition to other analysis tools and parame-
ters, such as the repairing time, the load flow, reconfiguration, optimization, etc. 
Changing the input data can easily be applied through RaFSA without major 
modifications to the underlying process. 
In Chapter 3, several practical tests were carried out. In part one, the analysis and 
the methodology for measuring and calculation of the GOOSE messaging laten-
cies in the multi-vendor SAS communications network were carried out. Firstly, 
we introduced the round-trip calculation method to calculate the GOOSE mes-
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sag-es’ latency. The achieved results show the successful measurement and calcu-
lation of the GOOSE messages’ latency for the DUTs based on the proposed 
round-trip method. Furthermore, they show that the DUTs are compliant with 
the IEC 61850 criteria and prove the interoperability concept. In part two, a novel 
approach to a vendor-independent SAS configuration tool was presented. This 
approach creates and increases the relay configuration to the system level based 
on the full IEC 61850 standard, including the parameter and feature setting level. 
Several advantages can be noted in its implementation, such as overcoming the 
lack and limitation of vendors’ proprietary (IED, system) configuration tools, the 
reduction of the operation and maintenance costs associated with the number of 
used IEDs and system configuration tools and the amount of staff training. Fur-
ther, interoperability and interchangeability are applicable among the technical 
staff. In addition, it provides for the adding, upgrading and expanding of AS 
functionality, and provides AS that has better reliability and which is independ-
ent of the vendors’ product lines. In part three, modelling of modern IEDs to 
build an SAS process bus network and evaluate the performance of the simulated 
network under different circumstances using OPNET was carried out. The 
achieved results from the modelled SAS process bus indicate that the first Ether-
net switch experienced more latency than the subsequent switches based on its 
serialized, bunched SV frames, whereas the subsequent switches experienced less 
latency. This result facilitates the connection of a large SAS, which might consist 
of more than one Ethernet switch. Further, several MUs within a process bus 
network were connected one-by-one to evaluate the limits and capacity of the 
process bus network. The achieved results show that no more than 19 MUs are 
able to be connected in one 100 Mb/s SAS communications network. In part 
four, a novel approach to estimate the SV packets’ stream latency in a LAN based 
on IEC 61850-9-2LE was presented. The implementation of this approach was 
based on considering the successful reservation of a sequence of an SV packet 
stream. The obtained results demonstrate the successful implementation of the 
novel SV latency estimation approach. Lastly, the comparative evaluation of prac-
tical and simulated SV traffic streaming latency results was carried out. The ob-
tained results show that, by implementing the comparison, two benefits are 
achieved. From the practical experiments point of view, it proves the correctness 
of the design and the implementation of the IEC 61850-9-2LE process bus in 
addition to the novel time analysis of the SV traffic stream’s latency. From the 
OPNET simulation modelling point of view, it shows the correctness of the IEC 
61850-9-2LE process bus modelling, as well as the power of the OPNET simula-
tion tools (which can model a high data-rate, real-time system based on the new 
standard IEC 61850-9-2L).  
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In Chapter 4, the alternative framework for the communications system network 
based upon the SG approach was proposed and analysed. The main feature of the 
proposed communications network model was introduced with the CR technolo-
gy. The CR technology has several advantages, such as offering a cost-effective 
solution to the communications system in an SG, high reliability and availability 
based upon bidirectional wireless communication among all the nodes within the 
SG. It might also reduce the scarcity evident among the available resources and 
introduce the concept of reusing favourable, licensed low-frequency bands. Fur-
ther, the feasibility of the proposed alternative framework for the communica-
tions network in detecting licensed spectrum occupancy was examined, showing 
that the license user’s signals can be detected in a noisy environment, even with a 
very low SNR. These results maintain the spirit of CR by sharing the available 
license spectrum while also offering a cost-effective solution for the SG commu-
nications network as a primary solution to the communications network or else 
as a backup for an existing one. Although this work has investigated several fun-
damental questions relating to legacy power systems and the IEC 61850 stand-
ard’s implementation, there remain certain areas for which future work needs to 
be considered, such as: 
• Several assumptions have been made in this work to simplify the 
calculations, which perhaps should be waived.  
• It may be necessary to consider measuring the latencies for the 
round-trip time of the GOOSE messages based on different bus to-
pologies with more than one Ethernet switch.  
• Similar issues relate to the calculation of accumulation jitter for the 
GOOSE messages where they interfere with traffic propagated with-
in the same SAS communications network. 
• The development and investigation of new (or the enhancement of) 
existing SAS digital automation and protection functions based up-
on IEC 61850 that offer unique characteristics. For instance, the is-
landing detection protection function can be improved significantly 
upon monitoring the CB status, DG status, etc., through the central 
ser-vices manager. This developed function was carried out in a 
sup-plementary work submitted to the pacworld conference (Glas-
gow, UK) and accepted for oral presentation on 29 June-2 July, 
2015. The underlying functional developments were carried out 
based on the MATLAB/Simulink simulation. As a next step, we 
need to imple-ment and test the developed solution on the practical 
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micro-grid (MG) using the commercial ABB COM600 and various 
IEDs.          
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APPENDICES   
Appendix 1  
In this part, we intended to present the simulation scenarios for the evaluation of 
the probability of failure for one protection IED, general bay protection function 
and BFP function upon different SAS communication network bus topologies. 
The same concepts of our observation that had been discussed in Chapter 2 for 
the reliability estimation analysis can be made here for the probability of failure 
estimation. Let’s first consider a single IED. According to the analytical results 
the true value of the probability of failure is (Q(t)=0.0644930149) for single IED 
as illustrated in Table 8. Where, the RaFSA estimation result values for the prob-
ability of failure for single IED are illustrated in Figures 114-118. From Figure 116 
the probability of failure values are significantly random variated about the true 
value when the number of trials was small, ±0.02450 at trial 100. Further, infre-
quently the true value (Q(t)=0.0644930149) occurs in trials (32, 47 and 75). 
Where, the number of instances that the values of the probability of failure were 
greater than the true value was approximately equal to number of instances when 
the probability of failure values were less than the true value. As a result, the 
main of the probability of failure values was 0.06283720836 and the standard 
deviation was 0.06441576092. Lastly, as the number of trials was increased the 
variations of the probability of failure result values were reduced. However, the 
result values of the probability of failure were still remaining variant even at trial 
10000, but the variation was reduced significantly and had a tendency towards 
the true value. A a result, the main was 0.06455271952 and the standard devia-
tion was 0.00710325701 as illustrated in Fig. 118. 
 
Figure 116. Probability of failure for single IED 100 trials. 
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Figure 117. Probability of failure for single IED 1000 trials. 
 
Figure 118. Probability of failure for single IED 10000 trials. 
 
Figure 119. Probability of failure mean for single IED. 
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Figure 120. Probability of failure error bar for single IED. 
Secondly, in case of the probability of failure estimation through RaFSA method 
for general bay protection function, the estimation result values were illustrated 
in Figures 119-123, the true value upon the mathematical calculations for the 
probability of failure result value was (Q(t)=0.045577538). From Figure 121 the 
probability of failure result values were significantly random variated about the 
true value when the number of trials was small, ±0.00057 at trial 100. Further, 
infrequently the true value Q(t)=0.045577538 was occurs in trials  44 and 86. 
Where, the number of instances that the result values for the probability of fail-
ure were greater than the true value is approximately equal to number of instanc-
es when the probability of failure result values were less than the true value. As a 
result, the main of the probability of failure values was 0.04950890549 and the 
standard deviation was 0.05990042920. Lastly, as the number of trials was in-
creased the variations of the probability of failure values were reduced. However, 
the values of the probability of failure were still remaining variant even at trial 
10000, but the variation was reduced significantly and had a tendency towards 
the true value. Therefore, the main was 0.06455271952 and the standard devia-
tion was 0.00710325701 as illustrated in Figure 125. 
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Figure 121. Probability of failure for GBPF 100 trials. 
 
Figure 122. Probability of failure for GBPF 1000 trials. 
 
Figure 123. Probability of failure for GBPF 10000 trials. 
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Figure 124. Probability of failure mean for GBPF function. 
 
Figure 125. Probability of failure error bar for GBPF function. 
Thirdly, we consider the probability of failure estimation for the BFP function for 
the cascaded SAS communication network bus topology through RaFSA estima-
tion method. The estimation result values were illustrated in Figures 126-130. 
The true value upon the mathematical calculations for the probability of failure 
was Q(t)=0.01702797362. From Figure 126 the probability of failure values were 
significantly random variated about the true value when the number of trials was 
small, ±0.020 at trial 100. Further, infrequently the mathematical result true 
value Q(t)=0.01702797362 was occurs in trials (70, 77, 82 and 88). Where, the 
number of instances that the values of the probability of failure were greater than 
the true value is approximately equal to number of instances when the probabil-
ity of failure values were less than the true value. As a result, the main of the 
probability of failure values was 0.16159198450 and the standard deviation was 
0.08025559475. Lastly, as the number of trials was increased the variations of 
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the probability of failure values were reduced. However, the values of the proba-
bility of failure were still remaining variant even at trial 10000, but the variation 
was reduced significantly and had a tendency towards the true value. Therefore 
the main was 0.17034559108 and the standard deviation was 0.01408304809 as 
illustrated in Figure 128. 
 
Figure 126. Probability of failure for BFP for the cascaded SAS 100 trials. 
 
Figure 127. Probability of failure for BFP for the cascaded SAS 1000 trials. 
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Figure 128. Probability of failure for BFP for the cascaded SAS 10000 trials. 
 
Figure 129. Probability of failure mean for BFP for the cascaded SAS. 
 
Figure 130. Probability of failure error bar for BFP for the cascaded SAS. 
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Lastly, in case of the probability of failure estimation through RaFSA method for 
the redundant ring SAS communication network bus topology, the estimation 
result values were illustrated in Figures 131-135, the true value upon the mathe-
matical calculations for the probability of failure result value was 
(Q(t)=0.0978396137). From Figure 131 the probability of failure result values 
were significantly random variated about the true value when the number of tri-
als was small, ±0.0316 at trial 100. Further, infrequently the true value 
Q(t)=0.0978396137 was occurs in trials  72 and 92. Where, the number of in-
stances that the result values for the probability of failure were greater than the 
true value is approximately equal to number of instances when the probability of 
failure result values were less than the true value. As a result, the main of the 
probability of failure values was 0.10016937835 and the standard deviation was 
0.07320785920. Lastly, as the number of trials was increased the variations of 
the probability of failure values were reduced. However, the values of the proba-
bility of failure were still remaining variant even at trial 10000, but the variation 
was reduced significantly and had a tendency towards the true value. Therefore, 
the main was 0.09768267111 and the standard deviation was 0.00937645051 as 
illustrated in Figure 133. 
 
Figure 131. Probability of failure for BFP for the redundant ring SAS 100 trials. 
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Figure 132. Probability of failure for BFP for the redundant ring SAS 1000 tri-
als. 
 
Figure 133. Probability of failure for BFP for redundant ring SAS 10000 trials. 
 
Figure 134. Probability of failure mean for BFP for redundant ring SAS. 
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Figure 135. Probability of failure error bar for BFP for redundant ring SAS. 
From the novel RaFSA probability of failure estimation method, mean and 
standard deviation result values with the probability of failure analytical result 
values for the above various SAS communication network bus topologies were 
illustrated in Table 18.  
Table 18. Probability of failure, analytical result values, means and standard  
deviations for Various SAS bus topologies. 
Single IED trials Mean STD Probability of failure 
analytical result values 
100 0.06283720836 0.06441576092 0.06449301496 
1000 0.06463912439 0.02127783774 0.06449301496 
10000 0.06455271952 0.00710325701 0.06449301496 
GBPF trial    
100 0.04950890549 0.05990042920 0.04559452026 
1000 0.04641035280 0.02554942821 0.04559452026 
10000 0.04553403984 0.00578643601 0.04559452026 
Cascaded trials    
100 0.16159198450 0.08025559475 0.17027973628  
1000 0.16967653843 0.02881141111 0.17027973628 
10000 0.17034559108 0.01408304809 0.17027973628 
Ring trials    
100 0.10016937835 0.07320785920 0.09783961378 
1000 0.09768792123 0.02303774519 0.09783961378 
10000 0.09768267111 0.00937645051 0.09783961378 
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Further, upon our observation about the achieving result values we are able to 
conclude that as follows:      
• Generally, significant variations (errors) of the RaFSA probability of fail-
ure estimation result values about the true value occur when the number 
of trials is small.   
• Infrequently, the true value occurs, in particular, random trials. However, 
for real system this would not be known. 
• The number of instances that the values for the RaFSA probability of fail-
ure estimation result values are greater than the true value is approxi-
mately equal to the number of instances when the probability of failure 
values are less than the true value. Therefore, the main of the probability 
of failure values is approximately equal to the true value.   
• The deviation from the RaFSA probability of failure estimation result val-
ues had been reduced as the number of trials is increased. Moreover, the 
probability of failure estimation values are still variant even after trial 
5000, however the variation is reduced significantly to least value.   
• In each analysis procedure, we need to estimate the probability of failure 
values from several simulations. Each simulation has different output da-
ta (result). However, all simulation results share the same characteristic 
that these results have the tendency toward the true values.    
According to the result values of the probability of failure based on the analytical 
and RaFSA estimation solutions, we observed that the SAS cascaded topology 
provided higher values than the SAS redundant ring topology, since it has non-
redundant Ethernet switches, which constitute the bottleneck of the SAS reliabil-
ity. Furthermore, all Ethernet switches need to work successfully (series) to exe-
cute the SAS (BFP) function. The advantages that can be achieved by SAS cascad-
ed topology is less expensive and simple configuration. Whereas, the redundant 
SAS ring provides the lower values in which that increase the reliability of the 
SAS. This result indicates that introducing redundancy in the Ethernet network 
has a greater impact on improving SAS reliability. However, on the other hand, it 
increases SAS complexity and costs. Therefore, it needs more practical and care-
ful upon its implementation. 
 
